Welcome to the Future: AI offers a window into the UK’s evolving regulatory environment

How to regulate an emerging sector is always an interesting question to which there can be many answers based on the various models of regulation. The UK’s regulatory environment for artificial intelligence (“AI“) is poised for significant evolution, and in this post we consider whether the somewhat unconventional approach proposed by the Government may provide some insight into the future of regulation in other areas.

Proposals for regulating AI – a centrally co-ordinated principles based approach

On 29 March 2023, the Government’s Department for Science, Innovation and Technology published its White Paper on a “pro-innovation approach to AI regulation” (the “White Paper“) (available here), which seeks stakeholder views on the Government’s proposed new AI regulatory framework. For a discussion of the substantive issues see our TMT Notes blog post.

In terms of the regulatory approach:

  1. The Government proposes to introduce five “cross-sectoral principles” (the “Cross-Sectoral Principles“) for existing regulators to have regard to when dealing with AI issues, intended to “guide and inform the responsible development and use of AI“.
  2. Initially, the principles will be issued on a non-statutory basis and applied by regulators within their remits, primarily through guidance. A new statutory duty may subsequently be introduced, which would require regulators to have due regard to the Cross-Sectoral Principles.
  3. The way that regulators apply the Cross-Sectoral Principles when introducing new guidance or other measures, as well as when conducting investigations and enforcement action, should be informed by existing law and regulations. This includes human rights and equality legislation, as well as general public law principles such as rationality and procedural fairness.

The White Paper recognises that AI technologies are advancing rapidly and that “a complex patchwork of legal requirements” currently applies to AI, creating difficulties for businesses. The White Paper explains that regulators also face difficulties, because “some AI risks arise across, or in the gaps between, existing regulatory remits“.

Rather than introducing a new, AI-specific regulator, the Government proposes to introduce a centrally co-ordinated regulatory approach across existing regulators, under the banner of “cross-cutting, principles-based regulation“.

At the heart of the proposed new framework are five Cross-Sectoral Principles, namely:

  • safety, security and robustness;
  • appropriate transparency and explainability;
  • fairness;
  • accountability and governance; and
  • contestability and redress.

Under the Government’s proposals, regulators would “be expected to apply the [Cross-Sectoral Principles] proportionately to address the risks posed by AI within their remits, in accordance with existing laws and regulations“.

The Government envisages playing a central co-ordinating role, including through the production of “central regulatory guidance“. The White Paper indicates that this central regulatory guidance would, amongst other things, encourage initiatives such as guidance being jointly produced by different regulators, and aim to prevent the Cross-Sectoral Principles from hindering innovation.

The potential introduction of a new statutory duty

The Government does not propose to incorporate the Cross-Sectoral Principles into statute in the initial stages of the new framework. However, it anticipates that it will eventually pursue the enactment of a statutory duty for regulators to “have due regard” to the Cross-Sectoral Principles. The enactment of such a duty would aim to “strengthen and clarify regulators’ mandates“, and could encourage an increased willingness to take enforcement action amongst some regulators.

The continuing relevance of existing law and regulations

Irrespective of whether the proposed statutory duty is enacted, regulators will be expected to continue taking account of existing law as they develop guidance or other measures. Some of the Cross-Sectoral Principles have close parallels with existing law; for example, the White Paper recognises that the application of the Cross-Sectoral Principle of “fairness” by regulators should “include consideration of compliance with relevant law and regulation“, including the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010. Regulators will therefore be required to have regard to these and other existing legislative requirements, as well as to public law principles more generally, when decision-making, including when conducting consultations, issuing guidance and conducting investigations and enforcement action.

What does this tell us about the future of regulation?

The approach proposed for AI differs significantly from the traditional model of a specific regulator as part of a detailed statutory regulatory scheme applying to a particular area, or even from models of self-regulation. It also departs significantly from the comprehensive and centralised framework proposed in the EU. The reasons given for this emphasise the need for flexibility and agility in the rapidly moving world of AI. AI is, of course, not the only area where developments often outpace law and regulation, and those arguments could apply equally well in other contexts and sectors. Indeed, this approach does appear to be part of a broader trend towards the use of policy and guidance, emphasising higher level principles and the attractiveness of being nimble, over detailed legislation. It also chimes with the Government’s recent policy paper on ‘Smarter regulation to grow the economy‘ which looks at reducing regulatory burdens to drive economic growth and boost innovation, and in which the view is expressed that “governments too often reach for the lever of regulation first, when other ways to improve and safeguard outcomes are available“.

