Court of Appeal confirms reflective loss rule will bar claims of former shareholders of a dissolved company because the principle must be determined at time of alleged loss

The Court of Appeal has upheld a decision of the High Court to strike out a claim by the former shareholders of a dissolved company against an investor on the basis that all the losses claimed were barred by the reflective loss principle: Burnford & Ors v Automobile Association Developments Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1943.

As a reminder, the Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 confirmed that the reflective loss principle is a bright line legal rule, which prevents only shareholders from bringing a claim based on any fall in the value of their shares or distributions, which is the consequence of loss sustained by the company, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrongdoer (see our blog post).

In the present case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court that although the company had been dissolved, the claimants’ claim fell within the ambit of the reflective loss principle. The decision puts the time at which the reflective loss rule falls to be assessed beyond doubt: it is the time when the claimant suffered the alleged loss and not at the time proceedings were brought.

This timing point has been the subject of uncertainty following the decision of Flaux LJ (as he then was) in Nectrus Ltd v UCP plc [2021] EWCA Civ 57. Sitting as a single judge of the Court of Appeal, Flaux LJ refused permission to appeal in Nectrus and in doing so held that the claim of an ex-shareholder was not barred by the reflective loss principle, finding that the rule should be assessed when the claim is made. Although the Board of the Privy Council in Primeo Fund v Bank of Bermuda (Cayman) Ltd [2021] UKPC 22 found that Nectrus was wrongly decided, the High Court in the present case considered that it was bound by the decision (albeit distinguishing the present case from Nectrus on the facts). On appeal, the Court of Appeal took the opportunity to set the record straight, confirming that the Privy Council’s decision in Primeo is the correct view.

We consider the decision in more detail below.

Background

The claimants were former shareholders in a company called Motoriety (UK) Ltd (Motoriety), whose business was the exploitation of two software-based products for the motoring industry. In 2015, Motoriety wished to expand its customer base and entered into negotiations with Automobile Association plc (better known as “the AA”), on the basis that the AA could invest in the company. Motoriety and the claimants subsequently entered into an investment agreement with the defendant subsidiary company of the AA. The defendant agreed to subscribe for 50% of the share capital of Motoriety and the defendant had a call option for the remaining 50% of Motoriety for consideration produced by a formula contained in the agreement. On the same day, Motoriety granted the defendant a licence to use its software and associated intellectual property rights. In 2017, Motoriety went into administration and was bought from its administrators by another company in the AA group.

The claimants subsequently brought a claim against the defendant for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation and/or for breach of contract. The claimants alleged that they had entered into the investment agreement and the licence agreement in reliance on false representations by the defendant. The claimants also alleged that the defendant breached implied terms of the investment agreement by pursuing a course of conduct that undermined the basis of the arrangements between the claimants, Motoriety and the defendant. The claimants alleged that this led to Motoriety going into administration. The claimants also pleaded an alternative breach of contract claim that, had it not been for the defendant’s breach of contract, the defendant would have exercised the call option and paid the consideration due.

The claimants sought damages for losses incurred as a result of the fraudulent/negligent misrepresentation and/or breach of contract. On the claimants’ misrepresentation claim, losses were claimed on the basis that, had the alleged misrepresentations not been made, the claimants and Motoriety would not have done the deal with the defendant, but would have entered into a venture with a third party company and the value of the claimants’ shareholdings would have increased accordingly. Similarly, in relation to the original breach of contract claim, the claimants claimed that if the contract had been properly performed, Motoriety would have thrived and the value of the claimants’ shareholdings would have increased. Alternatively, had it not been for the defendant’s breach of contract, the defendant would have exercised its call option, so that the claimants would have been entitled to the consideration provided for by that option. Three of the claimants also claimed for the loss of their initial investments in Motoriety.

The defendant denied the claim and brought an application to strike out the claim or for reverse summary judgment on the basis that all the losses claimed by the claimants were barred by the reflective loss principle.

High Court decision

The High Court found in favour of the defendant and granted its application to strike out the claim. The High Court’s reasoning is discussed in our previous blog post here.

In summary, the High Court found that the claimants’ claims satisfied all of the conditions (set out in Marex) needed for a claim to be barred by the reflective loss rule. The claimants’ alleged losses were entirely derived from the claimed losses of Motoriety and were not separate and distinct losses. If Motoriety was restored to the register, the loss would still be in the company.

The claimants appealed.

Court of Appeal decision

The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision to strike out the claim on the basis that all the losses claimed were barred by the reflective loss principle.

The key issues which may be of interest to financial institutions are set out below.

Grounds of appeal

Two of the claimants’ grounds of appeal related to the applicability of the reflective loss principle. The first ground was that the issue was not suitable for summary determination because it raised fact-sensitive questions and the relevant law is uncertain and developing. The second ground was that the claimants’ claims were not in any event barred by the reflective loss principle.

The “reflective loss” principle

The Court of Appeal drew the following points from its review of the authorities, in particular Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204, Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2000] UKHL 65, Marex, Primeo, Allianz Global Investors GmbH v Barclay Bank plc [2002] EWCA Civ 353, and Nectrus:

  1. The reflective loss principle applies where a shareholder brings a claim “in respect of loss which he has suffered in that capacity, in the form of a diminution in share value or in distributions, which is the consequence of loss sustained by the company, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrongdoer” (Marex at paragraph 79);
  2. A shareholder cannot escape the reflective loss principle merely by showing that he has an independent cause of action against the defendant. He must also have suffered separate and distinct loss, and the law does not regard a reduction in the value of shares or distributions which is a knock-on effect of loss suffered by the company as separate and distinct;
  3. There need be no exact correlation between the shareholder’s loss and the company’s for the reflective loss principle to be applicable. The reflective loss principle can apply “where recovery by the company might not … fully replenish the value of its shares” (see Marex at paragraph 42). Equally, the company’s loss can exceed the fall in the value of its shares;
  4. The reflective loss principle will not be in point if, although the shareholder’s loss is a consequence of loss sustained by the company, the company has no cause of action against the defendant in respect of its loss;
  5. Nor will the “reflective loss” principle apply to a claim which is not brought as a shareholder but rather as, say, a creditor or an employee;
  6. The Court has no discretion in the application of the reflective loss principle, which is a rule of substantive law;
  7. The applicability of the reflective loss principle is to be determined by reference to the circumstances when the shareholder suffered the alleged loss, not those when the claim was issued (as confirmed in Primeo).

Although not emphasised in the judgment, proposition (7) had been the subject of uncertainty following the decision of Flaux LJ (as he then was) in Nectrus. Sitting as a single judge of the Court of Appeal, Flaux LJ refused permission to appeal and in doing so held that the claim of an ex-shareholder was not barred by the reflective loss principle, finding that the rule should be assessed when the claim is made. In Primeo, the Board of the Privy Council found that Nectrus was wrongly decided, confirming that the rule falls to be assessed as at the point in time when a claimant suffers loss and not at the time proceedings are brought (see our blog post).

Notwithstanding the decision in Primeo, the High Court in the present case considered that it was bound by Flaux LJ’s decision in Nectrus, albeit the High Court considered that the present case was distinguishable on the facts from Nectrus. However, in the context of the present appeal, the court said that two further decisions of the Court of Appeal indicated that Primeo was the “correct view”, namely Allianz and a subsequent decision in the Nectrus litigation: UCP plc v Nectrus Limited [2022] EWCA Civ 949 (granting Nectrus’ application to reopen Flaux LJ’s decision and granting Nectrus permission to appeal).

Suitability for summary determination

The Court of Appeal was not persuaded that the reflective loss issue was unsuitable for summary determination on the basis that the law is uncertain and developing.

The Court of Appeal underlined that the reflective loss principle had recently been considered in depth by the Supreme Court in Marex, where its existence and scope were confirmed. Also, while the principle had been the subject of debate in a number of subsequent cases, the points aired in those cases did not give rise to any legal uncertainty relevant to the present case. The Court of Appeal went on to emphasise that it is also not the case that the court should not entertain a strike out or summary judgment application wherever an undecided question can be discerned in the relevant area of law.

The misrepresentation claim

The Court of Appeal found that the misrepresentation claim was wholly barred by the reflective loss principle and the High Court was right to strike it out. The applicability of the principle did not depend on any factual disputes.

The Court of Appeal highlighted that it was evident that if the allegations of misrepresentation were well-founded, Motoriety would itself have (or have had) a cause of action against the defendant in respect of them. There were multiple references in the particulars of claim to Motoriety having relied on all the alleged representations implying that they had been made to it as well as to the claimants. The Court of Appeal also considered that the loss of the claimants’ share value was a knock-on effect of loss suffered by Motoriety for which it would itself have (or have had) a cause of action and hence was not separate and distinct. The Court of Appeal concluded that, as per Marex, the claim is in this respect one relating to loss which the claimants would have suffered as shareholders “in the form of a diminution in share value…which is the consequence of loss sustained by the company, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrongdoer”. It was thus barred by the reflective loss principle.

The breach of contract claim

The Court of Appeal found that the breach of contract claim was also barred in its entirety by the reflective loss principle and the High Court was right to strike it out.

The Court of Appeal said that any good faith obligations would have been owed to Motoriety as well as the claimants. The Court of Appeal could not see that the terms the claimants alleged would have been implied solely in favour of the claimants. If the terms were implied in the investment agreement, they would surely have been implied in favour of all the defendant’s counterparties, including Motoriety, the more so since they related to the conduct of the business which Motoriety was conducting. The Court of Appeal therefore considered that if the claimants had a contractual cause of action in respect of the matters they alleged, so would Motoriety. That being so, the claimants’ claim would be barred by the reflective loss principle unless they were alleging separate and distinct loss.

The Court of Appeal then noted that the loss of the claimants’ share value did not constitute a separate and distinct loss and the position was similar to the corresponding head of claim for misrepresentation. The loss in share value would be reflective of loss sustained by Motoriety in respect of which it would itself have (or have had) a cause of action against the defendant.

