In advance of the next meeting of UNCITRAL Working Group III (WG III) in April 2019, the European Union and its Member States have made a submission on “Establishing a standing mechanism for the settlement of international investment disputes” (the Submission), as well as a possible work plan for achieving this aim. As described in our blog post here, WG III has identified a number of concerns in relation to the resolution of investor-state disputes by ad hoc tribunals. In the Report of the 36th Session, WG III encouraged governments to submit proposals as to how the concerns about ISDS identified in the 36th Session should be addressed by way of reform.
The Submission advocates systemic structural change, proposing a two tier “standing mechanism” as “the only available option that effectively responds to all the concerns identified in the working Group” and “the only option that captures the intertwined nature of those concerns“. The features of the “standing mechanism” proposed in the Submission are unsurprising given the previously published views of the EU’s institutions, in particular the European Commission (the Commission). The rhetoric in the Submission differs from the previous articulations coming out of the EU institutions which refer overtly to an “investment court system“. However, the Commission’s news page makes clear that the “standing mechanism” described in the Submission is a “multilateral investment court“. In addition, whilst the Submission makes reference to “adjudicators” rather than judges, the characteristics of the “adjudicators” are those described in the EU’s previous papers on this topic (see here).
The Commission has historically been the flag-bearer for the EU’s reform of ISDS. In the Submission however, it is emphasised that the proposal represents the views of the EU “and its Member States“. This proposition may be tested if the proposed standing mechanism ultimately finds support: further to CJEU Opinion 2/15 on the European Union–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on May 16, 2017, the instrument establishing a standing mechanism will need to be ratified by each of the Member States.
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL“) has been considering the possible reform of investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS“). UNCITRAL Working Group III (“WGIII“) has been given a broad mandate to identify concerns regarding ISDS procedure, consider whether reform is desirable, and, if so, develop relevant solutions to be recommended to the main UNCITRAL body (see our previous blog post here and article (issue 5, page 38) here). While WGIII enjoys broad discretion in discharging its mandate, any solutions devised will take into account the ongoing work of relevant international organisations, and each State may decide the extent to which it chooses to adopt the proposed solutions.
In the recent 36th session of WGIII, it was agreed that reform was desirable in at least three areas: (i) inconsistency and incorrectness of arbitral rulings; (ii) concerns about arbitrators and decision-makers; and (iii) the cost and duration of ISDS. However, the precise type of reform remains to be decided. Some States (and the EU) are advocating systemic reform while others propose a more nuanced approach, fixing perceived problems within the framework of the existing system.
Whilst WGIII’s mandate is limited to the procedural aspects of ISDS, changes to the way in which investor-state disputes are resolved may affect the value investors place on the substantive protections in investment treaties as a way of mitigating risks connected with foreign investment. Continue reading
Iberdrola, S.A. and Iberdrola Energia. S.A.U. v. Bolivia (PCA Case No. 2015-05) is the first case to apply the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration ("Rules on Transparency"). On 7 August 2015, the arbitral tribunal issued the first procedural order (available in Spanish only) disclosing the fact that the parties to the arbitration had agreed to the application of the Rules on Transparency to their proceeding. About a month later, a second procedural order in the case BSG Resources Limited v. Republic of Guinea (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/22) was published on ICSID's website revealing that the parties had also agreed on the application of the Rules on Transparency. The application of the Rules on Transparency in these cases represents not only a significant change in the way investor-state disputes are resolved, but the agreement of the parties to their application also suggests a change in the way states and investors view the public interest in the process.
On 9th July 2014, at its 47th session, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) approved a Draft Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (the Convention). The main aim of the Convention is to extend the application of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the Transparency Rules). As previously reported by us, the Transparency Rules were introduced to try and increase transparency in investor-state arbitrations by allowing for greater public access to documents and hearings and for interested parties to make submissions to the tribunal.
If adopted by the UN and embraced by states, the Convention has the potential to bring about a significant change to the resolution of investor-state disputes, impacting states and investors alike.