As always, flexibility comes with its downsides. There is an obvious risk, when tasking multiple regulators with providing guidance in their own areas, of inconsistency or indeed of certain matters falling between the gaps due to a lack of clarity as to who takes ultimate responsibility for a specific issue. Concerns have already been expressed by the Information Commissioner’s Office over precisely how regulators would be expected to interact with the central regulatory guidance, and over funding and co-ordination more generally. Consistency across sectors may be particularly difficult to achieve under this model.

This approach also lacks the certainty and predictability that businesses are used to in other regulatory spheres. The very point of “nimble” guidance is presumably that it can be changed at a moment’s notice, leaving businesses at risk of spending disproportionate time and money trying to comply with ever-shifting standards. Often when a new policy is announced by the Government we are told that the devil will be in the detail, but here there is to be no such detail, or what there is will be in non-statutory guidance only. That leaves businesses, and indeed regulators, seeking to use the high level principles to fill in gaps where no specific guidance applies. Needless to say, those two groups of organisations are not always going to interpret and apply high level principles in the same way. Further, it is unclear how enforcement will operate if standards are only contained in non-binding guidance, although the Government has emphasised its expectation for regulators to act proportionately and in a way that does not stifle innovation.

There are also broader constitutional implications about such heavy reliance on guidance, not least the lack of Parliamentary scrutiny. A more practical concern is that essential procedural safeguards for businesses in this regulatory space may not be guaranteed in the way they are in comprehensive statutory schemes.

One potential consequence of pursuing this avenue may be a greater reliance on general public law principles to fill the gaps when things go wrong. Where a regulator fails to act in a way which is incompatible with its public law duties, then it will be open to businesses and other stakeholders to challenge the regulator’s decisions or actions by way of judicial review. Judicial review may therefore play a significant role, for example in ensuring procedural fairness is upheld in circumstances where there is no set procedure laid down in legislation. Judicial review can also police how regulators use guidance, ensuring that relevant guidance is taken into account but not applied blindly and inflexibly.

It will certainly be interesting to see how this regulatory experiment works and whether, after some time, the Government decides to revert to more traditional statutory intervention. If the system works well, and is welcomed by both businesses and regulators for cutting red-tape and encouraging innovative and collaboration, that may well herald a new approach in other sectors.

Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
Partner
+44 20 7466 2066
Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
Partner
+44 20 7466 2465
Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
Professional Support Consultant
+44 20 7466 2998
Antonia Smith
Antonia Smith
Senior Associate
+44 20 7466 2550

High Court highlights important distinction between policy and legislation, holding exemption to UK GDPR unlawful

In R. (on the application of the3million and Open Rights Group) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 713 (Admin), the High Court held that the UK Government acted unlawfully in attempting to rely on a policy document as a substitute for a legislative measure to meet the requirements of the UK General Data Protection Regulation (“UK GDPR”) for an immigration-related exemption to the application of data protection rights.

Key points

  • The court accepted that exemptions to the application of UK GDPR rights can only be prescribed via a “legislative measure” which satisfies certain conditions such as being clear, precise, accessible, foreseeable and legally binding.
  • The court’s approach is of general relevance to situations where the Government seeks to use policy documents in a particular context rather than introducing legislation.
  • A policy document is more likely to be insufficient where a measure should be (i) legally binding; (ii) specific; and (iii) subject to Parliamentary scrutiny.

Background

The UK GDPR governs individuals’ rights in relation to their personal data. This case, heard by Saini J, concerned the Government’s second attempt to introduce an exemption (the “Immigration Exemption”) to these rights in cases where data is processed for “effective immigration control” by the Secretary of State (“SoS”). A claim was brought by two non-governmental organisations (the “Claimants”) against the Secretaries of State for the Home Department and for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (the “Defendants”), challenging this exemption.

Exemptions of this kind are permitted under Article 23(1) UK GDPR, but must comply with the requirements of Article 23(2) UK GDPR. The Immigration Exemption provided that certain UK GDPR rights did not apply to the SoS’ data processing for effective immigration control, subject to the SoS having “an immigration exemption policy document” in place (the “IEPD”). The SoS was required by the Immigration Exemption to “have regard” to the IEPD.

