High Court considers judicial review of public sector appointments made during the pandemic

April 5, 2022

In R (Good Law Project and Runnymede Trust) v Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Health & Social Care [2022] EWHC 298 (Admin) the High Court granted a declaration that the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care did not comply with the public sector equality duty (“PSED“) in relation to the decisions to appoint particular individuals to senior public sector positions as part of the government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Key points

  • Judicial review is ordinarily not the appropriate forum to challenge employment decisions taken by public authorities.
  • When making appointments, public authorities must evidence the actions they have taken to discharge the obligations imposed by the PSED.
  • While there has been a general trend towards liberalisation of the rules on standing, the courts will nevertheless consider the position carefully and dismiss grounds of challenge where there is no “sufficient interest”.

Background

The judicial review claim, brought by not-for-profit campaign organisation The Good Law Project and race equality think tank The Runnymede Trust (the “Claimants“), concerned a series of appointments to leading healthcare positions during the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic. Specifically, the appointment of Baroness Harding in May 2020 as Chair of NHS Test and Trace (“NHSTT“) and subsequently as Interim Chair of the National Institute for Health Protection in August 2020, and the appointment of Mike Coupe as Director of Testing at NHSTT were all challenged by the Claimants (the “Appointments“).

The Claimants contented that the Appointments were symptomatic of a government policy of recruitment to critical positions without open competition which had resulted in instances of indirect discrimination.

Judicial review was sought on three grounds:

  1. For indirect discrimination, pursuant to sections 29 and 50 of the Equality Act 2010, on the basis that the government had adopted an unlawful and discriminatory appointment policy (“Ground One“).
  2. For breach of the PSED under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, which imposes an obligation to have regard to the need to advance equality of opportunities and to eliminate discrimination (“Ground Two“).
  3. For breach of procedural fairness and apparent bias based on the fact that Baroness Harding was involved in the final stages of the appointment of Mike Coupe, despite there being a historic working relationship between the two appointees (“Ground Three“).

The Defendants opposed all three grounds on their merits and for a number of procedural reasons, including on the basis that the Claimants lacked standing to bring the claims. The Defendants also argued that the decisions challenged were not amenable to judicial review.

Standing and amenability

The judgment contains a detailed summary of the law of standing and its application to NGOs. The key question, which is set out in section 31(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, is whether the particular claimant has a “sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates“. Where a number of different grounds of challenge are being advanced, it is possible that particular claimants could have standing for some grounds but not others.

The judgment also contains an examination of how the principle of amenability – which is whether a decision is a public law decision which can be challenged by way of judicial review – applies in an employment context.

Ground One

The Court held that neither of the Claimants had standing to pursue the indirect discrimination claims. The Court’s conclusion on this point was closely bound up with its consideration of amenability. In particular, the Court emphasised that “The Employment Tribunal – where the relevant cause of action more appropriately exists – is far better suited than the Administrative Court to adjudicate on disputes of fact likely to be material to the outcome of any discrimination claim“. Such claims in the Employment Tribunal could not be advanced by the Claimants but could have been brought by specific individuals, namely the other candidates considered for the Appointments. Notwithstanding that no such individual complainants had come forward, the Claimants did not have standing to bring this ground of challenge.

Ground Two

In relation to the alleged breach of the PSED, the Court confirmed that judicial review is the appropriate forum to bring such a claim. While the Court concluded that the Runnymede Trust, as an organisation promoting racial equality, had standing to do so, it found that The Good Law Project did not have standing due to the organisation’s broad remit. Emphasising that “No individual, even one with a sincere interest in public law issues, would be regarded as having standing in all cases“, the Court found that “it cannot be supposed that the GLP now has carte blanche to bring any claim for judicial review no matter what the issues“.

Ground Three

The Court reiterated that the Employment Tribunal remains the appropriate place for this type of claim and that, consequently, Ground Three was not amenable to judicial review and that neither of the Claimants had standing.

The merits

Ultimately the only ground which the Court permitted to proceed concerned compliance with the PSED.

Emphasising that the PSED is “a duty of process, not of outcome“, the Court held that no evidence had been provided by the Defendants to confirm what actions were undertaken to comply with this duty, finding that the evidence presented “goes no further than generalities“. Ground Two therefore succeeded in respect of the decisions to appoint Baroness Harding as Interim Chair of NHSTT and Mike Coupe as Director of Testing and the Court granted a declaration accordingly.

While there was no formal need for the Court to consider the merits of the other grounds, the judgment does contain a useful discussion of apparent bias. In addition to finding that the claim failed on the facts (as the fair minded observer would not conclude that there was a real possibility of bias), the Court emphasised that “the principles of apparent bias have no application to employment recruitment exercises“.

Comment

The Court’s judgment is notable when set against the backdrop of the various, recent challenges that have been made to the government’s activities during the Covid-19 pandemic. Many of these challenges have been widely publicised and several have involved NGOs with no private interest in the relevant decisions.

A key point of interest here is standing. Whilst acknowledging that, since the House of Lords decision in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd [1982] AC 617, there has been an increased “”liberalisation” of the test for standing“, it is notable that the Court denied The Good Law Project standing on all grounds, having not been persuaded that the broad remit in the organisation’s objects was determinative. It remains to be seen whether this decision will reflect a trend towards tightening the law on standing.

Additionally, the dismissal of Grounds One and Three illustrates the difficulties faced by claimants when seeking to persuade the Court that claims for judicial review in the employment context should progress, given the position of the Employment Tribunal as the specialised forum to hear such claims.

Andrew Lidbetter
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James Wood
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High Court clarifies scope of challenges to consultations on primary legislation

April 4, 2022

The High Court has clarified that complaints of unfair consultation relating to the introduction of primary legislation cannot found a ground of challenge by way of judicial review (R (on the application of A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 360).

Key points

  • The principles on which the law of Parliamentary privilege is based involve “the requirement of mutual respect by the Courts for the proceedings and decisions of the legislature and by the legislature (and the executive) for the proceedings and decisions of the Courts” and the principle of separation of powers.
  • The Court would offend the constitutional principles of Parliamentary privilege and separation of powers if it concerned itself with complaints regarding a consultation and engagement process relating to the introduction of primary legislation.
  • The statutory duty under the Equalities Act 2010 not to indirectly discriminate and the public sector equality duty under the 2010 Act are not applicable to the “function” of making a substantive decision as to the design of a Bill of primary legislation to be placed before Parliament.