The Court of Appeal also considered that the reflective loss principle applied to the loss of the consideration from the call option the claimants claimed the defendant would have exercised. This loss related to what the claimants’ shares would have fetched if sold to the defendant following its exercise of the call option. The claimants’ allegation was that the defendant’s alleged breaches of contract meant that the claimants would not be paid anything for their shares and that reflected the fact that the breaches had brought about Motoriety’s failure such that there was no longer any prospect of either earnings or distributions. The loss claimed represented one way of measuring loss of share value. If the claimants’ case was correct, breaches of contract by the defendant caused Motoriety to fail and, in consequence, rendered the claimants’ shares worthless, both in the sense that they lost any value in the general market and in the sense that there was no longer any prospect of selling them to the defendant pursuant to the option. The Court of Appeal concluded that the claimants were therefore claiming in respect of loss “in the form of diminution in share value…which is the consequence of loss sustained by [Motoriety], in respect of which the company has [(or had]] a cause of action against [AAD]”. Further, there may or not be a precise correlation between the claimants’ loss and Motoriety’s, but no such correlation was required for the reflective loss principle to apply.

Accordingly, for all the reasons above, the Court of Appeal found in favour of the defendant and dismissed the claimants’ appeal.

Julian Copeman
Julian Copeman
Partner
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Ceri Morgan
Ceri Morgan
Professional Support Consultant
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Nihar Lovell
Nihar Lovell
Professional Support Lawyer
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Claire Nicholas
Claire Nicholas
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ESG Updates – The Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario

The Bank of England (BoE) has published the results of the Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario (CBES), which explores the financial risks posed by climate change for the largest banks and insurers operating in the UK. In line with the findings of other central bank stress tests across the globe, the CBES found that while the financial system might be adequately capitalised to absorb the shocks of climate change scenarios, the sector would suffer losses across each scenario, with the greatest quantifiable losses suffered in a No Action and Late Action scenario. This reaffirms the BoE’s drive to an early and orderly transition to a net-zero economy.

  • In June 2021 the BoE launched the CBES, seeking to explore and better understand the financial risks posed by climate change to the UK financial system, and to ensure that real change is effected to help with systemic resilience.
  • Following the submission of participants’ initial responses in October 2021, we looked at the CBES in the context of other central bank initiatives and stress tests across the globe, to understand the scope of the CBES as part of our November 2021 Global Banking Review, which focussed heavily on the issues facing financial institutions in connection with Climate Change.
  • Just over six months later the BoE has published the results of the CBES, and we consider here what it has learnt, where will the focus fall, and what will come next?

Summary of key findings – Banks

The climate risks captured in the CBES scenarios are likely to create a drag on the profitability of both UK banks and insurers. Loss projections varied across participating firms and the three different climate scenarios but equated to an annual drag on profits of around 10-15% on average. Projections suggested (unsurprisingly) that the overall costs will be lowest in scenarios with early, well-managed actions to transition to a net-zero economy.

However, the CBES found that there was substantial uncertainty as to the magnitude of climate risks. The figures identified in the BoE report were heavily caveated to allow for various acknowledged limitations, with this, its first CBES, including:

  • The banks’ projections were focused on credit risk, and did not yet fully take into account possible impacts resulting from market risk;
  • The data used to populate responses from firms was incomplete and inconsistent in its approach – for example, loss estimates on the same corporate customers differed substantially in participating firms’ responses;
  • The ‘No Action’ scenario would likely incur losses past the time horizon selected for the CBES projections, and as such projections for this scenario were likely partial; and
  • The BoE acknowledged the limitations of the fixed balance sheet approach adopted for the CBES.

Despite these, and other limitations, the CBES included a number of interesting observations for market participants:

Quantitative findings – calculating the risk

  • Projected climate risk impacts were highest for banks’ wholesale and mortgage exposures, and projected climate-related consumer credit losses were relatively low.
  • Institutions which relied upon third-party modelling and data without sufficient internal capability to challenge and scrutinise often gave rise to materially lower loss projections than those institutions which had invested in and developed their own internal models. The development of internal models was more established in the insurance than the banking sector.
  • Limitations caused by data gaps and inconsistent data provision from third parties such as clients and counterparties were again noted. In particular, the lack of available data regarding corporates’ current value chain emissions and future transition plans was a common issue affecting firms. The BoE also recommends that banks act to encourage remediation of data limitations and gaps to help firms meet the PRA’s supervisory expectations, as set out in SS3/19. Firms’ efforts in this area will be supported by initiatives currently in train to resolve some of these data gaps.

Qualitative findings – planning ahead

  • Responses to the qualitative secondary part of the CBES, which focused on transition planning, suggested that some banks, in particular, were not considering their transition plans holistically: they were failing to take into account the likelihood of similar management actions from competitors or adjusting for different macro scenarios.
  • Transition plans suggest that banks intend to divest from energy-intensive sectors. The BoE sounded a note of caution in relation to these suggestions and to the idea that capital requirements could be used to target investment towards “green” sectors and away from energy-intensive sectors. The BoE noted the systemic risk inherent in depriving energy-intensive sectors from the funding they would need to transition towards net-zero, and also the economic repercussions of mass divestment from providing finance to carbon-intensive sectors ahead of the expansion of renewable energy supply.
  • Capital adequacy remains at the forefront of the BoE’s mind, but in the context of developing (along with other central banks) Solvency II to better accommodate the nuances of climate change risk, rather than using the BoE’s prudential regulation as a pseudo-governmental arm seeking to drive policy change.
  • While participating firms were making good progress in some aspects of climate risk management, they all had more work to do to improve their climate risk management capabilities.

Climate Litigation Risk 

As part of the CBES, the BoE engaged with members of the London Insurance Market to understand the extent to which existing policies would cover climate-related litigation. Following the trend of increasing climate-related litigation (particularly in the United States, which is ahead of many European jurisdictions in this regard), the BoE wanted to look at the impact of this development in the contentious landscape. The BoE identified seven ‘types’ of climate-related litigation, these are set out in full below:

  • Direct causal contribution: a corporate is found liable for its representative contribution to manmade climate change.
  • Violation of fundamental rights resulting in cessation or reduction of operations: a corporate is prevented from practising carbon-intensive activities that violate fundamental human and dignity rights, this has a significant impact on financial revenues.
  • Greenwashing: a corporate is found to be misleading customers (e.g. false advertising, mislabelling as ‘environmentally friendly’, underreporting disclosures) and must pay out compensation to customers/investors.
  • Misreading the transition: a corporate is sued on the basis that it continued to sell a carbon-intensive product while in knowledge it would become redundant due to government net-zero policy, they must refund and compensate customers.
  • Indirect casual contribution (related to exposure to Utilities sector only): utilities are sued for their indirect contribution to climate change which amplifies physical risks due to inadequate or negligent preparation.
  • Directors’ breach of fiduciary duties (related to cover against asset managers only): investors of an asset manager allege that the entity’s directors have understated the physical and/or transition risk to their assets in their disclosures. Investors seek payment for damages from the directors’ breach of fiduciary duty.
  • Indirect causal contribution (financing): a case is brought against financiers of carbon-intensive activities, as they have contributed indirectly to manmade climate change through financing activities of carbon majors.

                                                  Taken from Table 1 of Box C of the CBES Results

Following engagement with members of the insurance market, the BoE identified that (in aggregate) just under half of the D&O insurance policies currently in place would cover these types of litigation risk; while approximately a quarter of the professional indemnity policies would cover climate related litigation. The respondents noted that this figure may not reflect coverage of the defendant’s own legal costs, which could often be high, particularly where the claims were investor-led.

While the focus of these questions was on the impact to the insurance industry of the developing trend, the analysis should focus the minds of banks and asset managers: have they sufficiently considered their litigation risk? Have they considered whether their policy coverage is adequate? As we move forward, have they budgeted for the increasing cost of Profin and D&O insurance which may arise from developing trends in this area?

What next

  • The BoE’s work on climate scenario analysis, including that done as part of the CBES, provides a key tool supporting firms and policymakers as they navigate uncertainty over future climate policy and climate change, enabling assessment against a range of possible outcomes.
  • As set out in the PRA’s October 2021 Climate Change Adaptation Report, the PRA and the BoE are undertaking further analysis to determine whether changes need to be made to the design, use, or calibration of the regulatory capital frameworks.
  • To support this work on the capital framework, the BoE will host a research conference on the interaction between climate change and capital in Q4 2022, and has already put out a ‘Call for Papers’. The BoE will publish follow-up material on the use of capital, including on the role of any future scenario exercises, informed by the conference and the findings of the CBES.
  • While no future CBES has been announced, it is clear that more work is needed before the BoE and market participants understand the stress that they may soon be under as a result of climate risks.
Simon Clarke
Simon Clarke
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Sousan Gorji
Sousan Gorji
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Eleanor Dole Sheaf
Eleanor Dole Sheaf
Associate
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How to navigate the Autonomy judgment: guidance for corporate issuers defending Section 90A / Schedule 10A FSMA shareholder claims

The High Court has handed down its long-awaited judgment in the US$5 billion civil fraud action brought by the Hewlett Packard group in connection with its acquisition of the UK software company Autonomy Corporation Limited in 2012: ACL Netherlands BV & Ors v Lynch & Ors [2022] EWHC 1178 (Ch).

The judgment follows a previously published Summary of Conclusions, in which the High Court confirmed that the claimants “substantially succeeded” in their claims against two former Autonomy executives (see this post on our Civil Fraud and Asset Tracing Notes blog, which sets out the background facts to the dispute and summarises the outcome).

The successful claims were brought under s.90A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), common law misrepresentation and deceit, and the Misrepresentation Act 1967, as well as claims for breach of the defendants’ management duties.

The 1657-page judgment is significant, not only because the case is one of the longest and most complex in English legal history, but also because it is the first s.90A FSMA case to come to trial in this jurisdiction.

As a reminder, s.90A (and its successor, Schedule 10A FSMA) is the statutory regime imposing civil liability for inaccurate statements in information disclosed by listed issuers to the market. It imposes liability on the issuers of securities for misleading statements or omissions in certain publications, but only in circumstances where a person discharging managerial responsibilities at the issuer (a PDMR) knew that, or was reckless as to whether, the statement was untrue or misleading, or knew the omission to be a dishonest concealment of a material fact. The issuer is liable to pay compensation to anyone who has acquired securities in reliance on the information contained in the publication, for any losses suffered as a result of the untrue or misleading statement or omission, but only where the reliance was reasonable.