Reliance on the IEPD was introduced after a previous version of the Immigration Exemption was ruled unlawful by the Court of Appeal (R. (Open Rights Group and the3million) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 800). That judgment, which was not appealed by the Government, was read by Saini J as confirming that Article 23(2) UK GDPR required an exemption to be introduced through a “legislative measure”. Considering the Court of Appeal’s judgment and other related case law, Saini J summarised Article 23(2) UK GDPR as requiring that exemptions:

  • be made by legally binding legislation;
  • have “clear and precise” content, as well as be “accessible and foreseeable”; and
  • provide substantive and procedural conditions and safeguards.

The Claimants in the present case argued the Immigration Exemption remained unlawful, since its reliance on the IEPD meant it was not a legislative measure and did not satisfy the requirements above, which the judge described as basic Rule of Law requirements.

Judgment

Saini J ruled in favour of the Claimants, holding the Immigration Exemption unlawful. It was common ground between the parties that the IEPD was not a “legislative measure”, and thus could not have itself satisfied Article 23(2) UK GDPR.

Saini J agreed with the Defendants that the Immigration Exemption was sufficiently clear on certain issues even without the IEPD. However, the Claimants’ case succeeded as there was no legislative measure underlying the Immigration Exemption which directed an evaluation of the proportionality of restrictions on data rights (as argued in “Complaint 2”), the implementation of safeguards to prevent abuse or unlawful data handling (as argued in “Complaint 4”), or the appropriate handling of risks (as argued in “Complaint 6”).

The non-binding nature of policies

Saini J’s judgment placed emphasis throughout on the non-binding nature of the IEPD. In addressing Complaint 2, Saini J noted the requirement for proportionality analysis, entailing the balancing of considerations for and against a given restriction on rights. The Immigration Exemption did not include a requirement of this kind. Although the IEPD did require a proportionality analysis, its “non-binding” nature meant it was of no assistance to the Defendants. The requirement needed “to be identified with legislative force in the [amending regulations] themselves”.

A similar issue arose in Saini J’s consideration of Complaint 4 on safeguards. Saini J explained that data subjects would not be able to found a claim for breach of their UK GDPR rights based on any non-adherence to the IEPD by the SoS. Moreover, the SoS was only required to “have regard” to the IEPD, which was described as a “soft obligation in public law terms” and weaker than the public law obligation to act consistently with published policies, underscoring the inadequacy of the Immigration Exemption’s reliance on the IEPD to set safeguards.

Insufficient specificity

Saini J also highlighted the insufficient specificity of the Immigration Exemption’s framework. Again in respect of Complaint 4, Saini J noted how the IEPD failed to dictate the processes which the SoS should have had in place when relying on the Immigration Exception. Saini J commented that “the very wording of the [amending regulations] encourages a generalised, non-prescriptive document”, inadequate for safeguarding data subjects. Complaint 6 was upheld because the Immigration Exemption totally failed to include provisions on addressing the risks to data subjects arising from its use.

Parliamentary scrutiny

Additionally, Saini J’s reasoning was influenced by how the IEPD was not subject to Parliamentary scrutiny. The IEPD could “be changed without formality or any Parliamentary procedure”. Saini J went as far as to say that this meant that Parliamentary scrutiny of the Immigration Exemption itself was “in practice absent“. Whilst the Defendants highlighted the attraction of this point, which they said allowed the policy to be “nimble”, Article 23(2) UK GDPR required legislation or a code endorsed by Parliament”.

Comment

Saini J’s reasoning is of interest beyond the data protection and immigration contexts. The approach adopted will be of general relevance to other situations where the Government seeks to use policy documents rather than introduce formal legislation. Where statute requires a given result to be achieved through legislation, it will not be open to the Government to justify the use of a policy document instead due to its expedience or flexibility.

In circumstances where the Government increasingly uses policy documents and there are significant constraints on Parliamentary time to pass new legislation, this judgment is a signal from the High Court that the use of vague policy documents which potentially undercut Parliamentary scrutiny will be examined particularly closely.

Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
Partner
+44 20 7466 2066

Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
Partner
+44 20 7466 2465

Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
Professional Support Consultant
+44 20 7466 2998

The UK’S Retained EU Law Bill – what do you need to know?