Background

In March 2021 the Secretary of State for the Home Department (the “Defendant“) presented to Parliament a policy statement entitled “New Plan for Immigration”. The Defendant stated in the policy statement that a comprehensive consultation and engagement process would commence on 24 March 2021. The subsequent consultation and engagement process lasted for six weeks. On 6 July 2021, the Nationality and Borders Bill was introduced in the House of Commons.

On 28 May 2021, the Claimants (a group of asylum seekers from El Salvador, Sudan, Yemen and Eritrea) filed a claim for judicial review which contained three grounds of challenge:

Ground One – The consultation on the New Plan for Immigration was indirectly discriminatory pursuant to sections 19 and 29(6) of the Equality Act 2010 (the “EA“) as the consultation documents were published only in English and Welsh.

Ground Two – The consultation was in breach of the public sector equality duty pursuant to section 149 of the EA (“PSED”) as certain engagement sessions were invitation-only and did not allow wider participation.

Ground Three – The consultation was in breach of common law requirements for lawful consultation, in particular the Gunning principles derived from R v Brent London Borough Council, ex p Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168.

Permission for judicial review was refused on the papers, and the Claimants renewed their application for permission at an oral hearing.

Judgment

The Court (Fordham J) dismissed the renewed application for permission on all grounds.

The Court considered first whether the claim was justiciable. This involved consideration of  whether the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction on judicial review extends to the Court ‘policing’ the Gunning principles in the context of a consultation which was concerned with “delivering effective legislative change” and whose culminating substantive decision entailed the design of a Bill of primary legislation to be introduced into Parliament. The Court concluded that the answer to that question was clearly and beyond reasonable argument “no”.

The Court noted that Article 9 of the 1689 Bill of Rights set the scene for consideration of this topic. Article 9 provides: “That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament”. The Court noted that the principles on which the law of Parliamentary privilege is based involve “the requirement of mutual respect by the Courts for the proceedings and decisions of the legislature and by the legislature (and the executive) for the proceedings and decisions of the Courts”, and that one of the principles on which the law of Parliamentary privilege is based is “the principle of the separation of powers, which in our Constitution …requires the executive and the legislature to abstain from interference with the judicial function, and conversely requires the judiciary not to interfere with or to criticise the proceedings of the legislature”.

The Court first addressed the third ground of challenge. It noted that it is well established that when a public authority decides to conduct a consultation the Gunning standards are applicable. It is also well established that in principle when a public authority reaches a substantive decision arising out of a decision-making process in which the Gunning standards have been breached, the substantive decision is vitiated. The Court concluded that a declaration that an applicable legal standard was breached in a consultation and engagement process culminating in the operative decisions as to the design of a Bill to introduce into Parliament would constitute a breach of Parliamentary privilege and the constitutional separation of powers.

On this basis it held that the Gunning standards are not applicable to a decision about the design of the consultation and engagement process which led to the introduction of the Nationality and Borders Bill.

In respect of the first two grounds, the Court held that both the EA duties invoked by the Claimants were inapplicable to the function of designing the consultation and engagement process which led to the introduction of the Bill. This was on the basis that it would be a breach of Parliamentary privilege and the constitutional separation of powers for a Court to hold that the procedure that led to legislation being enacted was unlawful. This resulted in the actions by a Government body leading up to the making of primary legislation (including decisions as to the design of the consultation and engagement process) not being within the “functions” of a public authority to which the PSED applies.

The Court went on to conclude that even if it had found the matters to be justiciable, it would have refused permission for judicial review on lack of arguability of all three grounds.

Comment

The High Court’s decision reaffirms the importance of the concepts of Parliamentary privilege and the constitutional separation of powers when considering the scope of the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.

The Court noted that the approach to the question of justiciability in case law recognises that responsibility for considering standards and accountability in relation to those standards is a responsibility of Parliament. The Court does not have a role of identifying legal standards and enforcing them (albeit they would be identified and enforced in the context of decision-making culminating in delegated legislation) so as to identify procedural impropriety in the lead up to primary legislation, for the purpose of informing Parliament or members of Parliament or informing public debate. That would be an act of interference which the Court’s “chosen, self-denying ordinance” based on the constitutional principles of the separation of powers and the rule of law inhibits it from undertaking.

Andrew Lidbetter
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Nusrat Zar
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HSF responds to the Government’s consultation on human rights reform

March 11, 2022

The main window for response to the Government’s consultation paper on the reform of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA“) has now closed. The consultation paper proposed an overhaul of the existing human rights regime in the UK by replacing the HRA with a new Bill of Rights. The proposals involved giving greater legislative guidance to courts on key human rights issues, tweaking some of the existing legislation, and cultivating a distinctly British angle to domestic human rights law. A summary of the proposals can be read here.

In this blog post, we summarise some of the key aspects of our response to the consultation paper. In general, we think the system works well as it currently stands. We are concerned that changes may result in misalignment with the jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR“). Such misalignment is likely to cause more cases to seek redress directly from the ECtHR, defeating the original purpose of the HRA, which was to make rights accessible domestically. We also consider that the courts are best placed to determine human rights law, and therefore we warn against an overly prescriptive legislative regime that may inhibit the courts’ discretion. Please see below for more detail on some of the key issues. You can find our full response here.

