The Government of India says it has sent notices to terminate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with 58 countries, including 22 EU countries. It has been reported that many of these BITs will cease to apply to new investments from as early as April 2017. The BIT between India and The Netherlands (which had been a common route for investment into India) has already been terminated from December 2016. Termination of the BITs would also remove protection for new investments by Indian investors into the counterparty countries. For the remaining 25 of its BITs that have not completed their initial term, and so are not ripe for termination, India has circulated a proposed joint interpretative statement to the counterparties to these BITs seeking to align the ongoing treaties with its 2015 Model BIT. While investments made before the termination of the 58 treaties may be protected for some years under the 'sunset' clauses in those BITs, India's actions send mixed messages at a time when the Indian government is making renewed efforts to attract inbound investment with its 'Make in India' campaign, and when outbound investment by Indian companies continues to increase into both developed and developing economies.
Tag: investor-state arbitration
Two recent decisions by tribunals have advanced the body of tribunal practice considering the issue of counterclaims by respondent states in investment treaty arbitration: Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, in which the tribunal awarded damages against the investor for breach of Ecuadorian environmental law in the performance of its investment, and Urbaser SA and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia v. Argentina, in which the tribunal accepted jurisdiction to hear Argentina's counterclaim asserting that the investor had violated international human rights obligations. These decisions arise in the context of conceptual challenges to the pursuit of counterclaims in investment arbitration.
A hearing on jurisdiction and the merits in UNCITRAL Case No. UNCT.15/3, will be transmitted live in English and Spanish via internet feed from Monday, December 5, 2016 to Monday, December 12, 2016, excluding Saturday and Sunday, from 9:00 a.m. to approximately 6:00 p.m. EST. The live streaming is being made available pursuant to Article 10.21.2 and of the Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR), and section 25.2 of the Tribunal’s Procedural Order No. 1 dated September 10, 2015.
As reported in our previous blog posts (please click here and here), the proposed inclusion of investor-state-dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in the Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (the TTIP), has caused considerable debate amongst many stakeholders. Against this backdrop of heated public discussion, the European Parliament (the EP) has drawn up recommendations on the TTIP, including on ISDS. Whilst it is the European Commission (the Commission) which is negotiating the TTIP with the US on behalf of the EU, there can be no final agreement without the EP’s approval. The EP’s recommendations are a crucial indication of what it would want to see in the final agreement and will undoubtedly shape the Commission’s negotiating position. Continue reading
After decades of governments concluding international investment agreements, reservations concerning free trade agreements (such as the TTIP, between the US and the EU) have led to unprecedented levels of public debate, focussing largely on the proposed inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions.
Matthew Weiniger QC was interviewed for a BBC Radio 4 programme to be broadcast at 8pm tonight, titled “Company vs Country“. It will discuss the nature of investment protections and ISDS, including the high profile investor-state disputes which are relied on as evidencing the alleged threat ISDS poses to democracy.
The programme will be available here shortly after the broadcast.
For further information, please contact Matthew Weiniger QC, or your usual Herbert Smith Freehills contact.
On Wednesday 4th March Herbert Smith Freehills hosted an event in partnership with Chatham House (the Royal Institute for International Affairs, London), seeking to explore the opposition to the TTIP and, in particular, the Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) chapter within it. Chaired by HSF partner, Andrew Cannon, the panel represented a broad range of stakeholders from in-house counsel, government officials, academia and civil society, together with HSF partner, Christian Leathley. The panel explored why ISDS arouses such opposition, and whether and how it can be improved to strike a balance between investment protection and the right of governments to regulate. The panel also considered whether the TTIP and its ISDS provisions will be a blue print for future free trade agreements.
The proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) free trade agreement between the EU and the US, two of the world’s largest economies, is intended to remove trade barriers, create wealth and promote investment. On 13 January, the European Commission published the results of its public consultation on the investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) chapter in TTIP. Of the 150,000 responses, 97 per cent were negative. Critics have stated that the ISDS proposals would allow corporates to undermine regulation by governments in fields such as environmental protection.
The event was very well attended with around 100 delegates from across a broad spectrum of sectors and backgrounds. Held under the Chatham House rule, the event opened with presentations by each of the five panellists, followed by questions from the floor. Of particular focus was whether the European Commission’s efforts to revise the substantive standards in the draft TTIP consultation text were merely “tinkering”, doing little to address the legitimacy crisis in ISDS. The panel went on to consider whether a broader shift in mind set towards investor protection was required which gave greater significance to states’ other international obligations such as Human Rights and the environment.