Much has been written about the Retained EU law (Revocation and Reform) Bill (the “Bill“), which is currently going through Parliament. This Bill is the latest in the line of legal developments since a majority of the UK voted to leave the European Union in June 2016. Approaching seven years later, what is clear is how difficult the process of unwinding our body of law from that of the EU has been. In this post we aim to keep things simple and focus on some key issues, namely:

  1. What is the current position?
  2. What is the Bill aimed at and what does it purport to do?
  3. What has the reaction been?
  4. Why does it matter?

WHAT IS THE CURRENT POSITION?

The UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. A transition or implementation period existed until 11pm on 31 December 2020 (known as IP completion day). However, to avoid a cliff edge in terms of legal certainty, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (as amended by the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020) created the concept of Retained EU law (“REUL“). This was a new category of domestic law, which possesses most of the features of EU law and essentially froze EU law at the point immediately before IP completion day. It covers (1) EU-derived domestic legislation (i.e. legislation that implemented EU obligations including those under EU Directives); (2) direct EU legislation e.g. Regulations; and (3) other rights, powers liabilities etc. that had effect under s. 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972, which includes a wide range of EU law requirements that have affected the application of EU law and domestic law in the UK, including some aspects of the approach taken by UK Courts. Further, the interpretation of REUL should still take place in accordance with retained EU case law (i.e. such case law which pre-dates IP completion day, including that of the CJEU) and the familiar general principles of EU law such as proportionality and certainty.

The effect of this has been that, although the UK is technically and formally no longer bound by EU law or by decisions of the CJEU after IP completion day, the reality is that much EU law is still on our statute book. The current Bill is the attempt to finally sever those ties.

WHAT IS THE BILL AIMED AT AND WHAT DOES IT PURPORT TO DO?

The explanatory notes explain that the Bill facilitates the amendment, repeal and replacement of REUL by the end of 2023, and assimilates REUL remaining in force after that date by removing the special EU law features attached to it.

Sunset clauses

The headline point is a sweeping sunset clause in clause 1(1) which revokes all EU-derived subordinate legislation (but not primary legislation) and retained direct EU legislation at the end of 2023. However, there are some exceptions, most notably to any instrument or provision specified in regulations or having effect under an instrument or provision so specified (clause 2(1)(b)).

There is also an exception for transitional, transitory or saving provisions (clause 2(1)(d)), which the Government has explained is aimed at a number of areas where REUL has already been reformed and transitional, transitory or saving provisions made, whereby some aspects of the previous legislation were saved to support implementation of or transition to the new regime. The aim of the Bill is not to undo or revoke REUL reform that has already been made. Thus, this exception to the sunset will ensure the continued legal operation of REUL that has been identified as necessary to serve a particular purpose.

The most important area of different treatment is REUL relating to financial services.  This extensive body of law is identified in Schedule 1 to the Financial Services and Markets Bill, also currently going through Parliament. That legislation is the subject of a Treasury-led project to create the UK’s own Financial Services regime and gives the Treasury control of the repeal of this body of REUL law.

Outside this and other limited exceptions, unless an instrument or provision is “specified in regulations” it will be revoked automatically at the end of this year.

The theory is that each Government department will consider the REUL that affects its area and decide what to keep, which it will specify in regulations, and what to allow to be revoked. The Government has worded the exceptions to the sunset so as to remove the need to individually list large numbers of legislative instruments in order to preserve them, so for example minor instruments can be preserved by a broader description rather than individual specification, and once parent legislation is preserved, all subordinate instruments will also automatically be saved without needing individual review.

Even with those exceptions, this is clearly still a monumental task – in the House of Commons on 18 January the Government explained that 3,200 pieces of REUL had already been identified at that time and indicated that the number may rise to 4,000. In case a department is not able to complete its task by the end of this year, clause 3 does provide a power to extend that end date to any other date as long as it is no later than 23 June 2026, which is the ten year anniversary of the referendum itself. Perhaps rather ambitiously, the Government had originally indicated that this extension power was not intended for wide usage but only as a fail-safe in extenuating circumstances. In more recent briefings, it appears to be acknowledged that a good deal of the law will need to be extended in its current form. There will then be competition for legislative time to complete the transition to domestic law by the end of 2026.  As the Bill stands, it would require primary legislation to extend that final sunset date.

At present what will actually change remains largely a mystery outside the field of financial services. The government’s intention is to use their dashboard of REUL to notify the public of what will change, and what is likely to remain the same. Each department is carrying out their review separately and reporting, and it is currently not expected anything will be published until the overall picture has been considered separately. This makes it difficult to know how to proceed on agreements expected to be completed in 2024, because it is uncertain whether relevant legislation, such as the TUPE legislation related to business transfers, will still be in force.

