On 18 March 2021, the Independent Review of Administrative Law (the “IRAL”) published its report on reform to the judicial review process (the “IRAL’s Report”) in which it made two substantive recommendations and a number of procedural recommendations. The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice agreed with those recommendations and was “also interested in exploring proposals beyond these”. This was the basis upon which on the same day the Ministry of Justice published a consultation on judicial review reform (the “Consultation”).


On 31 July 2020 the Government announced that it had appointed a panel of experts to examine if there is a need to reform the judicial review process and other aspects of public law decision making. The intention of the IRAL was to be wide-ranging in its scope. The Terms of Reference of the IRAL stated that it would “examine trends in judicial review of executive action, in particular in relation to the policies and decision making of the Government”. As part of its review the IRAL’s call for evidence invited submissions on how well or effectively judicial review currently balances, on the one hand, the legitimate interest in citizens being able to challenge the lawfulness of executive action with, on the other, the role of the executive in carrying on the business of Government.

While much can be said in respect of the IRAL’s Report and the Consultation, we have focussed on the key issues.

The IRAL’s Report

In summary, the IRAL made the following recommendations for changes to the substantive law:

  • Abolishing Cart JRs: Applications for judicial review against a decision of the Upper Tribunal (the “UTT”) to refuse permission to appeal against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (the “FTT”) on the basis that the FTT’s decision was affected by an error of law and therefore the UTT’s decision was also so affected are referred to as applications for a “Cart JR”. The IRAL received a request from judges to examine Cart JRs, which some of those who gave evidence thought adds an additional layer of appeal that is unnecessary and unintended. After conducting investigations, the IRAL concluded that in only 0.22% of all applications for a Cart JR since 2012 has granting permission to pursue an application for a Cart JR resulted in an error of law on the part of a FTT being identified and corrected. On that basis the IRAL concluded that the continued expenditure of judicial resources on considering applications for a Cart JR could not be defended, and recommended that the practice of making and considering such applications should be discontinued.
  • Allowing courts to suspend quashing orders: The remedies that are potentially available when an application for judicial review is successful are set out in section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981: a mandatory, prohibiting or quashing order; a declaration or injunction; damages, restitution or the recovery of a sum due. The IRAL’s recommendation in this area was that section 31 should be amended to give the courts the option of making a suspended quashing order, i.e. a quashing order which will automatically take effect after a certain period of time if certain specified conditions are not met. It is the view of the IRAL that by issuing such an order the Court would be able to acknowledge the supremacy of Parliament in resolving conflicts between the courts and the executive as to how public power should be employed.

The IRAL also made some further recommendations and suggestions, including for non-legislative changes, which are more procedural in nature. For example, it stated that there is a need to clarify the scope of the duty of candour (i.e. the requirement that a public authority, when presenting its evidence in response to an application for judicial review, to set out fully and fairly all matters that are relevant to the decision that is under challenge). The IRAL suggested that this clarification be achieved by revisiting the Treasury Solicitor’s Guidance. It also stated that some amendments be made to the Civil Procedure Rules, such as a formal provision for a Reply to be filed by a Claimant within 7 days of receipt of the Acknowledgement of Service. With regard to the time limit within which a claim for judicial review must be brought by filing a claim form at court, CPR 54.5 states that it must be “no later than three months after the grounds to make the claim first arose” but the first requirement is that this must be done “promptly”. The IRAL states that there may be a case for abolishing the requirement of promptitude and it would “certainly not favour” any tightening of the current time limits for bringing a judicial review. Also, the IRAL recommends that the criteria for permitting intervention should be developed and published, “perhaps in the Guidance for the Administrative Court”.

The IRAL explicitly ruled out some possible reforms. For instance, it rejected the concept of statutory codification because “the grounds for review are well established and accessibly stated in the leading textbooks”. However, it acknowledged that codification could make judicial review more accessible to non-lawyers. The IRAL also recommended that Parliament does not pass any comprehensive or far-reaching legislation regarding non-justiciability, but instead legislate in response to particular decisions. The IRAL warned that broader legislation in this area that purported to roll back certain developments in the law on non-justiciability would be regarded as amounting to an ouster clause and that while the use of such a clause would be justified, it is likely to face a hostile response from the courts and robust scrutiny by Parliament.

Language deferential to Parliament’s role as a legislature was incorporated throughout the IRAL’s Report, as illustrated at paragraph 2.78:

We should emphasise that our reasons for not favouring making large changes to this area of law do not include any argument that it might be inappropriate for Parliament to legislate in this area. On the contrary: we are of the firm view that it is entirely legitimate for Parliament to pass legislation making it clear what sorts of exercises of public power (or issues relating to such exercises) should be regarded as non-justiciable. We strongly agree with the view advanced by Baroness Hale in her submission to us that: ‘If Parliament does not like what a court has decided, it can change the law.’ This is the case in every other area of law, and it is hard to see why it should not be in relation to the law on judicial review.

Nonetheless, it is interesting that the IRAL chose to incorporate its observations that while R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2018] AC 61 and R (Miller) v Prime Minister [2020] AC 373 represented “substantial setbacks for the [Government] and were of considerable constitutional importance, [the IRAL is] not convinced that the decisions (novel as they were) in those cases are likely to have wider ramifications given the unique political circumstances” at the time. Indeed the IRAL goes so far as to state that for “every controversial decision, there are many others (less publicised and less commended-upon) where judges have shown ‘restraint’”.

The Consultation

The Government agrees with the IRAL’s recommendations regarding Cart JRs and adding a remedy for suspended quashing orders, as well as removing the requirement for a claim to be issued “promptly”; providing further guidance for interveners; and providing for an extra step in the process for a Reply to be filed within 7 days of receipt of the Acknowledgement of Service. The Consultation seeks further views on these issues.

The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice is “also interested in exploring proposals beyond these [recommendations]”. The Consultation makes clear that now is not the right time to propose far-reaching, radical structural changes to the system of judicial review, but that there is a case for targeted, incremental change. To that end the Government is now consulting on the following topics:

  • legislating to clarify the effect of statutory ouster clauses;
  • legislating to introduce remedies which are of prospective effect only, to be used by the courts on a discretionary basis;
  • legislating that, for challenges of Statutory Instruments, there is a presumption or a mandatory requirement for any remedy to be prospective only;
  • legislating for suspended quashing orders to be presumed or required;
  • legislating on the principles which lead to a decision being a nullity by operation of law; and
  • making further procedural reforms (which would need to be considered by the CPR Committee).

The Consultation closes on 29 April 2021.


Despite the wide remit conferred upon it at the outset of its review, the IRAL’s relatively modest recommendations may be underpinned by its view that while it “understands the [Government’s] concern about recent court defeats, [the IRAL] considers that disappointment with the outcome of a case (or cases) is rarely sufficient reason to legislate more generally.” However, it is clear that the Government continues to feel strongly that the courts should remain deferential to Parliament:

[It] cannot be emphasised enough that Parliament is the primary decision-maker here and the courts should ensure they remain, as Lady Hale put it, ‘the servant of Parliament’.

We note that that the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State explains that he wants to “focus attention first on the most pressing issues, namely ouster clauses and remedies, before considering whether any broader reforms are necessary”. This suggests that upon concluding the Consultation, the Government may propose further reforms to judicial review and public law matters.

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Andrew Lidbetter
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