Andrew Cannon comments, “this event gave us a unique opportunity to draw together viewpoints from the two sides of this very current debate at the historic venue of Chatham House. The ISDS system continues to come under ever-closer scrutiny and we will continue to follow developments closely.”
A fuller report of the seminar will be posted shortly.
For further information on the TTIP please contact partners Andrew Cannon, Christian Leathley, Matthew Weiniger and Laurence Shore or your usual Herbert Smith Freehills contact.
At a ceremony in Beijing on 4 January 2015, representatives of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China signed a Host Country Agreement and a related Memorandum of Administrative Arrangements to provide facilities and support services in Hong Kong for PCA-administered dispute resolution proceedings. The Government of Hong Kong announced the arrangements in a press release, available here. Continue reading
The UN General Assembly formally adopted the Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the Transparency Convention) on 10 December 2014. The Transparency Convention makes it easier for States to apply the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the Transparency Rules) in relation to investment agreements concluded before the Transparency Rules came into force in April 2014. The impact of the Transparency Rules on investor-state dispute resolution is discussed in our previous blog post here, and the Transparency Convention and the Transparency Rules are discussed by partner Christian Leathley in a short video blog post here.
We live in interesting times for investment arbitration. There is wider public engagement with investment protection than there has ever been, prompted by the European Commission’s public consultation on the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US, and the agreement in principle of the text of the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada.
Unfortunately, this engagement is by and large negative. Some have railed against the treaties themselves, expressing the view that such protections privilege foreign investors over domestic investors, that they bypass the operation of domestic law and national courts and stymie the right of states to regulate. Others have criticised the investor-state arbitration process, claiming that it allows partisan, self-interested arbitrators to secretly overrule governments with no right of appeal.
This story of a system biased against impoverished states, used as a weapon by “big business” intent on flexing its muscles, is a compelling one, bolstered by a small number of high profile cases which (whether rightly or wrongly) add fuel to the fire. Those few small voices of calm trying to put the case for free trade, protection of investment and a non-national, neutral and pacific method of dispute resolution are easily overlooked in the debate. Yet there is a strong case to be put.
Limitations of recourse to national courts and diplomacy
Before the introduction of investment treaties, if a national of one state was poorly treated, their assets commandeered, or their safety threatened in another state, they may (in theory) have been able to pursue a remedy in the national courts of that state. The difficulties of this course are readily apparent. The investor may not have access to an independent judiciary untouched by political or other influences. A final remedy may take years to achieve and enforcement against the state in question may be impossible. The main recourse was instead through diplomatic channels. The investor would need to get its own government interested in the issue and willing to engage in international diplomacy to seek to resolve the situation.
A government may be more inclined to act in the context of an outright taking, but host state actions are increasingly more subtle than this. The success of that state-to-state diplomacy would ultimately depend on the relative strengths of the states involved and whether any other, more pressing diplomatic issues took precedence. Failing diplomacy, a national would need to rely on its home state being willing to “send in the gunboats” to enforce or protect its rights.
Investment treaties as a vehicle for investment protection
Diplomacy might be an option in a world in which international investment and business transactions are extremely limited, but in the 21st century, few states would be willing or able to elevate events affecting one commercial party to the level of international diplomacy. Investment treaties offer states the opportunity to de-politicise these kinds of disputes. Germany entered into the first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Pakistan in 1959 (a fact which now seems ironic given Germany’s position in the current debate on the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the TTIP).
In the world’s 3000+ investment treaties, states agree between themselves standards of protection that they will offer to investors of the other. They then allow individual investors to enforce those standards against a host government, without needing the assistance or support of their own government. It is a system invented and developed by states for their own benefit, to attract foreign investment in order to boost their own economies.
These treaties have considerable importance for states in underpinning their viability as a place of investment. They contain protection standards with which few could take issue. They promise non-discrimination, fair and equitable treatment and compensation for expropriation of assets. In short, they ensure that foreign investors are treated fairly by the host state in which they invest.
In order to ensure that these standards of protection are concrete and enforceable, the treaties provide for investors who claim their investments have been damaged by the host state to claim recompense for that damage before an international arbitral tribunal. That arbitral tribunal is comprised of three individuals, one chosen by the state, one by the investor and the third by the co-arbitrators, to rule on whether the treaty standards have been breached by the host state and, if so, what compensation is payable. The tribunal sits outside the sphere of any domestic courts, free from the risk of domestic bias or political or other influence.
Potential for reform of the current ISDS system
As a basic proposition, the idea of investment treaties and “international” dispute resolution is a solid and positive one. Yet being a supporter of the idea of investment protection and investor state arbitration does not mean that one must also support the current system in its entirety. The reality of present-day investment arbitration is that states have created a system with flaws which need resolving in the light of modern experience.