Clause 4 provides the sunset clause for the other category of REUL – rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures derived from s 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 in force immediately before IP completion day.

Clause 5 makes it clear that the principle of supremacy of EU law is not part of domestic law after the end of 2023, regardless of when any underlying provision in question was made. Any retained direct EU legislation should now be interpreted, so far as possible, in a way that is compatible with domestic law and where incompatible, is “subject to” domestic law. This means retained direct EU legislation is effectively trumped by any domestic enactment, even if the domestic enactment is older.

Continuing the theme, clause 6 applies the same treatment to the general principles of EU law, so interpretation should no longer take place in accordance with these general principles. Presumably, although this is not explicit, normal common law principles of interpretation will be applied going forward.

To add to the unfamiliar terminology, after the end of 2023, REUL will be renamed “assimilated law” (clause 7). This will cover, for example, primary legislation which gives effect to EU law in domestic law, which is not affected by clause 1(1), and everything that the Government decides to save from automatic sunset by making specific regulations under clause 2. The explanatory notes suggest that this change of name is to reflect that the interpretive effects of EU law will no longer apply to this body of law once these changes have taken place.

Notably, there is no possibility of an extension to the sunset in relation to clauses 4-6, meaning directly effective EU law, the principle of supremacy and all general principles, will definitely come to an end at the end of 2023, although the Government can decide to reproduce the effect of some of these principles in specific situations.

The Bill also clarifies that clauses 4-6 do not apply in relation to anything occurring before the end of 2023 (clause 23(5)), although the same is not made explicit for the sunset in clause 1, leaving some confusion as to the treatment of causes of actions or rights accrued under legislation which is then revoked under clause 1. The expectation, in accordance with the general presumption against retrospectivity, must be that such causes of actions or rights would also not be affected by the Bill.

Interpretation and effect of REUL

The Bill then contains a section on interpretation and effect of REUL which starts in clause 8 by greater facilitating domestic courts departing from retained EU case law. A new test is set out for the higher courts (Court of Appeal and above) to consider when deciding whether or not to depart from retained EU case law (where the previous test was the same as that used by the Supreme Court when deciding whether to depart from its own previous decisions). Now the higher court must have regard to:

    • the fact that decisions of a foreign court are not (unless otherwise provided) binding;
    • any changes of circumstances which are relevant to the retained EU case law;
    • the extent to which the retained EU case law restricts the proper development of domestic law.

A similar, but slightly different, test is introduced for considering whether to depart from retained domestic case law.

Although these are simply factors the court has to consider, and do not explicitly point the court towards departing from retained case law, the explanatory notes make it clear that the Government considers that the UK courts should have greater freedom to develop case law on REUL that remains in force, in ways that are not unduly constrained by the continuing influence of previous EU case law. This clause has been described by commentators as a “nudge” to the courts to encourage greater departure from retained case law.

A new development under this clause is the introduction of a reference procedure, not dissimilar to references to the CJEU, whereby a lower court can refer points of law arising on retained case law to a higher court, if the lower court is bound by the retained case law and it considers that the point of law is of general public importance. The higher court will then decide the point of law only and the matter will be sent back to the lower court to apply that decision on the law to the facts before it.

This is an unusual process in the domestic field where normally our courts determine the dispute before them on the basis of the specific facts of the case. Now the appeal courts would be asked to determine questions of law in the abstract, leaving it to the lower court to then apply that ruling on the law to the facts. It is certainly interesting that in a Bill aimed at cutting all ties with the EU, in a legal sense we appear to be borrowing an established EU legal procedure.

If no reference is made during proceedings, there is the possibility of law officers making a similar type of reference within six months of lower court proceedings coming to a conclusion if there was a relevant point of law arising in the proceedings.  The outcome of such a reference would not impact the original decision, but would be binding on the point of law for future cases.

Another interesting concept which is familiar from the Human Rights Act is the idea of making an order where there is incompatibility. Clause 10 provides for these incompatibility orders, where REUL cannot be read compatibly with a domestic enactment, and the order can remove or limit any effect of the relevant provision as well as setting out the effect of the relevant provision in that particular case.

