Competition law: increased scrutiny on dominant enterprises

Adelaide Luke, Aaron Ong and Amanda Tay

Malaysia’s Competition Act (Act) was first enacted in 2010 (becoming effective in 2012), and is regulated by the Malaysian Competition Commission (MyCC). Whilst the MyCC’s initial focus was on education and advocacy, this has firmly shifted to enforcement.  The last few years have seen an increase in the level of enforcement, and the indications are that this trend is set to continue.

As with most competition law regimes around the world, the Act is extraterritorial in its effect.  This means that it does not matter where the conduct at issue takes place: the Act will apply if there is an effect on competition in Malaysia. Hence, it is important for both local and foreign enterprises to be aware of the implications of the MyCC’s increased level of activity.

In this article, we discuss the background and key takeaways of the recent case of Competition Commission v. Dagang Net Technologies Sdn. Bhd. (Case No. 700-2/2/003/2015) (Dagang Net Case), where MyCC held that Dagang Net Technologies Sdn Bhd (Dagang Net) enjoyed a dominant position, and abused that position by imposing excessive exclusivity provisions with software providers.  Following its investigation, the MyCC imposed a fine of MYR10.3 million.

Background of the Dagang Net Case

Dagang Net, a wholly owned subsidiary of the public listed Dagang NeXchange Berhad, has been the Malaysian government’s sole service provider in the provision of Malaysia’s National Single Window (NSW) for trade facilitation since 2009.

Following complaints by software providers regarding Dagang Net’s conduct, the MyCC commenced an investigation in or around 2016. The complainants alleged that, between 2015 and 2017, Dagang Net had imposed an exclusivity clause in its agreements with software providers.  The effect of these clauses was the reinforcement of Dagang Net’s position on the market because the software providers were prevented from providing similar services to future competitor(s) of Dagang Net.

The MyCC held that Dagang Net contravened Section 10(1) of the Act, which prohibits an enterprise from engaging, whether independently or collectively, in a conduct which amounts to an abuse of a dominant position in any market for goods or services in Malaysia.

In its provisional decision, the MyCC also made a provisional finding that Dagang Net refused to supply electronic mailboxes to certain customers. However, in its final decision, the MyCC concluded that Dagang Net’s refusal to supply did not significantly prevent, restrict or distort competition and therefore did not amount to an infringement of section 10.

Key to the infringement decision were the MyCC’s findings that: (a) at the time of the alleged infringement, Dagang Net held a dominant position in the relevant market, and (b) that Dagang Net had abused that dominant position.

Key takeaways

The decision held in the Dagang Net Case is important for a variety of reasons. We set out below some key takeaways.

1.       Legal monopoly is considered a “dominant position”

Under the Act, a dominant position arises where one or more market players possess such significant power in a market such that they are able to adjust price or outputs or trading terms, without effective constraint from competitors or potential competitors.

Dagang Net had contended that, as it is a monopolist without competitors, it cannot be held to have a dominant position. MyCC disagreed.

MyCC held that the Act regulates the behaviour of enterprises and not its form or structure. Further, MyCC referred to established EU principles and cases1 wherein it has been established that an enterprise vested with a legal monopoly may be regarded as occupying a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

2.       Future operations could be included as part of “relevant market”.

In its decision, the MyCC identified the market for the provision of trade facilitation services in Malaysia as the relevant market within which to conduct its assessment.

The MyCC determined that the relevant market here included not only the current NSW system Dagang Net was operating in, but also a new system, known as uCustoms that while not yet in operation is due to be implemented imminently, and both systems will serve as platforms to end-users to submit trade declarations.

In making this determination, the MyCC examined documentary evidence and concluded that the new system would inevitably come into operation in the future.  The MyCC rejected Dagang Net’s argument that this new system was a “hypothetical market” and not to be included as part of the “relevant market”.

3.       Danger of the exclusivity clause

As mentioned above, since 2015, Dagang Net had imposed exclusivity clauses on its software providers which prevented them from providing similar services to Dagang Net’s future competitors that provided the upcoming system.

The MyCC rejected the arguments put forth by Dagang Net and held that there were no reasonable commercial justifications to impose the exclusivity clause.  It determined that the purpose of the exclusivity was to protect Dagan Net’s current market share and that it had the effect of foreclosing the market for the provision of the trade facilitation services..

Some observations on MyCC’s findings in relation to exclusivity clauses:

  • Similar to the discussion on relevant market above, MyCC found that potential competitors had been foreclosed from the market.  Dagang Net had argued that the exclusivity clauses had no effect because Dagang Net did not face any current competitors, but this was rejected.
  • Lack of knowledge of the counterparty’s objection to an exclusivity clause is irrelevant. It is sufficient that the exclusivity clause is capable of having anti-competitive effects. MyCC held that Dagang Net as the incumbent will be held to a higher standard not to behave in such a way as to distort competition.