1. Clearer standards of protection
Let us start first with the allegation that the protections offered by investment treaties favour foreign investors over domestic investors and stifle regulation. The language used in these treaties has historically been wide and open to interpretation. This has resulted in a lacuna which investors have sought to interpret to their advantage, just as they would the obliquely worded language of a commercial contract. Similarly, arbitral tribunals are criticised for upsetting the balance of the treaty or going “off script” in rendering an investor- friendly decision. Yet where there is lack of clarity, there is scope for interpretation. While we might not like the outcome of a particular award or the interpretation offered by a tribunal, few can disagree that clearer, narrower standards of protection would remove that scope for interpretation and many of these concerns.
The answer must therefore be in clearer drafting. States are alive to the need to clarify the protections given: the CETA text and TTIP consultation show that states can actively seek to draft the treaty protections they are willing to offer. It remains to be seen whether this awareness will in future also prompt more states to utilise their rights under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 31) to seek to agree a binding interpretation of their existing stock of BITs with their state counterparties (in a system akin to that provided by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)).
2. Greater transparency
Similarly, the lack of transparency in the arbitral process has, rightly, been criticised. Lack of transparency has enabled allegations of “secret courts” to abound. Most now accept that, in order for investment arbitration to retain legitimacy, transparency is required. Increasingly, some transparency is becoming the norm.
Most investor-state arbitrations take place under the rules of either the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an autonomous institution within the World Bank that can facilitate the resolution of disputes between investors and signatory states to the ICSID Convention, or as an ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules. ICSID has a process that requires transparency (with greater transparency planned) and the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules have introduced a more transparent and open system, whilst still offering necessary protection for commercially sensitive information.
3. Development of an appeal mechanism
Criticism of the ICSID annulment process is also hard to refute. Whether by design, over-reaching of the tribunals appointed in annulment proceedings, or misuse by the (mostly state) parties seeking annulment, the process has turned into a very different creature from that which the ICSID Convention originally intended. There remains real scope for states, investors, practitioners, academics and interest groups to give thought to a way in which the annulment process could be improved or, indeed, replaced. As yet, however, the suggestions being offered, including some form of appeal mechanism, remain embryonic.
4. A more streamlined process
It is also fair to complain about the length of time taken to bring an investment treaty to a conclusion. In the light of a recent study finding that an ICSID arbitration takes an average of 3.6 years, many may believe efforts can and should be made by all concerned to make the process more efficient and cost effective.
So what does the future hold? States need to decide whether there is still merit in offering investment protection in the form of treaties or free trade agreements (FTAs). Some, like South Africa, appear to have decided to the contrary, and Australia has determined that ISDS will be considered on a case by case basis. Yet it is worth bearing in mind that both these states are resource-rich nations that will always attract investment. For other states this is a highly nuanced picture: Is it necessary between developed nations with established and reliable domestic court systems? Is it necessary for states negotiating with the EU, where not all courts create the same level of confidence in the eyes of foreign investors? Should investor protection be part of, or separate to, free trade negotiations?
Even once those questions are resolved, states who do decide to enter into investment treaties must acknowledge that investors can only claim the protections that are offered to them. If states wish to retain the right to regulate certain parts of their economy, to limit the ability of treaty-shopping shell companies to claim, or to limit the meaning of certain protections, the power rests with them to enter into new treaties on that basis. Given the backlash against CETA and the TTIP, we should and must expect real developments in this sphere over the coming years.
And finally, what is the future for arbitration in resolving disputes under investment treaties? If we decide that investment protection is important, then we must also acknowledge that in many regions of the world, the best custodians of that protection may well not be national courts. If we accept this to be the case, then an international system of dispute resolution is required. ICSID was established with this aim. Current fledgling proposals regarding standing international tribunals of state-appointed arbitrators do not appear to resolve concerns about legitimacy, and run the risk of being far more expensive and less reliable than the current system.
While we should anticipate change in the scope of investment protections offered going forward, and increasing revision of past treaties, the future for investor-state dispute settlement is far less certain. I, for one, hope that the benefits of arbitration do not get lost in the debate.
For further information, please contact Matthew Weiniger QC, Partner, Vanessa Naish, Professional Support Lawyer or your usual Herbert Smith Freehills contact.
The above article has been written by Matthew Weiniger QC for the inaugural Global Law Summit which takes place in London next February to celebrate the rule of law and mark the 800th anniversary of the signing of the magna carta. The Summit will consider as one of its key themes, ‘Law at the heart of 21st century business – from internal governance to regulation, competition and arbitration/dispute resolution’.