Modifying REUL

The Bill then includes various provisions about modifying and restating REUL. Essentially it will be easier for the Government to amend, restate or revoke large parts of REUL such as Regulations, often using only the negative resolution procedure in Parliament rather than the draft affirmative procedure, which reduces Parliamentary scrutiny. There is also an interesting question as to what counts as “restatement”, with the Government accepting that restatement should not substantively change the policy effect of legislation, but simply codify and clarify. However, since none of this restatement will be subject to any form of consultation or detailed scrutiny, if the drafters unintentionally change the meaning of a provision, or any mistakes creep in, those are not likely to be spotted until it is too late.

It is perhaps clause 16 of the Bill that has attracted the most attention, described as unprecedented from a constitutional perspective and dangerous. This creates a power to revoke and replace. Whilst on some occasions that replacement should be aimed at achieving “the same or similar objectives” as the measure being revoked (under 16(2)), that is not always the case. Clause 16(3) allows simply “such alternative provision as the relevant national authority considers appropriate” which the Government says is intended to cover similar ground to the REUL being replaced rather than creating new law in wholly unrelated policy areas. However this does not have to be used to achieve the same overarching objective but can be used for different objectives. There are some limits to this otherwise apparently unfettered power to “do whatever you like” as it has been called: for example, it cannot be used to create new criminal offences or levy taxes. The most unusual limit is that the clause 16 power can only be used where the national authority thinks that the overall effect of the changes in relation to a subject area does not increase the regulatory burden. Burden for these purposes includes cost, inconvenience and obstacles to innovation, trade, efficiency, productivity and profitability (16(10)). This is why clause 16 has been said to demonstrate that the Bill is one aimed at deregulation (in line with the Government’s message about “cutting red tape”), rather than improvement of standards.

WHAT HAS THE REACTION BEEN?

It is fair to say there have been significant concerns raised about the Bill.

Many prominent figures have voiced constitutional concerns about handing such significant power to the Executive and reducing the role of Parliament, including former Brexit secretary David Davis MP, describing the Bill as a “blank cheque” for the Executive. This was followed by a letter to the Times, from a cross party group of peers, also describing concerns over the Executive having power to change well established rights in numerous areas, and Parliament effectively being forced into rubber stamping proposals, for fear of the only alternative being no rules at all in a particular area come the end of the year.

The Law Society has raised fears about the Bill’s “devastating impact on legal certainty”. The director general of the Confederation of British Industry has also addressed the problem of uncertainty and confusion caused by this Bill, echoed by numerous other organisations.

Notably, the Regulatory Policy Committee was scathing about the Impact Assessment carried out for the Bill, concluding that it was “not fit for purpose” in that the Government had not sufficiently considered the full impacts of the Bill, particularly the impact on businesses.

By way of response to such concerns, DEFRA, the Department with the biggest job by far with over 1,700 pieces of REUL identified already, have indicated that their biggest priority will be to preserve what is needed before the end of 2023 and preservation will be the default approach for now unless there is good reason to revoke or amend REUL.

In this context, there are legitimate concerns over what will happen if a particular piece of REUL is simply not identified in time and therefore not specifically saved. In that situation it will be assumed to be revoked under clause 1, which highlights the risk that there will be unintended gaps in the legislative regime next year.

The Bill has now completed its Committee stage in the House of Lords with relatively few amendments, and has entered the report stage.  As anticipated, there were vehement objections raised in the Lords debate in Committee, with the Bill being described as “unacceptable” and noting that important rights may “disappear in a puff of smoke”. Others thought the Bill represented a “blatant attack on the powers of the UK parliament”. There are a large number of amendments tabled for the Report Stage, scheduled for 19th April, and it is possible the Bill will be further altered before returning to the Commons, given the constitutional concerns expressed by the Lords, and the full house consideration at this stage.

In debate the Government has been robust in not accepting the characterisation that these powers are unprecedented or weaken the scrutiny of Parliament, suggesting that many of these laws were themselves brought into force with no scrutiny of any kind by this Parliament and were merely directly imposed by Brussels. This treats the process in which most modern EU laws in the form of Directives and Regulations are adopted in “cooperation” with the elected European Parliament, including UK representatives, as unimportant to their characterisation.

WHY DOES IT MATTER?

The constitutional concerns and uncertainty are far-reaching problems that will impact all sectors, given the way EU law permeated every aspect of our lives.