4.      Reiteration of the requirement to show “effects” in an abuse of dominance case

The Commission reiterated that Section 10 of the Act is “effects based”, which means that actions that are potentially abusive must give rise to anti-competitive effects, and are not “per se” illegal. However, as to the standard of proof, the Commission also cited well-established principles set forth by the European Courts2 that it is sufficient to show that the conduct generally has or is capable of having anti-competitive effects.

In applying these principles, the Commission concluded that Dagang Net’s exclusivity clauses gave rise to anti-competitive effects. On the other hand, Dagang Net’s refusal to supply only gave rise to “insignificant” effects and therefore did not amount to an infringement.

Conclusion and lessons learnt

The Dagang Net case highlights the importance for large companies to take a proactive approach when handling competition matters. We set out below a summary of the two key lessons learnt from the Dagang Net case:

  • Are you at risk of being characterised as “dominant”?  There are a number of factors that are considered as part of the assessment, and market share is not the MyCC’s sole consideration.  It also factors in whether the company faces any effective competitive constraint, or whether it can dictate the terms of competition in a market in Malaysia.
  • Could any of your business practices be characterised as anti-competitive?  Competition risks can materialise in a number of different ways.  We recommend to conducting regular competition law training for staff and periodic competition audits on a company’s ongoing commercial activities.
  • Always check your contracts, in particular ones with exclusivity clauses. It is worth noting that exclusivity clauses are not fatal and will not automatically be deemed to be anti-competitive by the MyCC. Evergreen contracts can be problematic – shorter contracts that are subject to renewal negotiations at regular intervals pose a lower risk from a competition law perspective.  Note also that an exclusivity clause may result in a breach of the Act by virtue of it being an anti-competitive agreement (which is a separate offense to an abuse of dominant position).

1 Case 26/75 General Motors Continental NV; Case 311/84 Telemarketing (CBEM) SA and C-41/90 Klaus Hofner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmBH
2 Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige; Case T-336/07 Telefonica and Telefonica de Espana v Commission, Case T-398/07 Spain v Commission; Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v Commission and Case C-23/14 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencradet.

Disclaimer

Herbert Smith Freehills LLP is licensed to operate as a Qualified Foreign Law Firm in Malaysia. Where advice on Malaysian law is required, we will refer the matter to and work with licensed Malaysian law practices where necessary.

Glynn Cooper
Glynn Cooper
Partner, Kuala Lumpur
+60 3-2777 5102
Adelaide Luke
Adelaide Luke
Partner, Head of Competition, Asia, Hong Kong
+852 2101 4135
Aaron Ong
Aaron Ong
Associate, Kuala Lumpur
+60 3-2777 5105
Amanda Tay
Amanda Tay
Associate, Kuala Lumpur
+60 3-2777 5141

Cross-sector merger control in Malaysia: getting closer

Adelaide Luke, Howard Chan, John Ling and Loh Wan Jian

Like most competition law regimes around the world, Malaysia’s Competition Act 2010 contains provisions prohibiting anti-competitive practices and abuses of dominance. However, it does not currently include the third “pillar” of competition law that is common to many other regimes, namely, cross sector merger control rules. Such rules enable competition authorities to review transactions and to “step in” if an authority has concerns that a particular transaction could be harmful to competition.

Although the introduction of a merger control regime in Malaysia has been discussed for many years, it was not until 2018 that plans began to gain traction.  At this time, numerous authorities in South East Asia were monitoring the high profile Uber/Grab transaction, which resulted in Uber exiting the market.  Although concerns were raised in several jurisdictions (including Malaysia), the Malaysian Competition Commission’s (MyCC) powers were restricted to ex post conduct of Grab; it did not have the power to review the transaction itself.  The MyCC began to make public statements that it was actively working towards the introduction of a cross-sector merger control regime. Recently, in March 2021, the MyCC chief, Iskandar Ismail, announced that the MyCC was aiming to have the proposed amendments tabled in Parliament by the end of 2021.

What can we expect in Malaysia’s merger control regime?

At present, only certain sectors are subject to merger control, including the aviation sector and the communications sector.  Malaysia is not unique in this respect, with Hong Kong similarly regulating only certain mergers and acquisitions in the telecommunications sector at this stage (although many consider it to be a question of when, not if, Hong Kong will have a cross sector regime).  Singapore, too, has different merger control rules for certain sectors (such as telecommunications, gas, and electricity), but unlike Malaysia, it has a merger regime for all other sectors under its Competition Act.  In Malaysia, notifications under these sector specific regimes are voluntary in nature, although the Malaysian Aviation Commission has previously indicated that it is likely to initiate investigations into transactions exceeding the thresholds but which have not been formally notified to them.