  • Reform of section 2 concerning the status of Strasbourg caselaw. We do not consider it necessary to ‘soften’ the wording of section 2 or to explicitly suggest that domestic courts can draw on a wide range of sources when determining human rights issues. We believe that the current arrangements strike the right balance: they indicate that courts should generally align themselves with case law from the ECtHR while allowing for departure in appropriate cases.
  • Reform of section 3 concerning how legislation should be interpreted. We think that any attempt to provide more guidance in legislation that courts should consider the will of Parliament is not likely to have a significant effect. Courts already accept that section 3 cannot be used to ‘go against the grain’ of the legislation. Adjusting section 3 is likely to cause confusion and bring our domestic jurisprudence out of step with that of the ECtHR.
  • Permission stage. Our view is that a permission stage for human rights cases would not be desirable but would simply make the process of bringing a claim more expensive and cumbersome. Additionally, if the proposed ‘significant disadvantage’ test creates a higher threshold than the current ‘victim’ test, there is a risk that meritorious claims will not be heard. It may be that there are cases where the full extent of the harm caused to the claimant does not come fully to light at the permission stage.
  • Reduction of liability for public authorities. We do not support the proposed attempts to reduce the liability of public authorities. Regarding the proposals to limit the extent of public bodies’ positive obligations, although we accept that positive obligations do place a burden on public authorities, we think that in some circumstances they are necessary in order to give proper effect to rights. Equally, we do not think that public bodies should be afforded a greater defence when acting in accordance with the will of Parliament than that already present in section 6(2) of the HRA.
  • Proportionality. Proportionality is an inherently flexible principle that does not lend itself well to codification. Legislative guidance on the principle is likely to lead to uncertainty and unnecessary litigation. Moreover, our view is that any change is unnecessary. Courts already give significant deference to Parliament and the executive on appropriate matters. Legislative guidance on the principle of proportionality is likely to restrict the courts’ ability to apply the principle flexibly.
  • Declarations of incompatibility. We contend that while the declaration of incompatibility mechanism works well in relation to primary legislation, it is not necessary in the context of secondary legislation, because the same democratic concerns do not arise. Secondary legislation is normally passed quickly by ministers without, in practice, Parliamentary scrutiny. We do not think that the declaration of incompatibility mechanism should replace the courts’ existing power, explained in RR (AP) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2019] UKSC 52, to disapply secondary legislation.
  • Remedies. We do not think that any more guidance is needed for courts to determine the quantum of damages in human rights cases. The courts already take into account a wide range of considerations when determining the quantum of damages and are best placed to make fact-specific assessments in each case to achieve an equitable outcome.
Andrew Lidbetter
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Court of Appeal finds no breach of positive human rights duties

March 11, 2022

The Court of Appeal has allowed an appeal by the Environment Agency (“EA”) and set aside a declaration made by the High Court which had required the EA to take certain actions in order to comply with positive obligations under Articles 2 (the right to life) and 8 (the right to private life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), as incorporated into English law by way of the Human Rights Act (“the HRA”).

Key Points

  • The role of the Court under the HRA is to determine whether a public authority is acting unlawfully by acting in a way which is incompatible with a person’s ECHR rights. An act includes a failure to act.
  • If it is to be found that a public authority is acting, or is proposing to act, unlawfully, there must be a proper evidential basis for that finding. The Court’s role is to adjudicate on whether a claim as brought is made out, and, if so what remedy is appropriate
  • Courts must take the greatest care not to exceed their function, especially in cases relating to the regulation of dangerous industrial activities where the subject matter is complex and technical.
  • It is not the Courts’ role to dictate precise measures which should be adopted by public authorities in order to comply with their positive duties under the ECHR.

Background

The Claimant, a young child, suffered from severe respiratory problems.  His life expectancy was at risk of being significantly reduced because of exposure to hydrogen sulphide emissions from a landfill site near to where he lived which operates under a permit from the EA. The EA recognised and accepted that there was an issue with the emissions and steps had been and continue to be taken to rectify this.

The High Court in August 2021 held that positive operational duties upon the EA were triggered under Articles 2 and Article 8 of the ECHR. Whilst those Articles had been triggered, the High Court declined to find that there had been a breach of either Article. Nonetheless, it granted a declaration that the EA was required to implement the advice of Public Health England (“PHE”) as to the specific levels and target dates for reduced emissions in order to comply with its legal obligations under the ECHR. See our commentary on the judgment.

The EA appealed to the Court of Appeal. It contended that:

1)     The Court erred in concluding that the declaration was justified and appropriate. It should have been for the EA as the statutorily appointed and expert regulator to determine what further actions were required to reduce the levels of hydrogen sulphide to acceptable levels, taking into account the PHE guidance (the “First Ground”).

2)     The Court erred in granting a declaration in circumstances where there was no finding of any past or current breach of the EA’s obligations, as without a breach there was no proper basis on which to grant a declaration (the “Second Ground”).

In a cross appeal the Claimant contended that: (1) the Judge had found that the EA was in breach of its obligations under the ECHR and therefore was right to grant the declaration, or (2) alternatively, if the Judge had not found that there was a breach of the ECHR, he was wrong in failing to find a breach.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal granted the EA’s appeal on both grounds.

First Ground

The Court of Appeal explained that the Court’s role under the HRA is to determine whether a public authority is acting unlawfully in contravention of an individual’s ECHR rights, and to then determine the appropriate remedy. In this case its role was to determine whether the EA had acted unlawfully by acting incompatibly with the Claimant’s rights under Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR. However, the Judge at first instance instead “sought to define the legal content of the obligation” by electing the advice given by PHE to a legally binding standard and prescribing the actions and timeframes for reducing emissions that the EA was legally required to comply with. In doing so, he had exceeded the scope of the Court’s function under the HRA as it was not the Court’s role to prescribe such standards.

The Court of Appeal held that the Judge had acted contrary to principles established in the European Court of Human Rights in Budayeva v Russia (2014) 59 EHRR 2 (“Budayeva”) and Fadeyeva v Russia (55723/00) (2007) 45 EHRR 10 (“Fadeyeva”) on the appropriateness of judicial intervention in the regulation of dangerous industrial activities. In Fadeyeva it was held that it is not the Court’s task to determine what exactly must be done or what precise measures must be taken to reduce pollution. Similarly, in Budayeva the Court held that the choice of means of rectifying the unlawfulness was for the state to decide. On this basis the declaration granted by the Judge was set aside.

Second Ground

The Court of Appeal noted that declarations are commonly used as a remedy in judicial review cases where a public authority is acting, or proposing to act, unlawfully. In exceptional cases, an advisory declaration may be granted to clarify the law on a certain issue. Section 8 of the HRA states that “in relation to any act (or proposed act)” that is deemed unlawful, the Court can grant just and appropriate relief. Therefore, there should be an unlawful act or proposed act for declaratory relief to be granted.