In recent years, there has been a noticeable uptick in securities litigation in the UK, in particular in claims brought under s.90A/Sch 10A FSMA. The purpose of this blog post is to distil the key legal takeaways on s.90A FSMA arising from the judgment, which may be relevant to such claims.

Scope of s.90A / Sch 10A FSMA

The court accepted the defendants’ “general admonition” that the court should not interpret and apply s.90A/Sch 10A FSMA in a way which exposes public companies and their shareholders to unreasonably wide liability.

It emphasised that, in considering the scope of these provisions (and in particular in considering the nature of reliance which must be shown and the measure of damages), the history of the s.90A regime is relevant. The court highlighted the following background to the provisions of FSMA, in particular:

  • Prior to s.90A, English law did not provide any remedy (statutory or under the common law) for investors acquiring shares on the basis of inaccuracies in a company’s financial statements (in contrast to the long-established statutory scheme of liability for misstatements contained in prospectuses). The rationale for the different treatment of liability for misstatements in prospectuses and those in other disclosures was because an untrue statement in a prospectus can lead to payments being made to the company on a false basis, but the same cannot be said of an untrue statement contained in an annual report, for example.
  • The ultimate catalyst for the introduction of a scheme of liability was the Transparency Directive (Council Directive 2004/1209/EC), which included enhanced disclosure obligations and the requirement for a disclosure statement. This gave rise to concerns that the English law’s restrictive approach to issuer liability would be disturbed and that issuers (and directors and auditors) might be made liable for merely negligent errors contained in narrative reports or financial statements.
  • The regime for issuer liability was introduced in this jurisdiction in a piecemeal fashion, recognising the historical tendency against liability. The government was aware that the scheme would involve a balance between: (a) the desire to encourage proper disclosure and affording recourse to a defrauded investor in its absence; and (b) the need to protect existing and longer-term investors who, subject to any claim against relevant directors (who may not be good for the money), may indirectly bear the brunt of any award against the issuer.
  • The original s.90A provisions introduced by the government were subsequently extended with effect from 1 October 2010 as follows: (a) to issuers with securities admitted to trading on a greater variety of trading facilities; (b) to relevant information disclosed by an issuer through a UK recognised information service; (c) to permit sellers, as well as buyers, of securities to recover losses incurred through reliance on fraudulent misstatements or omissions; and (d) to permit recovery for losses resulting from dishonest delay in disclosure. However, liability continued to be based on fraud and no change was suggested or made to the limitations that: (i) liability is restricted to issuers; and (ii) liability can only be established through imputation of knowledge or recklessness on the part of PDMRs of the issuer. Further, no specific provisions to determine the basis for the assessment of damages were introduced.

Two-stage test for liability under s.90A /Sch 10A FSMA

The court confirmed that the provisions of s.90A / Sch 10A FSMA make clear that there is an objective and a subjective test, both of which must be satisfied to establish liability:

  • Objective test: the relevant information must be demonstrated to be “untrue or misleading” or the omissions a matter “required to be included”.
  • Subjective test: a PDMR must know that the statement was untrue or misleading, or know such omission to be a “dishonest concealment of a material fact” (referred to in the judgment as “guilty knowledge”).

Each of these tests is considered separately below.

The objective test (untrue or misleading statement or omission)

The court said that the objective meaning of the impugned statement, is “the meaning which would be ascribed to it by the intended readership, having regard to the circumstances at that time”, endorsing the guidance provided in Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] EWHC 1392 (Comm).

The court gave some further guidance as to how to establish the objective meaning of a statement for the purpose of a s.90A/Sch 10A FSMA claim, including the following:

  • The content of the published information covered by s.90A/Sch 10A will often be governed by certain accounting standards, provisions and rules, which involve the exercise of accounting judgement where there may be a range of permissible views. The court confirmed that a statement is not to be regarded as false or misleading where it can be justified by reference to that range of views.
  • Where the meaning of a statement is open to two or more legitimate interpretations, it is not the function of the court to determine the more likely meaning. Unless it is shown that the ambiguity was artful or contrived by the defendant, the claim may not satisfy the objective test.
  • The claimant must prove that they understood the statement in the sense ascribed to it by the court.

The subjective test (guilty knowledge)

As in the common law of deceit, it must be proven that a PDMR “knew the statement to be untrue or misleading or was reckless as to whether it was untrue or misleading”; or alternatively, that they knew that the omission of matters required to be included was the dishonest concealment of a material fact. The court noted that for both s.90A and Sch 10A, the language used shows that there is a requirement for actual knowledge.

The court clarified several key legal questions as to what will amount to “guilty knowledge” for the purpose of the subjective test, including the following:

  • Timing of knowledge. In the context of an allegedly untrue/misleading statement, a party will be liable only if the facts rendering the statement untrue were present in the mind of the PDMR at the moment the statement was made. In the case of an omission, the PDMR must have applied their mind to the omission at the time the information was published and appreciated that a material fact was being concealed (i.e. that it was required to be included, but was being deliberately left out).
  • Recklessness. In the context of s.90A/Sch 10A FSMA, recklessness bears the meaning laid down in Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337, i.e. not caring about the truth of the statement, such as to lack an honest belief in its truth.
  • Dishonesty
    • Even on the civil burden of proof, there is a general presumption of innocent incompetence over dishonest design and fraud, and the more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence required to prove dishonesty.
    • For deliberate concealment by omission, dishonesty has a special definition under Sch 10A (although s.90A contained no such special definition), which represents a statutory codification of the common law test for dishonesty laid down in R v Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053 (although in a common law context, that test has been revised by Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2018] AC 391). Under the Sch 10A definition, a person’s conduct is regarded as dishonest only if:

“(a) it is regarded as dishonest by persons who regularly trade on the securities market in question, and (b) the person was aware (or must be taken to have been aware) that it was so regarded.”

    • Any advice given to the company and its directors from professionals will be relevant to the question of dishonesty (see below).
  • Impact of advice given by professionals on the subjective test
    • The court emphasised that, where a PDMR receives guidance from the company’s auditors that a certain fact does not need to be included in the company’s published information, then the omission of that fact on the basis of the advice is unlikely to amount to a dishonest concealment of a material fact (even if the disclosure was in fact required).
    • Similarly, where a PDMR has been advised by auditors that a particular statement included in the accounts was a fair description (as required by the relevant accountancy standards), it may be unlikely that the PDMR had knowledge that the statement was untrue/misleading or was reckless as to its truth (unless the auditor was misled).
    • However, in the court’s view, directors are likely to be (and should be) in a better position than an auditor to assess the likely impact on their shareholders of what is reported, and (for example) to assess what shareholders will make of possibly ambiguous statements. Accordingly, the court said “on matters within the directors’ proper province, the view of the company’s auditors cannot be regarded as a litmus test nor a ‘safe harbour’: auditors may prompt but they cannot keep the directors’ conscience”.
    • Accordingly, narrative “front-end” reports and presentations of business activities cannot be delegated by directors, as their purpose/objective is to reflect the directors’ (not the auditors’) view of the business and require directors to provide an accurate account according to their own conscience and understanding.
  • Subjective test to be applied in respect of each false statement. The court confirmed that liability is only engaged in respect of statements known to be untrue. If a company’s annual report contains ten misstatements, each of them relied on by a person acquiring the company, but it can only be shown that a PDMR knew about one of those misstatements, the company will only be liable in respect of that one, not the other nine.

Reliance

Reasonable reliance is another necessary precondition to liability under s.90A and Sch 10A, although the precise requirements of reliance are not defined in those provisions. In the Autonomy judgment, the court considered the question of reliance in further detail, providing the following guidance:

  • Reliance by whom? The court held that reliance must be by the person acquiring the securities, and not by some other person.
  • Individual statements vs published information. The court held that reliance must be upon a statement or omission, rather than, in some generalised sense, on a piece of published information (e.g. the annual report for a given year).
  • Express statements vs impression. The court suggested that statements and omissions may in combination create an impression which no single one imparts and, if that impression is false, that may found a claim (subject to the “awareness” requirement below).
  • Awareness requirement. The court held that, in order to demonstrate reliance upon a statement or omission, a claimant will have to demonstrate that they were consciously aware of the statement or omission in question, and that it induced them to enter into the transaction. The requirement for reliance upon a piece of information will not be satisfied if the claimant cannot demonstrate that they reviewed or considered the information: “it cannot have been intended to give an acquirer of shares a cause of action based on a misstatement that he never even looked at, merely because it is contained, for example, in an annual report, some other part of which he relied on”. Further, the relevant statement “must have been present to the claimant’s mind at the time he took the action on which he bases his claim”, i.e. made his investment decision.
  • Standard of reliance. The court held that a claimant must show that the fraudulent representation had an “impact on their mind” or an “influence on their judgement” in relation to the investment decision.
  • Presumption of inducement. The court held that the so-called “presumption of inducement” applies in the context of a FSMA claim to the same extent as it does in other cases of deceit. This is a presumption that the claimant was induced by a fraudulent misrepresentation to act in a certain way, which will assist the claimant when proving reliance. The presumption is an inference of fact which is rebuttable on the facts. In addition, for the purposes of s.90A and Sch 10A, any reliance must be “reasonable”, and that reasonableness requirement mitigates the effect of the presumption by introducing an additional test for the claimant to satisfy. The court also made clear that the presumption of inducement is subject to the “awareness” requirement above, i.e. the presumption of inducement will not arise if the claimant was not consciously aware of the representation.
  • When is reliance reasonable? The court held that “the test of reasonableness is not further defined, but is plainly to be applied by reference to the conditions at the time when the representee claimant relied on it. Circumstances, caveats or conditions which qualify the apparent reliability of the statement relied on by the claimant are all to be taken into account. The question of when reliance is reasonable is fact-sensitive.”

Loss in the context of FSMA claims

The court expressed its provisional view on some “novel and difficult issues” in the context of loss. In particular, it said that it is for the court to decide, and not for the defrauded party to make an election, as to whether “inflation” damages (i.e. if the truth had been known the claimant would have acquired the shares at a lower price) or “no transaction” damages (i.e. if the truth had been known, the claimant would not have purchased the shares in question) are available. The court will return to this question when addressing issues of quantum (the present judgment considered liability only).