This uncertainty for businesses and their legal advisers is troublesome and only becomes greater as time passes without much indication of what will be preserved or replaced in similar terms. Those responsible for affected business areas should review the Government dashboard which lists REUL already identified, although it should be noted that it is not necessarily exhaustive and is updated only intermittently, currently on a quarterly pattern.

For organisations that operate in areas heavily dependent on specific EU law, there is certainly something to be said for engaging in specific correspondence or discussions with the relevant Government department to ensure that key pieces of REUL in your area have not been missed. It will also be important to review any new Regulations that the relevant department does produce. New secondary legislation made in this way will be subject to challenge if it is defective, in the usual way, and that may well lead to further delays and uncertainty that extend far beyond the end of 2023.

Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
Partner
+44 20 7466 2066

Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
Partner
+44 20 7466 2465

Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
Professional Support Consultant
+44 20 7466 2998

Paul Butcher
Paul Butcher
Director of Public Policy
+44 20 7466 2844

Dorothy Livingston
Dorothy Livingston
Consultant
+44 20 7466 2061

High Court upholds decision maker’s broad discretion in relation to impact of emissions of proposed airport expansion

In Bristol Airport Action Network Co-ordinating Committee v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2023] EWHC 171 (Admin), the High Court dismissed a challenge brought primarily on climate change grounds by various local environmental groups and residents to the grant of planning permission for the expansion of Bristol Airport.

Key points

  • Planning authorities are entitled to consider in a generalised way whether emissions from a proposed development would materially affect the UK’s ability to meet its carbon budgets and targets.
  • Local decision makers may assume that separate pollution control regimes will operate effectively in respect of the emissions from a proposed development.
  • Aviation carbon emissions are primarily to be considered at a national, rather than local, level in accordance with Government policy.

Background

The first interested party, Bristol Airport Ltd (“BAL“), applied to North Somerset Council (“the Council“) for planning permission to increase its capacity by about 2 million passengers per year. The application was refused by the Council, but BAL’s appeal against that refusal was allowed, following an inquiry by a panel of planning inspectors (the “Panel“).

In relation to climate change issues, the claimant alleged that the Panel erred in:

  1. Its interpretation that the Council’s development plan policies did not directly address aviation emissions;
  2. Its interpretation of the national policy “Making Best – Use of Existing Runways” (“MBU”);
  3. Finding that it was required to “assume” that the Secretary of State (“SoS“) would comply with his duty under the Climate Change Act 2008 (“CCA“), as per paragraph 188 of the National Planning Policy Framework (“NPPF”);
  4. Failing to consider the impact on the local carbon budget for the Council; and
  5. Its conclusion that the impact of non-CO2 emissions could be excluded from the Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA“) prepared by BAL and should not weigh in the balance against the proposed expansion.

In the alternative, the claimant submitted that the Panel failed to give adequate reasons.

Judgment

Lane J dismissed each of the grounds raised by the claimant, including the reasons challenge. In large part, the case was about the key question underpinning the inquiry (to which there was no substantial dissent): whether emissions from the proposal would be so significant that they would materially affect the ability of the UK to meet its carbon budgets and the target of net zero by 2050.

Ground 1

In relation to Ground 1, the court noted the principle in Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee CC [2012] UKSC 13, that planning policy statements are not to be construed as statutory or contractual provisions.

Although the relevant policies here were broad enough to encompass the issue of aviation emissions, they did not seek to articulate how the Council should address that issue as a planning authority. Aviation emissions, which can occur at any point during an aircraft’s journey to and from the airport, are clearly of a different character to other forms of emissions that can be reduced in the Council’s own area. The Panel was entitled to conclude that aviation emissions should be addressed “indirectly“, meaning they would only become relevant if they were likely to have a material impact on the SoS’ ability to meet his climate targets and budgets (which the Panel did not consider to be the case here). Aviation emissions were not, therefore, a material consideration against BAL.

Ground 2

The court found that the Panel considered carbon emissions from all sources, including aviation, in detail. Referring back to the key question, the court noted that planning authorities are entitled to make judgments of a generalised nature about the likelihood of a proposal harming the achievement of a national target. The MBU, read as a whole, also showed that the admitted increase in CO2 emissions was a matter for national, not local, decision-making.

Ground 3

The claimant’s main argument was that the Panel erred in law in treating the CCA and the various duties placed on the SoS under it as a “separate pollution control regime” that would operate effectively, relying on the different approach taken in relation to air quality in Gladman Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and others [2019] EWCA Civ 1543.