It was held that on a fair reading of the High Court judgment, the Judge did not find that the EA had breached any of its obligations under Articles 2 or 8 of the ECHR at the date of the hearing, nor was there basis to say it was proposing to act unlawfully. In fact, the Judge had expressly declined to make such a finding. Moreover, an advisory declaration to clarify a point of law was not sought by the Claimant and in any case would not have been appropriate given the issue involved deciding what action to take in a complex regulatory and technical sphere. Therefore, the declaration granted was neither justified nor required to remedy any unlawful act or failure to act as one did not exist.

Cross Appeal

The Court of Appeal found that there was no proper basis upon which a Court could find that Articles 2 and 8 had been breached, or that the EA proposed to act in breach of its obligations under those Articles. The cross-appeal was therefore dismissed.

Comment

The Court of Appeal’s judgment affirms that the Court’s role in claims alleging breaches of the HRA is to adjudicate on whether the public authority is acting unlawfully by acting, or failing to act, in a way that is incompatible with a person’s ECHR rights. To go further and define the legal content of the positive obligation wrongfully exceeds the Court’s role, and the Court of Appeal has emphasised that the Courts must take great care not to do so.

 

Andrew Lidbetter
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Nusrat Zar
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Jasveer Randhawa
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Lara Nassif
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ADMINISTRATIVE COURT DEFERS TO THE EXPERT VIEW OF REGULATOR

March 11, 2022

In R (on the application of Cox) v Oil and Gas Authority [2022] EWHC 75 (Admin) the High Court has dismissed a judicial review challenge to a decision of the Oil and Gas Authority (“OGA“), in doing so emphasising that it will afford considerable deference to a regulator’s expert view and that there may not be a “single right answer” to questions of statutory construction.

Key points

Background

Section 9A of the Petroleum Act 1998 (as amended) sets out a “principle objective” for the OGA of “maximising the economic recovery of UK petroleum” (“MER“). The Act also requires the publication of a strategy which must be reviewed periodically, with which the OGA must act in accordance. In addition, the Energy Act 2016 requires the OGA to “have regard” to a number of matters when exercising its functions, including how facilities for storing carbon dioxide may assist the Secretary of State to meet the Net Zero Target (set out in section 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008).

The OGA’s current strategy came into force in February 2021 (the “Strategy“). The Strategy included a “central obligation” which provided that, in meeting the principal objective of MER, relevant persons must take appropriate steps to assist the Secretary of State in meeting the Net Zero Target. The Strategy also gave a definition of “economically recoverable” which included “resources which could be recovered at an expected (pre-tax) market value greater than the expected (pre-tax) resource cost of their extraction“.

The three individual Claimants in this case, who were environmental campaigners, brought a claim for judicial review against the OGA and the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in relation to the decision to adopt the Strategy.

Grounds of challenge

The Claimants were granted permission to pursue two grounds of challenge.

Ground One

The Claimants submitted that the Strategy’s definition of “economically recoverable” frustrated the statutory purpose of section 9A and in particular that the OGA had erred by adopting an objective of maximising the economic recovery of UK petroleum on a pre-tax basis. The essence of the Claimants’ case was that, by ignoring the effect of government-backed financial support, the Strategy had stretched the definition of “economically recoverable” too wide, such that activities that were not truly “economic” for the UK as a whole were nonetheless still sought to be maximised through the Strategy. This was because in some years there had been negative tax flows (such that taxpayers were recipients, not payers).

The Claimants also argued that the meaning of the statutory provision was a question for the Court, that there could not be more than one permissible interpretation of it, and the OGA had erred in law by adopting the construction that it had.

Ground Two

The Claimants claimed that the definition of “economically recoverable” which the OGA had adopted was irrational as it would have the effect of increasing the amount of petroleum which would be sought and recovered, such that the Strategy would be inconsistent with the Net Zero Target (to which the Energy Act 2016 required the OGA to have regard).

Decision of the Administrative Court

Mrs Justice Cockerill dismissed both grounds of challenge.

As to Ground One, Cockerill J summarised the primary question for the Court as being whether it is for the Court to determine the correct construction of MER or whether that is for the OGA to determine, subject only to a “Wednesbury” unreasonableness test (ie a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable public body could come to that decision).

Ultimately, Cockerill J held that, while she did not necessarily accept the Defendants’ submission that it was always improper in a judicial review for a Court to substitute itself for the regulator on complex issues of economic assessment, the Court will afford considerable deference to the regulator’s expert view. In this particular case, Parliament had not intended the Court, rather than the expert regulator, to determine the best method of economic assessment.

Even if it had been for the Court to determine the correct construction, Cockerill J considered that the OGA had reached the right result. In arriving at this conclusion, Cockerill J considered that the Claimants’ case was “considerably hampered” by their failure to put forward a positive case as to construction, which made it harder to test the “wrong” approach. Cockerill J was also influenced by conducting a “sense check” of the Claimants’ concerns, which she found led to a “strained and nonsensical approach“.

As to Ground Two, Cockerill J explained that the starting point for the Claimants was that they needed to meet the high threshold of irrationality. They also needed to show that, while the pre-tax method is not legally an incorrect construction to have arrived at (on the basis that Ground One had been dismissed), it was nevertheless irrational to reach that conclusion. On the facts of this case, the threshold for irrationality had not been reached. The Claimants could also not show a breach of the “have regard” duty under the Energy Act 2016, which the Court emphasised was a “process duty“. Balancing the various matters to which the regulator must have regard was a matter for the OGA, not the Court.

Comment

This decision illustrates that the Court’s approach to statutory construction will vary according to the context. While in some cases there might be a “right” approach, in others (and particularly where an expert regulator is concerned) the Courts might show significant deference. It is therefore important that those construing statutory provisions (whether public bodies considering their own powers or those considering bringing challenges) consider the context carefully to assess the Court’s likely approach.

The judgment in this case also demonstrates that it is often important (and of significant persuasive value) for parties to put forward positively what they consider the “right” approach to the construction of a particular point. A Court may also be influenced by consideration of whether the practical effects of a particular construction are sensible.

