After the Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 2019 (the “Bill“) was passed by both houses of the Indian Parliament, the President of India on 9 August 2019 gave his assent. The new Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 (the “2019 Act“) will amend the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “1996 Act“), implementing the recommendations of the High Level Committee Report issued in 2017 under the chairmanship of Justice BN Srikrishna. The changes proposed in the Bill were previously discussed here.
Tag: Rebecca Warder
The Independent State of Papua New Guinea (“PNG“) has become the 160th state to accede to the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “Convention“).
In P v D  EWHC 1277 (Comm), the English High Court set aside an arbitral award on the basis that the tribunal had reached a finding of fact on a core issue that had not properly been put to a witness in cross-examination and that the tribunal had based its decision on a case not properly argued by the parties. Under s68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (the “Act”), the court has the power to set aside an award on grounds of serious irregularity. It is rare for the court to exercise this power – although that does not deter aggrieved parties from submitting applications to set aside. The judgment gives important guidance on the court’s approach on this important procedural issue, and addresses considerations of fairness to witnesses in cross-examination, and to the parties putting those witnesses forward.
In the recent case of ZCCM Investments Holdings PLC v Kansanshi Holdings PLC & Anor  EWHC 1285 (Comm), the English Court (the Court) rejected a challenge under s.68 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 (the Act) and provided useful guidance on the test for determining whether a tribunal’s decision qualifies as an award for the purpose of a s.68 challenge.
In Gracie and another v Rose  EWHC 1176 (Ch), the English court dismissed a challenge to an arbitration award under s68 of the Arbitration Act 1996.
While the court found that the Arbitrator’s reasoning in relation to certain topics was ambiguous, it held that this was insufficient for a successful s68 challenge. The judgment contains useful guidance on the scope of s68 and its interplay with other provisions of the 1996 Act. In particular, the court emphasised that the applicant had an obligation to first request the arbitrator to correct, supplement or clarify the award under s57 before bringing a challenge in the courts.
The English High Court (the Court) in Eleni Shipping Limited v Transgrain Shipping B.V.  EWHC 910 (Comm) has reviewed an arbitral award, following an appeal on a point of law brought under s69 Arbitration Act 1996 (s69 AA 1996), and determined that the tribunal made an error of law. While the Court ultimately refused to overturn the award, as it upheld the tribunal’s interpretation of the second point of law in question, this case is nevertheless significant as a rare example of the Court ruling that the tribunal had erred under s69.
In The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators v B, C, D  EWHC 460 (Comm), the Commercial Court granted an application made by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (the CIArb) under CPR 5.4C for permission to obtain copies of certain court records, to be produced in disciplinary proceedings against a CIArb member. The Court found that the public interest in ensuring CIArb members meet their professional standards outweighed the confidential nature of the arbitration, and allowed the disclosure of certain documents which were on the court’s records and which had originally been produced during an arbitral hearing.
In late November 2018, the Russian Arbitration Association (“RAA”) published a detailed study on the application of the New York Convention in Russia between 2008 and 2017. The Working Group of the RAA analysed 10 consecutive years of case law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the Russian courts. The study provides valuable statistical data on the success rates of Russian enforcement proceedings under the New York Convention and uncovers interesting trends for those looking to enforce in the jurisdiction.
In a decision of 11 March 2019, the Supreme Court of India (the “Court“) struck down part of an arbitration clause which required a claimant to deposit 10 per cent of the amount claimed with the arbitrator before the arbitration went ahead. The contract was between a government entity and a private party and the Court relied on principles of Indian constitutional and administrative law to hold that the clause was arbitrary and therefore liable to be struck down. The Court also emphasised the need for arbitration to be speedy, effective and inexpensive so that it can “de-clog” the overburdened court system in India. This is an important decision for parties with arbitration agreements with Indian state or state-owned entities, and another encouraging indicator of the pro-arbitration mindset shown by the highest echelons of the Indian judiciary.
In Koshigi Ltd and another company v Donna Union Foundation and another  EWHC 122 (Comm) the English High Court considered an application for costs arising from discontinued proceedings under s.68 Arbitration Act 1996 to challenge two arbitral awards. The claimant in the underlying arbitration had successfully obtained two awards in its favour from the tribunal, which the respondents then sought to challenge in the English courts through two related sets of proceedings for serious irregularity under s.68, alleging bias on the part of the chairman of the tribunal. The respondents then discontinued the s.68 proceedings before they reached a hearing, asserting that the awards which they were seeking to challenge had become unenforceable.
In considering the claimant’s application for costs in relation to the discontinued proceedings, the Court decided that the liability for the costs rested with the applicants (the respondents in the arbitration) and that the costs should be assessed on an indemnity basis rather than the usual – and typically lower – standard basis. The Court’s approach, which disincentivizes the pursuit of s.68 applications without a strong substantive basis, is consistent with other attempts by the English courts to block applicants who bring weak s.68 appeals.