Future use of s.90A / Sch 10A claims in M&A disputes

In the present case, the alleged liability of Autonomy under s.90A/Sch 10A was used as a stepping-stone to a claim against the defendants. This was described by the court as a “dog leg claim” because Autonomy (now under the control of HP) accepted full liability to its shareholder, and Autonomy sought to recover in turn from the defendants as PDMRs of Autonomy at the relevant time. The court said that there was no conceptual impediment to this, but that it was right to bear in mind that in interpreting the provisions and conditions of liability, the relevant question was whether the issuer itself should be liable.

This may open the door for future M&A disputes to be brought by way of a s.90A FSMA claim by disgruntled purchasers against the target company in order – ultimately – to pursue a claim against former directors of the target company (i.e. the vendors), based on breach of their duties owed to the target company.

Simon Clarke
Simon Clarke
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Ceri Morgan
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Rupert Lewis
Rupert Lewis
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Chris Bushell
Chris Bushell
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High Court strikes out shareholders’ claim barred by the reflective loss rule

The High Court has struck out a claim by the former shareholders of a dissolved company against an investor on the basis that all the losses claimed were barred by the reflective loss principle: Burnford & Ors v Automobile Association Developments Ltd [2022] EWHC 368 (Ch).

As a reminder, the Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 confirmed (by a 4-3 majority) that the reflective loss principle is a bright line legal rule, which prevents only shareholders from bringing a claim based on any fall in the value of their shares or distributions, which is the consequence of loss sustained by the company, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrongdoer (see our blog post).

Although the company in the present case had been dissolved, the High Court found that the claimants’ claim fell within the ambit of the reflective loss principle.

The decision is of interest because of the High Court’s consideration of the question as to the time at which the reflective loss rule falls to be assessed. In Nectrus Ltd v UCP plc [2021] EWCA Civ 57, Flaux LJ (as he then was) sitting as a single judge of the Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal and in doing so held that the claim of an ex-shareholder was not barred by the reflective loss principle, finding that the rule should be assessed at the time the claim is made. However, in Primeo Fund v Bank of Bermuda (Cayman) Ltd [2021] UKPC 22 the Board of the Privy Council (comprising five of the seven judges who had heard the Supreme Court appeal in Marex) concluded that Nectrus was wrongly decided. The Board confirmed that the rule falls to be assessed as at the point in time when a claimant suffers loss and not at the time proceedings are brought (see our blog post).

Notwithstanding the ruling of the Board of the Privy Council in Primeo, the High Court in the present case considered that it was bound by the decision in Nectrus, even though Flaux LJ’s decision in Nectrus was made as a single member of the Court of Appeal on an application for permission to appeal, and would therefore not normally have any precedent value.

In spite of this, the High Court then concluded that the present case was distinguishable on its facts from Nectrus and did, therefore, follow the Board of the Privy Council’s decision in Primeo. As such, even though the company in the present case was dissolved, the claimants’ claims were barred because their losses were suffered in the capacity of shareholders, in the form of a diminution in the value of their shareholdings, which was the consequence of loss sustained by the company in respect of which the company had a cause of action against the same wrongdoer.

This case suggests a judicial reluctance to follow Nectrus, which is not surprising given its uncertain precedent value and the Privy Council’s comments in Primeo. This may lead to further attempts to distinguish Nectrus in future cases, until the Court of Appeal has the opportunity to reconsider the issue properly.

We consider the decision in more detail below.

Background

The claimants were former shareholders in a company called Motoriety (UK) Ltd (Motoriety), whose business was the exploitation of two software-based products for the motoring industry. In 2015, Motoriety wished to expand its customer base and entered into negotiations with Automobile Association plc (better known as “the AA”), on the basis that the AA could invest in the company. Motoriety and the claimants subsequently entered into an investment agreement with the defendant subsidiary company of the AA. The defendant agreed to subscribe for 50% of the share capital of Motoriety and the defendant had a call option for the remaining 50%, for consideration produced by a formula contained in the agreement. On the same day, Motoriety granted the defendant a licence to use its software and associated intellectual property rights. In 2017, Motoriety went into administration and was bought from its administrators by another company in the AA group.

The claimants subsequently brought a claim against the defendant for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation and/or for breach of contract. The claimants alleged that they had entered into the investment agreement and the licence agreement in reliance on false representations by the defendant. The claimants also alleged that the defendant breached implied terms of the investment agreement by pursuing a course of conduct that undermined the basis of the arrangements between the claimants, Motoriety and the defendant. The claimants alleged that this led to Motoriety going into administration. The claimants also pleaded an alternative breach of contract claim that, had it not been for the defendant’s breach of contract, the defendant would have exercised the call option and paid the consideration due.

The claimants sought damages for losses incurred as a result of the fraudulent/negligent misrepresentation and/or breach of contract. On the claimants’ misrepresentation claim, losses were claimed on the basis that, had the alleged misrepresentations not been made, the claimants and Motoriety would not have done the deal with the defendant, but would have entered into a venture with a third party company and the value of the claimants’ shareholdings would have increased accordingly. Similarly, in relation to the original breach of contract claim, the claimants claimed that if the contract had been properly performed, Motoriety would have thrived and the value of the claimants’ shareholdings would have increased. Alternatively, had it not been for the defendant’s breach of contract, the defendant would have exercised its call option, so that the claimants would have been entitled to the consideration provided for by that option. Three of the claimants also claimed for the loss of their initial investments in Motoriety.

The defendant denied the claim and brought an application to strike out the claim or for reverse summary judgment on the basis that all the losses claimed by the claimants were barred by the reflective loss principle.

Decision

The High Court found in favour of the defendant and granted its application to strike out the claim.

The key issues which may be of interest to financial institutions are set out below.

Developing area of the law

The claimants argued that it was inappropriate to deal with the reflective loss principle in a strike out application because this is a “fiendishly complex area of the law” which is “uncertain and developing”. However, the High Court did not accept this and, on the contrary, considered that Marex had restated and recast the principle. Even the “timing issue” (referred to below) which was raised by the decision in Nectrus was quickly resolved by the Privy Council in Primeo.

The High Court stated that Lord Reed’s judgment in Marex had made clear that claims by shareholders against third parties fell foul of the reflective loss rule where (and only where):

  • The shareholder suffers loss,
  • in the capacity of shareholder,
  • in the form of a diminution in share value or in distributions,
  • which is the consequence of loss sustained by the company,
  • in respect of which the company has a cause of action,
  • against the same wrongdoer.

All of these conditions needed to be satisfied for a claim to be barred by the reflective loss rule and, conversely, if any of them were not satisfied, the claim was not barred.

Independent wrongs

The claimants argued that their losses were caused by independent wrongs committed against them by the defendant. Their losses did not simply follow on from the loss of the company, reflected through their shareholdings in it. The representations were made to them personally and they were separate parties to the contract, such that they had “separate and distinct” losses from that of Motoriety.

However, the High Court noted that, as per Prudential Assurance Co v Newman Industries Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 204, shareholders may not recover a loss caused to the company by breach of the duty owed to the company. To allow otherwise, would subvert the rule that no shareholder can bring a claim on behalf of the company (as per Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461). With the above in mind, the High Court considered that the claimants had to show that Motoriety had not suffered the same loss. In fact, the claimants’ alleged losses were entirely derived from the claimed losses of Motoriety. They may have had a direct claim, but they only had an indirect loss.

The “timing” point

The claimants argued that the reflective loss rule did not apply because Motoriety had been dissolved before the commencement of the claim, and therefore they were no longer shareholders in it. In the claimants’ view, the reflective loss rule must be applied by reference to the time when the claims commenced, and not when the loss was suffered. The claimants relied on Nectrus in which Flaux LJ (as he then was) sitting as a single judge of the Court of Appeal, refused permission to appeal. In doing so, he held that the claim of an ex-shareholder was not barred by the reflective loss principle, finding that the rule should be assessed at the time the claim is made. The claimants argued that, although the Board of the Privy Council in Primeo (comprising five of the seven judges who had heard the Supreme Court appeal in Marex) found that Nectrus was wrongly decided and confirmed that the rule falls to be assessed as at the point in time when a claimant suffers loss and not at the time proceedings are brought, this decision was not binding on the High Court. Conversely, the defendant argued that Nectrus was not binding on the High Court and was distinguishable in any event.

The High Court highlighted that Flaux LJ’s decision in relation to permission to appeal in Nectrus contained no express statement that it was establishing a new principle or extending the current law. It should therefore not ordinarily be cited before a court or bind another court. However, in Allianz Global Investors GmbH v Barclays Bank plc [2021] EWHC 399 (Comm), Sir Nigel Teare (sitting as a High Court judge) while acknowledging that remarks made when refusing (or granting) permission to appeal are ordinarily of no weight, stated that he had been informed that Flaux LJ’s intention was that his ruling may be cited. As such, the High Court in the present case proceeded on the basis that that was correct and therefore Flaux LJ’s decision was binding.

The High Court noted that, as per Willers v Joyce, it was obliged to follow an otherwise binding decision of the Court of Appeal in preference to a decision of the Privy Council. The High Court considered whether the “timing” point was merely obiter dicta and therefore not strictly binding, but concluded that Flaux LJ’s decision in Nectrus was based on four separate grounds which were all part of the binding ratio decidendi. One of the grounds was that it was “unarguable” that the reflective loss rule applied to a claimant who had ceased to be a shareholder at the date of the claim and the High Court was therefore bound by this part of the decision unless it could be distinguished.

The High Court did, however, find that Nectrus was distinguishable. In that case the shareholder had sold its shareholding at a reduced price, which meant that the company’s loss had in effect been “passed on” (pro rata) to the shareholder so the company could no longer claim that share of the loss. As per Allianz, it was clear that in such circumstances there was no risk of: (a) the rule in Foss v Harbottle being subverted as there would be no concurrent claims; and (b) double recovery. In the present case, there had been no sale of the shares at a reduced price, and no “passing on” of any part of the loss of the company. If Motoriety was restored to the register, the loss would still be in the company. As such, the High Court determined that it was not bound to follow Nectrus and was free to follow the decision in Primeo in finding that the reflective loss principle did bar the claimants’ misrepresentation and original breach of contract claim.