Finally, the decision shows the difficulty in succeeding on an irrationality challenge where another more “hard edged” challenge based on legality has failed. For this reason, before including an irrationality ground, parties ought to consider carefully whether that is really likely to add anything to a legality challenge.

 

Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
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Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
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Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
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James Wood
James Wood
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COURTS CONSIDER LEGALITY OF PROCUREMENT DECISIONS TAKEN DURING THE PANDEMIC

January 31, 2022

Two recent judgments have been handed down, relating to allegations of breach of procurement rules by campaign organisation The Good Law Project against the Government. Both judgments related to procurement decisions made during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic:

Key points

  • Where a contracting authority considers bids from more than one economic operator, there is no obvious rationale for disregarding the principle of equal treatment in terms of the criteria used to decide which bidders should be awarded a contract. Dispensing with a competition does not justify arbitrary or unfair selection criteria where more than one economic operator could satisfy the demand.
  • In a case concerning decisions made by a public body where it is required to make a complex evaluation of a wide range of overlapping criteria, all of which involve difficult and technical judgments, the purpose of which is to safeguard front line workers in a public health crisis, the Court must accord proper respect to the fact that the decision-maker is much better placed to carry out the assessment than the judiciary by way of judicial review.
  • Consideration of allegations of bias, actual or apparent, requires an assessment of whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there is a real possibility of bias. The central context for an assessment of the fair minded and informed observer’s belief is the emergency conditions arising out of the pandemic which, in turn, lead to the engagement of regulation 32 of the PCR, which allows for relaxation of the usual procurement rules where “strictly necessary” and for reasons of “extreme urgency brought about by events unforeseeable by the contracting authority“.
  • A claimant may have standing to challenge the award of a government contract despite not being an economic operator if it has a sufficient interest in the public procurement process, and there are no obviously identifiable disappointed bidders who might otherwise be in a position to identify causation and loss. However, the issue of standing in procurement claims is “ripe for review“.

R (GLP) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care

Background

The judicial review claim, brought by The Good Law Project and doctors’ organisation EveryDoctor, related to the award of contracts for the supply of PPE during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic between March and April 2020. The urgency of the health emergency meant the Secretary of State abandoned the usual competitive procurement process in favour of an “open source” approach to purchase over £14 billion-worth of PPE procured through more than 1,000 contracts. Nine of these contracts were awarded to three companies: Ayanda Capital Limited (“Ayanda“) for a value of £252 million, Crisp Websites Limited t/a PestFix (“PestFix“) for a value of £342 million, and Clandeboye Agencies Limited (“Clandeboye”) for a value of £123 million.

The Secretary of State established a ‘high priority lane’ for companies referred by Ministers, MPs and senior officials, which had their offers considered sooner than rival bids and thus increased their chances of being awarded a contract. A National Audit Office report found that companies within the high priority lane were ten times more likely to succeed in their bids.

The claimants sought judicial review on three grounds:

  1. The Defendant was in breach of the EU principles of equal treatment and transparency by:
    1. Failing to identify the contract selection criteria or guidance.
    2. Operating a high priority lane which significantly increased a bidder’s prospects of being awarded a contract.
  2. The Defendant failed to provide proper reasons for its decisions.
  3. The decision to award the contracts to PestFix and Ayanda was irrational because no sufficient financial or technical verification was carried out in respect of their offers due to the operation of the high priority lane.

The Secretary of State relied on regulation 32(2)(c) of the PCR, which allows for relaxation of the usual procurement rules where “strictly necessary” and for reasons of “extreme urgency brought about by events unforeseeable by the contracting authority”. Regulation 18 of the PCR requires contracting authorities to treat economic operators equally and without discrimination and to act in a transparent and proportionate manner. The Secretary of State argued that the Claimants lacked standing to bring the claim because they are not “economic operators” within the meaning of regulation 18.

Judgment

On the issue of standing, the Court found that the Claimants had sufficient interest to bring the challenge on each ground.

In relation to the first ground, Mrs Justice O’Farrell found the Defendant’s open source procurement process had in place adequate selection criteria and guidance for the evaluators of bids. However, the operation of the high priority lane breached its obligation of equal treatment and it was unlawful to confer such an advantage on PestFix and Ayanda. Clandeboye was found not to have been awarded its contracts through the high priority lane and so this part of the claim was dismissed.

The Court dismissed the second ground as the Defendant had given sufficient reasons for the decisions. In relation to the third ground, the Court found there was objective justification for treating the offers from PestFix and Ayanda as high priority offers and that sufficient due diligence had been carried out in respect of these companies prior to the award of contracts, taking into account the limited time and resources.

The Court concluded that, although the Defendant’s operation of the high priority lane breached its obligation of equal treatment and was therefore unlawful, the merits of PestFix and Ayanda’s offers meant it was highly likely the contracts would be awarded regardless of their position in the high priority lane. On this basis, the Court did not grant the declaratory relief sought by the Claimants.

R (GLP) v Minister for the Cabinet Office

Background

This case is an appeal from the High Court judgment handed down on 15 February 2021. Our ebulletin on the High Court judgment can be found here.

The claim related to the award by the Cabinet Office in June 2020 of a contract for the provision of focus group and communication support services (the “Contract“) to Public First, a public policy research agency. The Contract was intended to assist the Government’s communications strategy regarding the public health risks posed by the pandemic. Both the Minister for the Cabinet Office and the then Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister (Dominic Cummings) had personal and professional connections with the co-founders and directors of Public First.

The Minister for the Cabinet Office appealed the High Court judgment that the relationship between the directors of Public First and Mr Cummings led to apparent bias. The Good Law Project put forward three submissions on a cross-appeal:

  1. It was not “strictly necessary”, as required by regulation 32(2)(c) of the PCR, for the Government to award the Contract to Public First as it already had existing suppliers which could have been used instead.
  2. It was not strictly necessary for the Contract to have a six-month duration.
  3. The scope of the Contract was not strictly necessary because work unrelated to the Covid-19 pandemic was carried out in later stages.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s finding of apparent bias. It held that a fair-minded and reasonably informed observer would not have concluded that a failure to carry out a comparative exercise between Public First and other research agencies created a real possibility that the decision-maker was biased. Equally, the fair-minded and informed observer, realising that the use of a negotiated procedure without prior publication (with Public First) was strictly necessary because of the pandemic emergency, would not have found the absence of any formal record of the decision making process indicative of apparent bias.