In contrast to these existing, voluntary, regimes, the MyCC may seek to introduce a mandatory or a hybrid model.  Mandatory regimes are relatively common with the key ones generally considered to be the US, EU, and China.  In each of these regimes, if certain thresholds are met, filings must be made (and indeed, transactions cannot close until clearance has been granted by the relevant authority).  In a 2019 paper submitted by the MyCC to the OECD Global Forum on Competition, the MyCC stated that it was leaning towards making the upcoming merger control regime mandatory in nature. This is in line with most of the regimes implemented by Malaysia’s South East Asian neighbours, with the notable exception of Singapore.

In terms of the applicable jurisdictional thresholds, the MyCC has indicated that it is keen to learn from the experiences in other jurisdictions, in particular that of the Philippines. Notably, the Philippines has increased its thresholds on several occasions since the regime first came into force in 2016, reducing the scope of transactions that need to be filed (and reviewed by the Philippines Competition Commission). Another important factor in the Philippines regime is that the thresholds incorporate what can be described as a “local effects” requirement, through incorporating a “value of the transaction” threshold that is typically assessed based on the value of assets located in the Philippines or the turnover generated in the Philippines by the target acquired (in an acquisition) or held by/contributed into a joint venture. This contrasts with regimes such as China, where the jurisdictional thresholds can be triggered by “any two relevant parties”, and so captures transactions involving joint ventures with no turnover or assets within China (so-called “offshore joint venture” transactions).

It remains unclear whether the filing requirement will be suspensory in nature, which means that filings will have to be made prior to closing of the transaction and parties may not proceed to closing until clearance is received. This is the most common form of merger control requirement, but there remains a degree of variance amongst the Asian regimes: in Indonesia, filings are currently required to be made post-closing (although there is a legislative proposal to amend this to make it a suspensory requirement), whereas the regime in Thailand uses a combination of both pre-closing and post-closing filings.

If the regime will be mandatory and suspensory in nature, another crucial question that remains uncertain is the applicable penalties for failure to file. Across Asia, there is significant variance in the way that penalties and fines are structured: for example, in the Philippines, fines for failure to file are calculated vis-à-vis the value of the transaction, whereas in Indonesia, fines for failure to file are calculated based on the length of the delay from the statutory deadline. In China and South Korea, fines for failure to file are viewed as administrative in nature, and are capped at relatively small amounts (although the cap was recently increased in South Korea, and the same is currently under review in China).

Getting ready for the changes

From a broader perspective, the introduction of merger control will enhance the effectiveness of competition enforcement in Malaysia, and give the MyCC the tools it needs to help ensure a fair and thriving competitive market across all sectors.

However, for Malaysian and overseas companies alike, the new regime may add a further regulatory hurdle to deal making.  One important uncertainty is the degree of impact that a Malaysian filing may have on deal timelines, and this will depend on a number of factors, including the length of the review timeline that is ultimately included in the legislation, the complexity of the filing and review process, and the efficiency and approach of the MyCC in reviewing and clearing transactions (particularly those that do not give rise to any substantive competition concerns).

In its 2019 submission to the OECD Global Forum on Competition, the MyCC flagged that it may introduce a grace period before the merger control regime takes effect, allowing both the MyCC itself and market participants to prepare for implementation. However, at least from the MyCC’s perspective, given there is pre-existing expertise with regard to merger control in Malaysia in other sectors, and in light of the increasingly close cooperation amongst ASEAN and international competition authorities (some of which have extensive merger control experience), that period may not need to be particularly long.  Indeed, in the 2019 paper, the MyCC stated in the paper that it was already in the midst of preparing its officers for the upcoming merger control regime.

Companies active in Malaysia should therefore prepare for the seemingly inevitable changes on the horizon.

Disclaimer

Herbert Smith Freehills LLP is licensed to operate as a Qualified Foreign Law Firm in Malaysia. Where advice on Malaysian law is required, we will refer the matter to and work with licensed Malaysian law practices where necessary.

Adelaide Luke
Adelaide Luke
Partner, Head of Competition, Asia, Hong Kong
+852 2101 4135
Peter Godwin
Peter Godwin
Managing Partner, Kuala Lumpur
+60 3-2777 5104
Glynn Cooper
Glynn Cooper
Partner, Kuala Lumpur
+60 3-2777 5102
Sophie Lenox
Sophie Lenox
Senior Associate, Singapore
+65 6868 8036
John Ling
John Ling
Associate, Kuala Lumpur
+60 3-2777 5107
Wan Jian Loh
Wan Jian Loh
Associate, Kuala Lumpur
+60 3-2777 5143