Alternative claim for breach of contract

The claimants argued that the alternative breach of contract claim fell outside the scope of the reflective loss rule because the loss consisted of the formula set out in the investment agreement to calculate the consideration due under the call option and because only the claimants, not Motoriety, had rights to the consideration under the call option. Therefore Motoriety never had a cause of action to claim compensation in respect of this head of loss.

The High Court found that this claim was also barred by the reflective loss rule. The claim satisfied all six of the conditions set out in Lord Reed’s judgment in Marex. The fact that the measure of the claimants’ loss was by reference to a contractual formula and different to the measure of the loss of the company was beside the point.

The initial investments claim

The claimants who claimed for the loss of their initial investments in Motoriety argued that this head of loss fell outside of the reflective loss rule because it did not reflect a diminution in the value of their shares.

The High Court agreed with the defendant’s argument that this was simply a “less ambitious” version of the same claim. Instead of claiming the difference between what the values of their shareholdings should have been and what they now were, the claimants were claiming the much smaller difference between what they paid for their shareholdings and what they now had. The High Court found that even though the claims were limited to the amounts paid for the shares, the loss suffered by the claimants was still the loss of their value and the loss of their value was still reflective of the loss to Motoriety.

Accordingly, for all the reasons above, the High Court found in favour of the defendant and granted its application to strike out the claim.

Julian Copeman
Julian Copeman
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Ceri Morgan
Ceri Morgan
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Nihar Lovell
Nihar Lovell
Professional Support Lawyer
+44 20 7466 2529
Claire Nicholas
Claire Nicholas
Senior Associate
+44 20 7466 2058

High Court decision in first s.90A FSMA claim to reach trial

The High Court has published a summary of its findings on liability in the long-running USD$5 billion civil fraud action brought by the Hewlett Packard group in connection with its acquisition of the UK software company Autonomy Corporation Limited in 2012. The claimants have “substantially succeeded” in their claims against two former Autonomy executives: ACL Netherlands BV, Hewlett Packard The Hague BV and others v Lynch and Shushovan [HC-2015-001324].

Mr Justice Hildyard in the Chancery Division outlined his findings in a detailed Summary of Conclusions, in advance of his full judgment which is currently embargoed. The successful claims were brought under s.90A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), common law misrepresentation and deceit, and the Misrepresentation Act 1967, as well as claims for breach of the defendants’ management duties.

The findings are limited to the issue of liability, with a separate judgment on the quantum of damages to be delivered at a later date. The court indicated that although “substantial”, damages are anticipated to be “considerably less than claimed”.

This decision represents a significant development, as the first claim brought under s.90A FSMA to be considered at full trial. However, the s.90A FSMA claim was brought in the very different context of a post-closing M&A dispute, rather than the more classic securities class action brought on behalf of a large group of institutional investors. That said, there may be some helpful guidance on key elements of s.90A when the full decision becomes available, which we will consider in due course when it becomes public.

For more information see this post on our Civil Fraud and Asset Tracing Notes blog.

Court of Appeal rejects novel argument that fraud victims should give credit for the “time value” of cash received as part of a fraudulent transaction

In the context of a claim brought by the victim of a fraud against the perpetrator, seeking damages for consequential loss of investment opportunity in relation to certain fraudulent transactions, the Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal by the fraudster on the basis that the victim was obliged to give credit not only for the cash they received as part of the fraudulent transactions, but also for the “time value” of that money in the period between the transaction and the trial: Tuke v Hood [2022] EWCA Civ 23.

This decision will be noteworthy for financial institutions for the Court of Appeal’s analysis as to the correct calculation of damages in deceit claims, particularly in the context of mis-selling disputes, shareholder claims and the increasing number of fraud claims emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic. The Court of Appeal found that where the measure of damages is reflected by comparing the value of what was sold with the value of what was received, the innocent party must simply give credit for the money (or money’s worth) they received under the transaction itself, in order to reflect the position as it would have been if the deceit had not occurred.

The Court of Appeal referred to the classic modern statement of the applicable principles when assessing damages for deceit in Smith New Court Ltd v Scrimgeour Vickers [1997] AC 254. Smith New Court confirmed that the time at which credit is to be given for the benefits received by the innocent party is normally the date of the fraudulently induced transaction (although this is not an inflexible rule and a different date may be adopted if taking the date of the transaction would under-compensate the victim). The Court of Appeal noted that Smith New Court did not say anything about the innocent party having to give credit for benefits received against claims for consequential losses.

The suggestion in the present case that, unless the victim gave credit for the time value of the money received, they would be overcompensated, was a novel one. The Court of Appeal found it to be fundamentally misconceived and contrary to principle. In the court’s view, a claimant would not be fully compensated if they were required to give any credit for the time value of the money received.

We consider the decision in more detail below.

Background

Between 2009 and 2012, the claimant, Mr Tuke purchased a number of classic cars as investments either from or through a specialist classic car dealership, JD Classics Ltd (JDC), which was founded and run by the defendant, Mr Hood.

In 2011, on Mr Hood’s suggestion, Mr Tuke entered into a transaction which involved him borrowing £8 million from a finance company to purchase 5 Jaguar racing cars for £10 million. It later transpired that Mr Hood had deceived Mr Tuke into buying the cars for far more than they were worth, having provided Mr Tuke with bogus valuations. In order to repay the loan from the finance company, Mr Tuke was obliged to sell a number of his classic cars and was induced to sell all but one to JDC at an undervalue.

Mr Tuke subsequently brought a claim against Mr Hood for deceit, dishonest assistance in breach of fiduciary duty, knowing receipt and conversion. Mr Tuke sought damages including for loss of investment opportunity. Mr Tuke’s case was that if he had not been defrauded, he would have sought to retain particular cars which would have substantially increased in value.

High Court decision

The High Court found that Mr Hood had deceived Mr Tuke on many occasions over many years in flagrant breach of the trust that had been placed in him. The High Court said that Mr Hood was liable in both deceit and dishonest assistance in JDC’s breaches of trust in relation to a number of transactions. The High Court also said that, but for the fraud, Mr Tuke would have been able to keep many of the cars until 2020 or at least until 2015/2016 by which time the market had risen significantly.

The High Court quantified the “base claims” in respect of the loss made on the sales at an undervalue in the normal way, by comparing the market value of the cars at the date of sale to the true value of the consideration received for them.

In relation to the claim for consequential loss of investment opportunity, the High Court compared the market value of each car with its 2020 value, which reflected the subsequent enhancement in value of the investment, before applying a 25% discount for uncertainties.

Mr Hood appealed against the High Court’s decision. Mr Hood contended that the High Court, when assessing loss of investment opportunity, should have taken into account the notional benefit that Mr Tuke received over time from the cash element of the consideration he received for the investment cars and that this resulted in Mr Tuke being overcompensated.

Court of Appeal decision

The Court of Appeal found in favour of Mr Tuke and dismissed the appeal by Mr Hood.

The key issues which will be of interest to financial institutions are set out below.

Legal principles on the calculation of damages for deceit

The Court of Appeal noted that the aim of an award of damages for deceit is to put the claimant in the position in which he would have been if no dishonest representations had been made to him.

The Court of Appeal then went on to highlight the following key legal principles relating to the assessment of damages for deceit:

  • In assessing damages, the claimant must give credit for any benefits which he has received as a result of the transaction. The time at which credit is to be given for the benefits is normally the date of the fraudulently induced transaction, but this is not an inflexible rule (as per Smith New Court).
  • A defendant who wishes to assert that post-breach events have reduced a recoverable loss must plead as well as prove it (as per OMV Petrom SA v Glencore International AG (Rev 1) [2016] EWCA Civ 778).

Application of legal principles on the calculation of damages for deceit to the present case

The Court of Appeal held that all that the innocent party is required to do, in order to reflect the position as it would have been if the deceit had not occurred, in a case where the measure of damages is reflected by comparing the value of what was sold with the value of what was received, is to give credit for the money (or money’s worth) he received under the transaction itself.

The Court of Appeal felt that Mr Hood should not be rewarded for his dishonest behaviour by the reduction of his liability, especially if to do so would result in Mr Tuke not receiving the full value of loss. Requiring Mr Tuke to give credit for the hypothetical “time value” of the cash he received from JDC under the relevant transactions would result in his not receiving full credit for the loss of investment opportunity. That would be directly contrary to the policy of seeking to award the innocent party full compensation for the wrong suffered in cases of dishonesty.

The Court of Appeal observed that in this case, but for Mr Hood’s fraudulent misrepresentations, Mr Tuke would not have taken out the loan and he would not have had to sell all but one of his investment cars to repay the loan. Also, Mr Hood had not pleaded or proved that post-breach events had reduced a recoverable loss.

The Court of Appeal noted that Smith New Court did not say anything about the innocent party having to give credit for benefits received against claims for consequential losses. Once the value of the cash benefit received by Mr Tuke when he sold the cars was taken into account in the basic computation of loss, there was no justification for taking into account its value over time. There was also no reason to give credit for the “time value” of the cash benefit when assessing the further loss of the chance of making a capital gain from keeping the cars rather than selling them.

Further, the Court of Appeal said that as a matter of principle a claimant is only required to give credit for a benefit that results from and is intrinsic to a transaction. What Mr Tuke did, or may have done, with the cash he received for the cars was irrelevant. Any gains or losses would be as a result of Mr Tuke’s own independent acts and decisions. The time value of the cash received had insufficient nexus with the fraudulent transactions and was not a benefit received under those transactions. In any event, the loss of investment opportunity was not an award calculated by reference to the passage of time as such, but was a claim for the loss of the cars’ appreciation in capital.