The Court of Appeal rejected all three grounds of the Claimant’s cross-appeal. It concluded that the Minister was entitled to exercise his judgment about which suppliers could carry out the urgently required services. Furthermore, at the point in time at which the Contract was made, it was impossible to judge whether six months was longer than strictly necessary. Finally, to the extent that work done under the Contract did not relate to the Covid-19 pandemic, this was a matter of contract performance and was unrelated to the Minister’s procurement decision.

Comment

The two judgments are significant from both a procurement law and public law perspective.

Mrs Justice O’Farrell’s detailed exposition of the requirements of equal treatment and transparency in situations of extreme urgency under regulation 32(2)(c) of the PCR will be relevant in any future challenge based on breach of these procurement rules. Her judgment also emphasises the difficulty of succeeding in judicial review claims alleging irrationality, the judge noting that “the court’s role is not to second-guess an appropriate calculation of the risks involved or substitute its own assessment as to the propriety of the contracts awarded“. The Court of Appeal’s decision in the second claim described above is likely to be welcomed by contracting authorities which awarded contracts under conditions of unprecedented urgency brought about by the first wave of the pandemic.

The approach of the High Court and Court of Appeal to the issue of standing in procurement challenges is also of interest. The High Court in R (GLP) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care found the claimants had standing to bring the judicial review despite neither claimant being an “economic operator”. However, the Court of Appeal in R (GLP) v Minister for the Cabinet Office regarded the first instance decision on standing to be “an unprecedented outcome”, adding that “[t]he question of standing for complete strangers to the procurement process with no commercial interest both under the Regulations and on public law grounds is a question ripe for review when it next arises”. These comments are likely to encourage contracting authorities to seek to question the standing of certain categories of claimant in future claims.

Andrew Lidbetter
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Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
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Jasveer Randhawa
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High Court gives guidance on the admissibility of expert evidence in judicial review

November 30, 2021

The High Court has considered the principles applicable to the admissibility of expert evidence in judicial review proceedings, as well as the weight to be given to witnesses’ comments that stray beyond opinion into argument (R (Gardner) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2021] EWHC 2946 (Admin)).

Key points

  • In judicial review proceedings it is not the function of the Court to assess the merits of the decision under challenge. The issue is whether the decision was lawful, not whether it was ‘right’. Evidence not before the decision-maker, such as that of experts relating to the period after the decision was made, is seldom required to resolve that issue.
  • The admissibility of expert evidence will depend on what type of evidence it is. Whilst statements of fact may assist the Court in understanding the context of the decision in question, statements of expert opinion will only be admitted if they were available at the time of the decision, and those amounting to legal argument will generally be given little weight.
  • The Court will try to take a proportionate approach to inadmissible evidence at the interlocutory stage. Parties will not necessarily be required to re-file statements. Instead, the Court may invite them to make submissions at the substantive hearing as to the appropriate weight to be given to particular passages.

Background

The Claimants, the children of two care home residents who died during the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic between March and June 2020, issued judicial review proceedings against three Government bodies challenging their alleged failure to protect care home residents in England over that period: the Secretary of State for Health of Social Care, NHS England, and Public Health England. It was claimed that the conduct of the Defendants breached both Articles 2 (right to life) and 8 (right to private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR“), as well as the domestic public law principle of rationality.

The Claimants filed two witness statements given by medical consultants, which contained opinions severely critical of the Defendants. At the interlocutory stage, the issue before the Court concerned the Claimants’ application to file a further, third statement and the Defendants’ cross-application to resist this and to excise a number of passages from the statements already filed. The substantive hearing in the case is scheduled to take place in March 2022.

Decision

The High Court (constituted as the Divisional Court) rejected the Claimants’ application to adduce the third statement, as it consisted entirely of criticisms of the Defendants’ evidence. However, the Court considered it disproportionate to have the Claimants’ other two statements re-filed; passages amounting to argument would instead be given little weight at the substantive hearing, whilst those expressing an opinion on the reasonableness or negligence of the Defendants’ conduct would be inadmissible.

In reaching this decision, the Court considered the principles applicable to expert evidence in judicial review, both in relation to ECHR claims and domestic law grounds of challenge. For these purposes, it did not consider it relevant that the expert evidence which the Claimants sought to rely upon was contained in witness statements, as opposed to expert reports.

The Court explained that whilst evidence of opinion from an expert is admissible with the permission of the Court in ordinary civil claims under Part 35 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Court is less willing to provide that permission in judicial review proceedings. This difference in treatment was explained by reference to the Divisional Court’s decision in R (The Law Society) v The Lord Chancellor [2018] EWHC 2094 (Admin), which the Court described as “an authoritative review of the law” on this point. Given the function of judicial review is not to assess the merits of the decision being challenged, it is rarely appropriate for the Court to consider evidence going beyond that which was available to the decision-maker, such as that given by experts.

Applying these principles, the Court held that expert evidence of opinion was admissible to the extent that it was available at the time of the decisions in question. For example, a Guardian article written by one of the consultants stating that care home residents should be made to isolate, published in March 2020, was admissible. But a statement that the Government’s failure to do so was negligent, given by the same consultant as a witness in litigation a year later, was not. Expert evidence of fact, namely as to what had taken place in care homes over the first wave of the pandemic was, however, admissible.

The Claimants contended that, even if there were grounds for declining to admit expert opinion as a matter of domestic law, the position was different in relation to the ECHR claims. It was argued that Article 2 in particular mandated closer scrutiny of the facts than under a rationality challenge alone. The Court agreed to proceed on the basis of that assumption at this interlocutory stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Claimants were permitted to refer, not just to the material on which the Defendants based their decisions, but to all other material (including expert evidence of opinion) that they could reasonably have accessed. However, the Court held that this did not extend to opinion evidence post-dating the decisions being challenged – admitting such evidence “would become entirely unmanageable“.

Finally, the Court addressed the sections of the three witness statements that were neither opinion nor fact, but argument. These included comments by witnesses as to whether the Defendants’ actions were ‘appropriate’ or ‘proportionate’. In line with decision in R (The Good Law Project Ltd) v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2021] EWHC 2091, the Court held that it would not take an “excessively purist” approach, reviewing line-by-line to remove such comments. It would instead consider submissions from Counsel at the substantive hearing as to the weight to be given to them.

Comment

The guidance on the admissibility of expert evidence in judicial review provided in the case of R (Law Society) v The Lord Chancellor has again been affirmed as authoritative (see our previous e-Bulletin). Whilst expert evidence may be admitted, it is seldom required to resolve the issues in judicial review. This is because the Court’s role is not to determine the merits of the decision, but to assess its lawfulness. To answer that question, material not before the decision-maker, such as expert evidence, is generally not required. Whether it is required and should be admissible will depend on the kind of expert evidence it is – evidence of fact, of opinion, or of argument.

The Court’s decision also indicates that in relation to grounds of challenge brought under the ECHR, claimants may have a greater range of evidence admitted, given the closer scrutiny of the decision those grounds may require.

Andrew Lidbetter
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Kyle Johnson
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High Court finds failure to comply with human rights duties in context of monitoring of pollutant levels

October 14, 2021

The High Court has found that positive operational duties under the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA“) were triggered by the failure of the Environment Agency (“EA”) to address recommendations in a health risk assessment by Public Health England (“PHE“) regarding the operation of a landfill site which operates under an EA permit (R (on the application of Richards) v Environment Agency [2021] EWHC 2501 (Admin)).

Key points

  • Section 6 of the HRA provides that it is “unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”, and that an act includes a failure to act. A positive operational duty can arise where there is a positive duty on state authorities to take reasonable and appropriate operational measures to protect individuals’ rights.
  • In determining whether a positive operational duty under Article 2 (the right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR“) is triggered, there must be a known, real and imminent risk to life. This can include a reduction in life expectancy. Once triggered, the public authority must take reasonable steps to protect the right to life.
  • In determining whether a positive operational duty under Article 8 (the right to private life) of the ECHR is triggered, there must be a direct impact on the individual’s home, family or private life, striking a fair balance between the individual and community as a whole, and minimum pollutant levels must be met. Once triggered, the authority must take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure rights to private and family life.
  • The public authority will be afforded a latitude of judgment in respect of compliance with positive operational duties, and the Court will not impose its own views as to best policy.

Background

The claimant, Mathew Richards, is a 5 year old boy who lives in close proximity to Walleys Quarry Landfill Site (“WQLS“). WQLS operates under a permit issued by the EA. Mathew was born prematurely and developed lung complications and respiratory problems. Hydrogen sulphide emissions from WQLS prevented his recovery, which would inevitably lead to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and would consequently significantly reduce his life expectancy. The local community also expressed significant concerns about the impact of the hydrogen sulphide emissions emanating from WQLS on their own health and wellbeing.

PHE, the executive agency of the Department of Health and Social Care, conducted a health risk assessment of the air quality at WQLS. It found that the level of hydrogen sulphide in the air exceeded guideline levels and was not acceptable. PHE recommended that: (1) all measures be taken to reduce off-site odours from the landfill site as early as possible so that WHO guidelines are met, and (2) all measures be taken to reduce the concentrations of hydrogen sulphide in the local area for 2022 to levels below those health-based guidance values used to assess long-term exposure.

The claimant sought judicial review of the EA, alleging that it had failed to discharge its statutory duty under the HRA to protect his rights under the ECHR which are incorporated into English law by way of the HRA, in particular his right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR and his right to respect for private and family life under Article 8. The two critical questions considered by the Court were: (1) whether positive operational duties were triggered under Articles 2 and 8, meaning that the EA would have an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure Mathew’s rights to respect for private and family life and to life; and (2) what those positive operational obligations would entail in the circumstances.

Judgment

The High Court held that Article 2 imposes a positive obligation on state authorities to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those in its jurisdiction. This duty requires a legislative and administrative framework to be put in place to protect the right to life.

The Court cited the Supreme Court’s judgment in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2 (“Rabone“), where the Court held that the trigger for the Article 2 positive operational duty is that “the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and imminent risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals“. The real and imminent risk to life must be present and continuing and significant and substantial. Once triggered, the authority must have “failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk“.

It was held that in this case there was a real and imminent risk to the claimant’s life that was significant, substantial, present and continuing by virtue of his development of a condition which reduced his life expectancy, caused by the activity at WQLS, thereby accelerating death. The Court held that severe environmental pollution affecting an individual’s well-being and adversely affecting private and family life can trigger a positive obligation on the state authorities pursuant to Article 8 to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure rights to private and family life. There must be a direct impact on the individual’s home, family or private life, striking a fair balance between the individual and community as a whole, and minimum pollutant levels must be met. Overall, it was held that the positive operational duty under Article 8 was triggered in this case.

The High Court held that on the facts there was no evidence that the EA had complied with its legal duty. Compliance would require a clear objective and a plan to achieve that objective, and there was no evidence to this effect.

The High Court accordingly made a declaration that the EA must implement the recommendations of PHE in order to comply with its legal obligations. However, the Court declined to find that there was a current breach by the EA of its duties.

Comment

The High Court’s judgment is the first domestic judgment dealing with both Article 2 and Article 8 rights in an environmental context. The Court noted that the majority of similar cases before the European Court of Human Rights are “looking back” cases where the harm has already been done. The Court contrasted the current case which was “in the moment”, with the pollution being a current problem. The judgment makes clear that in such cases the Courts must “step up” to address and enforce the positive operational duties.

The judgment clarifies that a shortening of life expectancy will be deemed a real and immediate risk to life under Article 2 of the ECHR. This is because the relevant risk to life is to be identified with a risk of life ending earlier than it would have but for the relevant failing on the part of the state authority, irrespective of whether death happens immediately or after a time lag (of perhaps several decades if the victim is a child).

Moreover, the judgment makes clear that the lived experience of the victim’s wider local community is relevant in Article 2 and/or Article 8 pollution cases, despite their not being party to the proceedings. It is relevant to establishing as regards Article 8 whether the adverse effects of pollution have reached the “minimum level” necessary to engage the operational duty, and whether a “fair balance” has been struck between the victim’s interest and the public interest. It is also relevant as regards Article 2 to establish whether reasonable steps have been taken by the authority to avoid the risk to life.