The Court of Appeal also commented that the analogy made by Mr Hood with awards of interest was deeply flawed. Mr Hood had contended that the “time value” should be calculated either in the same way as Mr Tuke was awarded compound interest on the equitable compensation for Mr Hood’s dishonest assistance in breaches of fiduciary duty of JDC, or in the same manner as discretionary interest under statute. Firstly, the loss of investment opportunity claim was an alternative to a claim for interest on the base damages awarded. Secondly, the discretionary award of interest on a debt or damages under s.35A of the Senior Courts Act 1981 is purely the creature of statute. There is no discretion at common law to make such an award to a claimant for the loss of use of money over time, if the claim is not a claim for “debt or damages” within the meaning of s.35A (as per Odyssey Aviation Ltd v GFG 373 Ltd [2019] EWHC 1980). Thirdly, if interest is claimed at common law as damages for later payment of a debt, the actual losses must be pleaded and proven (as per Sempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners and another [2007] UKHL 34). The Court of Appeal found it difficult to see how there could be any power to compute the supposed “time value” of a cash receipt by the innocent party and credit it to the dishonest defendant, especially in an evidential vacuum. The analogy with compound interest was even more difficult to maintain, given that compound interest is an award in equity designed as a means of discouraging dishonest behaviour. There was no reason for the innocent victim of the fraud to be put on the same footing as the fraudster and treated as if he had received compound interest on any cash he had received as part of the fraudulent transaction.

Finally, the Court of Appeal said that policy considerations strongly militated against requiring credit to be given by the injured party for the notional time value of the money. That would incentivise the fraudster to lengthen the time between the fraudulent transaction and the award of damages, because the longer that period, the higher the credit. A fraudster should not be encouraged to prevaricate or to conceal his wrongdoing.

Accordingly, for the reasons above, the Court of Appeal found in favour of Mr Tuke and dismissed the appeal by Mr Hood.

Rupert Lewis
Rupert Lewis
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Ceri Morgan
Ceri Morgan
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Nihar Lovell
Nihar Lovell
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Claire Nicholas
Claire Nicholas
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SPACs in the City: the emerging litigation and regulatory risks in England & Wales

Herbert Smith Freehills LLP have published an article in Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law on the litigation and regulatory risks for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) in England & Wales.

SPACs scorched the US stock markets last year, with the UK left out in the cold. While the recent crackdown by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is cooling investor interest in the US, the UK regulators are hoping that changes to the regulatory framework will bring some SPAC sunshine to this side of the Atlantic.

Given the limited number of London-listed SPACs to date, the litigation and regulatory risks for SPACs in the UK remain broadly untested. However, some cautionary tales are emerging from the US, where increasingly SPACs are the subject of litigation and regulatory scrutiny.

The article considers the changes to the UK’s regulatory framework applying to SPACs, before exploring some of the key anticipated regulatory and litigation risks for SPACs in this jurisdiction.

The article can be found here: SPACs in the City: the emerging litigation and regulatory risks in England & Wales. This article first appeared in the October 2021 edition of JIBFL.

Karen Anderson
Karen Anderson
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Emma Deas
Emma Deas
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Sarah Hawes
Sarah Hawes
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Ceri Morgan
Ceri Morgan
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Eleanor Dole Sheaf
Eleanor Dole Sheaf
Associate
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Privy Council confirms that the so-called “reflective loss” principle applies to ex-shareholders

The Board of the Privy Council has allowed an appeal in relation to the application of the so-called “reflective loss” principle, confirming that the rule falls to be assessed as at the point in time when a claimant suffers loss and not at the time proceedings are brought Primeo Fund v Bank of Bermuda (Cayman) Ltd & Anor (Cayman Islands) [2021] UKPC 22.

As a reminder, the Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 confirmed (by a 4-3 majority) that the reflective loss principle is a bright line legal rule, which prevents only shareholders from bringing a claim based on any fall in the value of their shares or distributions, which is the consequence of loss sustained by the company, where the company has a cause of action against the same wrongdoer (see our blog post: Untangling, but not killing off, the Japanese knotweed: Supreme Court confirms existence and scope of “reflective loss” rule).

On the facts of the present case, the claimant suffered loss arising from a breach of obligation by a wrongdoer before it became a shareholder in a company. However, by the time the claimant brought its claims, it had become a member of the relevant company, which had its own claim for the same loss against the same wrongdoer. It was common ground that if the company succeeded in its claims, it would fully restore the value of the shares in the company held by the claimant. However, the Board found that the claimant’s claims were not barred by the reflective loss principle. It emphasised that the reflective loss rule is not a procedural rule, concerned only with the avoidance of double recovery, but must be applied as a substantive rule of law, focusing on the nature of the loss, which must be assessed at the time the loss is suffered.

This is a helpful clarification of the correct approach to the issue of timing. Since Marex, there have been conflicting decisions as to whether the rule against reflective loss will apply to a former shareholder, who is no longer a shareholder in the relevant entity at the time the claim is commenced. In particular, there has been a lot of focus in some quarters on a decision by Flaux LJ as a single judge of the Court of Appeal in relation to an application for permission to appeal in Nectrus Ltd v UCP plc [2021] EWCA Civ 57. In Nectrus, Flaux LJ held that the claim of an ex-shareholder was not barred by the reflective loss principle, finding that the rule should be assessed when the claim is made.

The decision of the Board in Primeo Fund has put this question beyond doubt, expressly confirming that a shareholder which suffers a loss in the form of a diminution in value of its shareholding which is not recoverable as a result of the application of the reflective loss rule, cannot later convert that loss into one which is recoverable simply by selling its shareholding. The Board said that to find otherwise would lead to very “odd results”. While decisions of the Privy Council are not binding on English courts, they are regarded as having great weight and persuasive value (unless inconsistent with a decision that would otherwise be binding on the lower court). Given the questionable precedent value of Nectrus  and the constitution of the Board of the Privy Council in Primeo Fund, it is highly likely that the decision in Primeo Fund will be followed by the Court of Appeal the next time this issue arises in an English case.

The decision is considered in further detail below.

Background

The appellant (Primeo), was an open-ended mutual investment fund set up in 1994 and registered in the Cayman Islands, but now in liquidation. The respondents acted as Primeo’s custodian and administrator from 1993.

From inception, Primeo placed a proportion of funds raised from investors with Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS) for investment. Over time, Primeo increased the proportion of its fund which invested with BLIMIS until, by 1 May 2001, the whole of its fund was invested in this way either directly, or indirectly through two feeder funds called Herald Fund SPC (Herald) and Alpha Prime Fund Limited (Alpha).

On 1 May 2007, Primeo’s direct investments with BLMIS were transferred to Herald, in consideration for new shares in Herald (the Herald Transfer). From that date, Primeo no longer had any direct investments with BLMIS, all investments were held indirectly via Herald or Alpha.

On 11 December 2008, the Ponzi scheme operated by Mr Madoff and BLMIS collapsed. Mr Madoff surrendered to the authorities in the United States and was charged with fraudulently operating a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme. Primeo was placed into voluntary liquidation on 23 January 2009.

Primeo brought claims in the Cayman Islands against its administrators and custodians, alleging breaches of duty.

Decisions of the Grand Court and Court of Appeal of the Cayman Islands

The Grand Court held that the administrators and custodians owed relevant duties to Primeo and breached those duties. However, the Grand Court dismissed Primeo’s claims on the grounds that they infringed the reflective loss rule, on the basis that Herald and Alpha also had claims against the same defendants which covered the same loss, and if they made recovery on those claims that would eliminate any loss suffered by Primeo.

Each side appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Cayman Islands (on various issues), which dismissed Primeo’s appeal against the Grand Court’s finding that its claims were barred by the reflective loss rule.

Appeal to the Privy Council

The Board of the Privy Council gave directions to hear and determine the discrete issue as to the operation of the reflective loss rule (with another hearing to follow, dealing with other issues on appeal). The parties were agreed that Cayman Islands law regarding the reflective loss rule, was the same as English law.

The specific issues for the Board of the Privy Council to determine were as follows:

  1. What is the relevant time to determine whether the reflective loss rule applies? Is it the time when the relevant claimant (here, Primeo) issued proceedings (by which time Primeo was a shareholder in Herald), or is it the time when the claimant acquired its causes of action (when Primeo was not a shareholder in Herald)?
  2. If the time to determine whether the reflective loss applies is when the claimant acquired its causes of action, did Primeo nonetheless lose its right to claim for the losses it suffered and become subject to the reflective loss rule by reason of the Herald Transfer, by which it ceased to be a direct investor in BLMIS and became an indirect investor via its replacement shareholding in Herald?
  3. The reflective loss rule operates where there is a common wrongdoer whose actions have affected both the claimant shareholder (Primeo) and the company (Herald/Alpha) – must the claims against the common wrongdoer be direct claims, and what degree of overlap between the claims of the shareholder and the company is required?
  4. Were the Grand Court and Court of Appeal correct to say that the reflective loss rule is brought into operation where the company has a realistic prospect of success, as opposed to being likely to succeed on the balance of probabilities?

Decision of the Board of the Privy Council

The Board of the Privy Council concluded that Primeo’s appeal in relation to the application of the reflective loss rule should be allowed. Each of the issues considered by the Board are discussed further below.

1. The timing issue

The Board confirmed that the reflective loss rule falls to be assessed as at the point in time when the claimant suffers loss arising from some relevant breach of obligation by the relevant wrongdoer, and not at the time proceedings are brought. On the facts of the present case, at the time Primeo suffered loss, it was not a shareholder in Herald and therefore its claim was not barred by the reflective loss principle.

The Board emphasised that the reflective loss rule is not a procedural rule, concerned only with the avoidance of double recovery, and must be applied as a substantive rule of law. In this context, the majority in Marex said that the focus of the reflective loss rule is on the nature of the loss, which involves consideration of the capacity in which the claimant suffered the loss and the form of the loss. The Board concluded that the issue is one of the characterisation of the loss, which depends on its status (i.e. whether or not it is recognised by the law) at the time it is suffered.

In the Board’s view, Nectrus Ltd v UCP plc [2021] EWCA Civ 57 was wrongly decided. In Nectrus, Flaux LJ presided as a single judge of the Court of Appeal over an application for permission to appeal. Flaux LJ held that the claim of an ex-shareholder was not barred by the reflective loss principle, finding that the rule should be assessed when the claim is made, at a time when the loss claimed has crystallised.

As a consequence of its decision, the Board confirmed that a shareholder which suffers a loss in the form of a diminution in value of its shareholding which is not recoverable as a result of the application of the reflective loss rule, cannot later convert that loss into one which is recoverable simply by selling its shareholding. The Board said that to find otherwise would lead to very “odd results”.

2. The Herald Transfer issue

Having found that the reflective loss principle was not engaged following analysis of the timing issue above, the Board considered whether the outcome was affected by the Herald Transfer.

In Marex, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge explained the justification for the reflective loss rule as based on the fact that, by becoming a member of the company, the shareholder agrees to “follow the fortunes of the company” in relation to losses suffered by it as a result of wrongs done to the company, and agrees that the company will have the right to decide whether claims should be brought in respect of such wrongs.

The question then was whether the Herald Transfer precluded Primeo from pursuing the causes of action it had already acquired before the Herald Transfer, because of the “follow the fortunes” bargain.

The Board considered that this argument was unsustainable, because the “follow the fortunes” bargain is forward-looking, not backward-looking. It is directed to characterisation of loss suffered by a claimant after they become a shareholder in the company (and they then suffer loss of the requisite type arising as a consequence of a wrong done to the company), and is directed to limiting the ability of a shareholder to acquire a right of action from that time on.

In the Board’s view, to apply the reflective loss rule to preclude a new shareholder from enforcing rights of action which had already accrued to them before they became a member of the company would be an unwarranted extension of the reflective loss rule. The Board noted that the issue of possible double recovery by Primeo on the one hand, and Herald and Alpha on the other, would have to be managed by a procedural mechanism.

3. The common wrongdoer issue

Primeo submitted that the Court of Appeal was wrong to apply the reflective loss rule in respect of claims against its former administrator, because neither Herald nor Alpha had any claim against the same corporate entity (different entities in the same group were involved in the provision of administration and custody services over the years to the various parties). Primeo made the same argument in relation to certain claims against its former custodian.

The Board agreed with Primeo, saying that it is an inherent part of the reflective loss rule that it only applies to exclude a claim by a shareholder where what is in issue is a wrong committed by a person who is a wrongdoer both as against the shareholder and as against the company. It noted that the separate legal identity of the administrator and custodian were of critical importance in the application of the reflective loss rule. The Board commented that to extend the reflective loss rule in these circumstances would be contrary to the decision in Marex, which was directed to keeping the operation of the rule within narrow parameters.

4. The merits issue

Given the Board’s other findings, it was not necessary to decide whether the Grand Court and Court of Appeal were correct to say that the reflective loss rule is brought into operation where the company has a realistic prospect of success, as opposed to being likely to succeed on the balance of probabilities.

However, the Board observed that those judgments were reached without the benefit of the decision in Marex, and adopting a materially different approach to the Supreme Court in that case. Accordingly, the Board warned that what the Grand Court and Court of Appeal said about this issue should not be treated as authoritative.

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Court of Appeal provides guidance on the “reflective loss” principle and its interaction with the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999

The Court of Appeal has held that the so-called “reflective loss” principle will not bar the claim of a shareholder, who is also a contractual promisee/beneficiary, in circumstances where the company in which the shares are owned has acquired the right to bring a claim in respect of the same contract against the same wrongdoer pursuant to s.1 of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (1999 Act): Broadcasting Investment Group Ltd & Ors v Smith & Anr [2021] EWCA Civ 912.

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s judgment striking out the contractual promisee’s claim (see our banking litigation blog post). The High Court had ruled that the company (of which the contractual promisee was a shareholder) acquired a right to enforce the contract in question pursuant to s.1 of the 1999 Act. Consequently, the promisee’s claim, as a shareholder of the company, was barred by the rule in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (often referred to as the reflective loss principle). The High Court found that s.4 of the 1999 Act, which preserves the rights of a promisee to enforce a contract, was subject to generally applicable legal principles including the rule in Prudential.

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the High Court’s interpretation of s.4 of the 1999 Act. It held that, since the company’s right to enforce the contract was conferred by the 1999 Act, it was subject to the terms and limitations imposed by that statute. Since the rule in Prudential was only engaged because of s.1 of the 1999 Act, it could not bar the promisee’s right to enforce the contract as prescribed by s.4 of the 1999 Act. In the Court of Appeal’s view, to interpret the rule in Prudential independently of the 1999 Act was entirely artificial, would sidestep the limitations imposed by s.4 designed to protect the rights of the promisee, and would effectively extinguish the promisee’s right to enforce the contract, which was impermissible by statute.

This decision will be of interest for financial institutions following developments to the reflective loss principle, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court last year in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 (see our banking litigation blog post: Untangling, but not killing off, the Japanese knotweed: Supreme Court confirms existence and scope of “reflective loss” rule). The reflective loss rule plays an important part in the defence of claims brought against banks by shareholders (aside from claims brought under section 90 and 90A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which provide a statutory exemption).

Given that the outcome in the present case is to allow the concurrent claims of a shareholder and company against the same third party wrongdoer, some might argue that it has narrowed the scope of the reflective loss principle. However, the rationale supporting the decision is based on the effect of the 1999 Act and its very specific wording, and does not have wider application. Accordingly, the decision is unlikely to impact the scope of the reflective loss principle in a general sense, and is likely to be limited to the (unusual) fact pattern of cases where the company only has a claim as a result of s.1 of the 1999 Act, and the shareholder is a contractual promisee.

In addition, financial institutions are likely to welcome the helpful obiter comments from the Court of Appeal on the question of whether the reflective loss principle should bar the claim of an “indirect” shareholder, i.e. where there is a chain of shareholder ownership. On this point, the concurring judgment of Arnold LJ considered it “well arguable” that the rule in Prudential can apply to indirect shareholders in appropriate circumstances.

Background

The underlying facts of the dispute are complex, but relate to the development of a start-up company in the technology sector. In summary, in October 2012 an alleged oral joint venture agreement (JV Agreement) was entered into by the claimants, the first defendant (Mr Smith), the second defendant (Mr Finch) and certain other parties. Under the terms of the JV Agreement, it was intended (among other things) that a joint venture vehicle would be set up, called Simplestream Group plc (SS plc), and that Mr Smith’s shares in two existing software companies would be transferred to SS plc.

SS plc was subsequently formed and its shareholders were Mr Smith, Mr Finch and the first claimant, Broadcasting Investment Group Limited (BIG). In alleged breach of the JV Agreement, the relevant shares were not transferred to SS plc, and SS plc subsequently entered creditors’ voluntary liquidation.

BIG brought a claim against Mr Smith and Mr Finch (and others) for breach of the JV Agreement, claiming specific performance as regards the transfer of shares to SS plc, or damages in lieu of specific performance. Alternatively, BIG claimed that it had suffered loss by reason of the consequent diminution in the value of its shareholding in SS plc and loss of dividend income from SS plc.

The second claimant (VIIL) was the majority shareholder of BIG and the third claimant (Mr Burgess) was, in turn, the majority shareholder of VIIL. Mr Burgess brought parallel claims to those brought by BIG, on the basis that both BIG and Mr Burgess personally were alleged to be parties to, and therefore prima facie entitled to enforce, the JV Agreement.

Mr Smith applied for strike out / reverse summary judgment on the basis that the claims of BIG and Mr Burgess were barred by the rule against reflective loss, as recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Marex.

The liquidator of SS plc has, thus far, not indicated any intention to pursue any claims which SS plc might have in relation to the JV Agreement.

High Court decision

The High Court’s reasoning is discussed in our previous banking litigation blog post.

In summary, the High Court struck out BIG’s claims for both damages and specific performance in relation to the JV Agreement because the court found that BIG’s claim was a paradigm example of a claim within the scope of the reflective loss principle, and therefore should be barred.

The High Court found that SS plc had a right to enforce the JV Agreement pursuant to s.1(1)(b) of the 1999 Act and therefore SS plc and BIG had concurrent claims. The High Court held that BIG’s claim as a direct shareholder in SS plc fell within the scope of the rule in Prudential and was consequently barred. Further, the High Court held that s.4 of the 1999 Act, which states that s.1 of the 1999 Act does not affect any right of the promisee to enforce the terms of the contract, is subject to generally applicable legal principles and consequently, does not override the rule in Prudential.

The High Court ruled that Mr Burgess’s claim to enforce the JV Agreement was not barred by the rule in Prudential and could proceed to trial, because he was an indirect or quasi-shareholder in SS plc, rather than a direct shareholder (aptly referred to as the “Russian Doll” argument). In the view of the High Court, Marex emphasised that the reflective loss principle bars only shareholders in the loss-suffering company and is a “highly specific exception of no wider ambit”.

BIG appealed the High Court’s decision to strike out its claims on two grounds: (i) the High Court’s interpretation of both s.4 of the 1999 Act and Prudential; and (ii) whether Prudential bars claims for specific performance. In addition, Mr Smith cross-appealed the High Court’s refusal to strike out Mr Burgess’s claims in respect of the JV Agreement (i.e. the Russian Doll argument).

Court of Appeal decision

The Court of Appeal allowed BIG’s appeal on the interpretation of the 1999 Act and held that the rule in Prudential was not engaged to bar its claim.

Given its primary ruling, the Court of Appeal did not consider in detail either BIG’s alternative ground of appeal on the question of whether the rule in Prudential applies to claims for specific performance, or the cross-appeal.

Interpretation of the 1999 Act and Prudential

There was no dispute that SS plc acquired a right to enforce the JV Agreement pursuant to s.1(1)(b) the 1999 Act, with the result that both SS plc and BIG had concurrent claims for breach of contract against Mr Smith. Nor was it in dispute that BIG was a “contractual promisee” under the JV Agreement.

The question for the Court of Appeal was whether s.4 of the 1999 Act preserved BIG’s right to enforce the JV Agreement, notwithstanding the concurrent claim of SS plc, because it provides that the contractual promisee’s right to enforce the contract is not “affected” by s.1. In other words, did the creation of a right in SS plc under s.1 of the 1999 Act, destroy BIG’s rights as contractual promisee because of the operation of the rule in Prudential?

BIG argued that if the right acquired by SS plc by virtue of s.1, prevented BIG as a shareholder of SS plc from pursuing its cause of action for breach of the JV Agreement because of the rule in Prudential, then the situation was analogous to a parasite killing its host. Conversely, Mr Smith submitted that s.4 of the 1999 Act could not be construed to mean that it abrogates the rule in Prudential and, as a result, subverts the principle of the autonomy of the company in Foss v Harbottle.