Finally, it is notable that the Court declined to find a current breach by the EA. The Court’s reasoning was that there is an “obvious and pressing public interest imperative” that the EA must comply with its legal duties “as a matter of urgency“, and that what matters is to provide clarity with regards to what the EA’s legal obligations are and what the EA must legally do.

Andrew Lidbetter
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Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
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Cost implications at the permission stage for those bringing judicial reviews

September 29, 2021

In a rare intervention on the question of costs, the Supreme Court has confirmed in CPRE Kent v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2021] UKSC 36 that those bringing claims for judicial review and statutory challenges can face exposure to multiple sets of costs at the permission stage.

Key points

  • The court can order that the applicants are required to pay costs of multiple defendants and interested parties at the permission stage.
  • The position is different at later stages of proceedings (or if permission is reconsidered at an oral hearing), where it will be more unusual for interested parties to be able to recover their costs.
  • In all cases it remains true that costs need to be reasonable and proportionate.

Background

The Kent branch of the Campaign to Protect Rural England (“CPRE“) sought to oppose a plan adopted by Maidstone Borough Council (the “Council“). A claim was made by CPRE in which it named the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government as first defendant, the Council as second defendant and Roxhill Developments Ltd as an interested party.

The claim was made under Part 8 (and Practice Direction 8C) of the Civil Procedure Rules (the “CPR“). The rules applicable to claims made under these provisions are similar to those for judicial reviews brought under Part 54 of the CPR. In both forms of proceedings, there is first a permission stage, as part of which defendants and other parties served with the claim form wishing to take part in the claim should file an acknowledgment of service. If permission is granted, there will then be a substantive stage in which the case is determined.

At first instance, Lang J refused permission for CPRE’s claim and made costs orders in favour of each of the first defendant, the second defendant and the interested party. Each of these parties had filed an acknowledgment of service and a summary of grounds for contesting the claim.

The claimant did not challenge the refusal of permission but did appeal the costs award which had been made. The costs award was initially affirmed by HHJ Evans-Gordon. CPRE was then given leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, which ultimately dismissed CPRE’s appeal. Giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Coulson LJ held that the ordinary rule on costs (whereby a claimant whose claim is refused at an early stage will usually be liable for the other parties’ reasonable and proportionate costs) applies at the permission stage of judicial review and statutory challenges. On this basis there was therefore no need for an additional defendant or interested party to show “exceptional” or “special” circumstances in order to recover their reasonable and proportionate costs.

The Supreme Court granted permission to appeal.

The question for the Supreme Court

Giving the judgment of the Supreme Court, Lord Hodge emphasised that, in line with the approach set out in R (Gourlay) v Parole Board [2020] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court will only rarely interfere with decisions relating to costs, the exception being where the appeal raises a question of law of general public importance. Lord Hodge noted that the Court of Appeal has principal responsibility for monitoring and controlling developments in practice (including in relation to costs). This is because the Court of Appeal hears many more cases so is better placed to assess what changes are appropriate, but also because the Supreme Court cannot respond with the same speed, flexibility and sensitivity as the Court of Appeal.

It was therefore for CPRE to show that the Court of Appeal had erred in law.

Judgment

Lord Hodge held that the Court of Appeal had not erred in law and accordingly dismissed CPRE’s appeal.

In support of its appeal, CPRE sought to rely on the House of Lords decision in Bolton MDC v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1176 as authority for the proposition that, where there is multiple representation, the losing party will not normally be required to pay more than one set of costs. CPRE argued that there is no principled justification for adopting a different approach at the permission stage of proceedings.

However, the Supreme Court emphasised that Bolton was concerned with the costs incurred at a substantive hearing and that it had been decided prior to the introduction of the CPR (which had introduced the acknowledgment of service procedure). On an examination of case law decided since the introduction of the CPR, the Supreme Court found there to be established authority that the procedural innovations in the CPR (ie, the acknowledgment of service procedure) justify an exception from the practice set out in Bolton. That is because, under the CPR, in circumstances where a party (including an interested party) wishes to contest a claim, filing an acknowledgment of service is mandatory (and costs consequences can follow if they do not).

Comment

In light of the Supreme Court decision, it is now clear that interested parties may be able to recover their costs for participating in the permission stage of judicial reviews and statutory challenges, in circumstances where permission is refused and provided that those costs are reasonable and proportionate.

From a claimant’s perspective, this could be viewed as inhibiting access to justice, as claimants may be unwilling to face exposure to multiple sets of costs. There will also be uncertainty in any given case as to how the court will exercise its discretion in this regard.

However, this will be welcome news to interested parties who now have the benefit of clear Supreme Court authority in their favour when seeking to recover their costs for successfully resisting permission in judicial review or statutory challenges.

Andrew Lidbetter
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Public Law Project: Judicial Review Trends and Forecasts conference 2021

September 29, 2021

We are delighted to be supporting the Public Law Project again in running its annual Judicial Review Trends and Forecasts conference. This year the conference will take place as a week of online seminars on the theme of ‘accountability and the constitution’.

The sessions will begin on Monday 18 October, and will include a keynote speech by the Rt Hon Suella Braverman MP QC, Attorney General. Andrew Lidbetter, Nusrat Zar, Jasveer Randhawa and James Wood of Herbert Smith Freehills will be among the other speakers.

Sessions will run from Monday 18 October – Friday 22 October. Topics covered include:

  • Top Public Law Cases of the Year
  • Judicial Review of the Regulators
  • Judicial Review and justice during the pandemic
  • Interveners and third parties in Judicial Review

For full event details and to purchase your tickets please visit the Public Law Project website: JR Trends and Forecasts 2021: Accountability and the Constitution – Public Law Project

If you have any further queries or special requirements, please contact the PLP Events Team at: events@publiclawproject.org.uk

Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
Partner
+44 20 7466 2066
Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
Partner
+44 20 7466 2465
Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
Of Counsel
+44 20 7466 2998
James Wood
James Wood
Senior Associate
+44 20 7466 2306