In the Court of Appeal’s view it was clear from the natural meaning of the words in s.4 of the 1999 Act that the rights conferred on third parties by virtue of s.1 of the 1999 Act are in addition to any right the contractual promisee has to enforce th e contract (and that such a construction is consistent with the Explanatory Notes to the 1999 Act). This interpretation is consistent with the 1999 Act as a whole, which created only a limited and tightly constrained incursion into the rule of privity of contract. The legislation created rights and took “nothing away”.

The Court of Appeal focused on the use of the word “affect” in s.4 of the 1999 Act, which provides that s.1 must not “affect” the promisee’s right to enforce the contract. The Court of Appeal held that the proximate cause for BIG’s rights being extinguished was s.1 of the 1999 Act, and not the rule in Prudential. The rule in Prudential was only engaged when s.1 of the 1999 Act enabled SS plc to enforce the JV Agreement. Treating the rule in Prudential as if it were independent to the right conferred by s.1 of the 1999 Act was entirely artificial and would effectively sidestep the limitations imposed by s.4, which protect the rights of the promisee. This interpretation would not only affect BIG’s right to enforce the JV Agreement, but extinguish it completely – which it considered to be impermissible as a matter of statute. The Court of Appeal held that it would be a nonsense to interpret s. 4 of the 1999 Act in any other way.

The Court of Appeal also disagreed with the High Court’s reasoning that s.4 of the 1999 Act was subject to “generally applicable legal principles, including (where applicable) the rule in Prudential“, as this interpretation would defeat the purpose of s.4 of the 1999 Act. In this context, the Court of Appeal observed that SS plc’s right to enforce the JV Agreement was conferred purely by statute and is therefore subject to the terms and limitations imposed by that statute.

It therefore concluded that BIG’s claims under the JV Agreement were not barred by the rule in Prudential and were, to the contrary, expressly protected by s.4 of the 1999 Act.

Specific performance

The Court of Appeal did not consider this ground in detail given that it had allowed BIG’s appeal on the grounds discussed above.

The Court of Appeal said that a “superficial consideration” of Lord Reed’s reference in Marex to a shareholder being unable to bring an action against a wrongdoer to recover damages “or secure other relief for an injury done to the company”, might lead to the conclusion that claims for specific performance also fall within the rule in Prudential. However, Asplin LJ highlighted that the matter was complex and was best left to a case where it was necessary to decide this issue.

The cross-appeal (the “Russian Doll” argument)

Again, the Court of Appeal did not need to consider the cross-appeal given its finding that the rule in Prudential was not engaged in the current case.

However, in a short concurring judgment given by Arnold LJ, he disagreed with the High Court’s conclusion that the rule in Prudential was not engaged in relation to indirect shareholders (e.g. to prevent the claims of shareholders in a corporate shareholder).

Arnold LJ observed that it was “well arguable”, in appropriate circumstances, that the rule in Prudential can apply to indirect shareholders. Although his comments on this point are obiter, and therefore not binding, Arnold LJ suggested that it was difficult to see why the rule in Prudential should not apply in such a scenario.

Julian Copeman
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Court of Appeal clarifies proper approach to assessing damages for fraudulent misrepresentation

The Court of Appeal has allowed an appeal by a purchaser in the context of its claim for damages for fraudulent misrepresentation against the sellers of certain business assets that it had acquired. In doing so, the Court of Appeal held that damages for fraudulent misrepresentation should, as a general rule, be assessed by ascertaining the actual value of the assets bought at the relevant date and deducting that figure from the price paid: Glossop Cartons and Print Ltd and others v Contact (Print & Packaging) Ltd and others [2021] EWCA Civ 639.

The Court of Appeal found that the High Court was incorrect to apply the “deduction method” to calculate the market value of the business assets as at the transaction date. The approach adopted by the High Court involved deducting from the purchase price the cost of every flaw or defect that the claimant had not itself factored into its calculation of the price. The Court of Appeal said that, in a normal case for fraudulent misrepresentation, this method is wrong in principle, unduly complex and inappropriately requires the court to consider what subjectively the claimant factored into its calculation of the purchase price. These matters are irrelevant to the calculation of direct loss for fraudulent misrepresentation, which merely requires the court to ascertain the actual value of the assets bought at the relevant date and to deduct that figure from the price paid (as per Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd [1997] AC 254). In Smith New Court Securities, the House of Lords emphasised that the general rule for the measure of damages in deceit claims should not be “mechanistically applied”. However, the Court of Appeal’s decision in the present case suggests that these general principles will be the norm and that there is a threshold question as to when an alternative measure of damages may be applied.

The decision is noteworthy for financial institutions faced with claims founded in the tort of deceit, particularly in the context of mis-selling disputes and shareholder claims. In securities litigation, the judgment is relevant to claims based on alleged fraudulent misrepresentation at common law. It may also be relevant to claims brought under section 90A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, although currently it remains unclear whether the appropriate measure is as for the tort of deceit or the tort of negligent misstatement (and of course there are many additional, complicating factors in measuring damages in securities litigation, not least the impact of “harmed” investors both buying and selling securities during the period in which the misrepresentation is alleged to have endured).

In the context of a shareholder claim based on a false representation, the general rule in Smith New Court Securities means that damages will be assessed on the date on which the securities were purchased (the transaction date). Accordingly, the amount will be calculated as the difference between the price paid for the shares and their actual/true value as at the transaction date. As a result of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Glossop, claimants may face additional challenges where they try to depart from the general rule, for example by seeking to recover the difference between the price paid for the shares and the amount realised on disposal of the shares, which is often one of the methods by which damages are calculated by claimants in such claims. This may be an attractive option for claimants where there has been a later fall in value of the shares due to some separate event.

The extent to which falls in the share price may be claimed by shareholders is an important battleground in securities litigation, and there is a clear (although complex) inter-relationship between the measure of damages (in cases such as Smith New Court Securities and Glossop) and the application of the principle in South Australia Asset Management Corpn v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191 (SAAMCO).

The SAAMCO principle confirms that a claimant can only recover loss that falls within the scope of the duty of care assumed by the defendant issuer, and was recently considered by the Supreme Court in Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2021] UKSC 20 (see our banking litigation blog post). In Manchester Building Society, the Supreme Court said that cases should not be shoe-horned into the categories of “information” cases or “advice” cases, and confirmed that the scope of the duty of care assumed by a professional adviser is governed by the purpose of the duty, judged on an objective basis by reference to the purpose for which the advice is being given. Whether or not a claimant can recover an unrelated stock price drop during the period between acquisition and disposal of the shares will usually depend upon whether the defendant’s responsibility extended to the decision to purchase the shares in the first place. This will present a further hurdle for claimants seeking to depart from the general rule as to the measure of damages in such cases.

The case is considered in more detail below.

Background

A packaging manufacturer (Glossop), entered into an asset sale agreement and lease sale agreements (together, the agreements) to buy the business assets of a print company, and the lease of a property owned by Mr Smith and a pension company. The print company was a loss-making company which was ultimately owned and controlled by Mr Smith.

Glossop subsequently issued proceedings against the print company, Mr Smith and the pension company (together, Carton), claiming that it had been induced to enter into the agreements by Mr Smith’s fraudulent misrepresentations about the property.

High Court decision

The High Court found in Glossop’s favour, but held that a claimant in a deceit claim could not recover for losses which directly flowed from the relevant transaction if those losses were the product of the claimant’s own commercial misjudgement.

In attempting to ascertain the market value of the business assets sold, the High Court applied the “deduction method”, deducting from the purchase price the cost of every flaw or defect that Glossop had not itself factored into its calculation of the price. Following this approach, the High Court found that certain crucial flaws or defects could not be deducted from the purchase price, for example where Glossop had appreciated certain risks and had factored them into the purchase price.

Glossop appealed the High Court’s decision, arguing that the deduction method was not an appropriate way to assess damages. It argued that the High Court had failed to award damages for the direct loss caused by the fraudulent misrepresentations: the difference between the actual market value of the business assets sold and the price paid. Glossop argued that the difference was £300,000, which was the sum Glossop claimed it had paid for goodwill.

Court of Appeal decision

The Court of Appeal allowed Glossop’s appeal. It held that the High Court was incorrect to apply the deduction method, and that the direct loss here was simply the difference between the price paid and the market value.

The Court of Appeal referred back to the basic rules applicable where claimants (as in this case) have been induced by fraudulent misrepresentations to buy property, as per Smith New Court Securities. In that case, where the claimant acquired shares in reliance on fraudulent misrepresentations made by the defendants, the House of Lords held that a defendant is liable for all losses directly flowing from a fraudulently induced transaction even if they were unforeseeable. The House of Lords re-stated the general rule for the assessment of damages, which is that damages for tort or breach of contract are assessed at the date of the breach. In a shareholder claim based on a false representation, the House of Lords confirmed the general rule that this would be the date on which the securities were purchased (the transaction date). The amount would be calculated as the difference between the price paid for the shares and their actual/true value as at the transaction date.

In assessing the direct loss for fraudulent misrepresentation, in the Court of Appeal’s view the deduction method is wrong in principle. It is unduly complex and inappropriately requires the court to consider what subjectively the claimant had factored into its calculation of the purchase price. These matters are irrelevant to the calculation of direct loss for fraudulent misrepresentation in a normal case, which merely requires the court to ascertain the actual value of the assets bought at the relevant date and to deduct that figure from the price paid.

The Court of Appeal emphasised that a claimant is entitled to the difference between the price paid and the market value, whatever miscalculations it may have made in entering into the transaction. Claimants may, therefore, be compensated for making (or notwithstanding that they made) a bad bargain, even if they knew or ought to have known about defects before entering into the transaction. The purchaser’s commercial judgements and misjudgements are irrelevant to the evaluation of what direct loss it suffered.

On the facts of the present case, the Court of Appeal held that an alternative “broad brush” approach was appropriate. Glossop was entitled to recover, by way of direct loss, the difference between the price it paid and the market value of the assets purchased at the relevant date. That difference was best represented by the sum of £300,000 which Glossop paid for goodwill (mostly for business contracts) that had no real value and it was hard to see how there could be any goodwill in a loss-making business.

Harry Edwards
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Nihar Lovell
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