Lane J explained that the relationships between local and national decision-making in the areas of air quality and emissions from aviation are significantly different, with the latter controlled at the national level pursuant to the CCA, including through trading schemes by contrast to air quality issues which have a significant and discrete local element. Disapplying the assumption in paragraph 188 of the NPPF, that other regimes would operate effectively, would lead local decision makers into an area of national policy with which they are not directly concerned.

Ground 4

The court found that the impact of the proposal on the Council’s local carbon budget was only a consideration “to which the decision-maker may have regard if, in their judgment and discretion, they think it is right to do”, (the third category of ‘relevant considerations’ summarised in R (Friends of the Earth Limited) v Heathrow Airport Limited [2020] UKSC 52 (“Friends of the Earth“).

Given the decision letter demonstrated that the Panel engaged with the issue before concluding that it had no basis in law or policy, and therefore giving it no weight, the claimant failed to overcome the high threshold of irrationality. Lane J reiterated the court’s concern not to adopt a stance which may result in it wrongly substituting its own view on weight for that of the decision-maker.

Ground 5

The claimant submitted that the impact of non-CO2 emissions was a matter of critical importance to determining the impact of the airport’s expansion on climate change and should have been in the environmental statement.

Lane J referred to the “well-established” position that EIA compliance is a matter of planning judgment, challengeable only on a Wednesbury basis. The EIA did not ignore the non-CO2 emissions but noted the uncertain state of scientific knowledge regarding their assessment, and their present exclusion from domestic and international legislation and targets. Accordingly, the EIA did not disclose a ‘patent defect’ that the Panel unlawfully failed to recognise. Applying Friends of the Earth, leaving a matter about which there is scientific uncertainty for further consideration within the development process did not breach the precautionary principle.

Comment

This judgment, which began by acknowledging the “very great importance” of climate change and the international consensus on the need to reduce CO2 emissions, is the latest in a growing line of climate change challenges. In a decision that will be welcomed by the aviation industry, the court afforded a wide margin of discretion to the Panel’s assessment of the impact of the proposed expansion on the ability of the UK to meet its carbon budgets, and reiterated its very limited role as regards to the application of policy and weight to be given to various factors.

The judgment also contains useful guidance on evaluating emissions in EIAs, particularly in respect of non-CO2 emissions. In light of significant scientific uncertainty, it was open to BAL to leave the issues to be dealt with when the science allowed. Scientific developments in this area could shift the dial on the need to address non-CO2 emissions.

Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
Partner
+44 20 7466 2066

Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
Partner
+44 20 7466 2465

Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
Professional Support Consultant
+44 20 7466 2998

Katie-Scarlett Wetherall
Katie-Scarlett Wetherall
Associate
+44 20 7466 3843

High Court quashes refusal of development consent for energy project

Judgment was handed down in the High Court today by Mrs Justice Lieven in the case of R (on the application of AQUIND Limited) v Secretary of State for BEIS and others [2023] EWHC 98 (Admin). Mrs Justice Lieven found in favour of the Claimant, AQUIND Limited, represented by Herbert Smith Freehills LLP. The judgment results in the quashing of the decision of the Secretary of State to refuse development consent for the AQUIND Interconnector.

The proceedings related to AQUIND’s application for development consent to build an electric power cable between the south coast of England and Normandy in France. The cable would have the capacity to transmit approximately 5% and 3% per annum of the total consumption of electricity of the UK and France respectively. The Planning Inspectorate’s examination of its application began in September 2020 and concluded in March 2021. Following the examination, in January 2022, the Secretary of State for BEIS ultimately decided to refuse development consent for the project on the basis of AQUIND’s assessment of an alternative to the proposed route of the cable, located in Mannington, Dorset. This decision was held to be unlawful.

The case centred on the issue of alternatives and the claim was successful on 4 out of 7 grounds, as follows:

  1. Failure to take into account relevant evidence relating to alternatives;
  2. Failure to discharge the duty of the decision-maker to have regard to any relevant national policy statement under section 104 of the Planning Act 2008;
  3. Failure to apply policies in the Overarching National Policy Statement For Energy (NPS EN-1) relating to the assessment of alternatives; and
  4. Breach of the Tameside duty of the decision-maker to take reasonable steps to acquaint themselves with the relevant information so as to be able to discharge their statutory duties.

On the Secretary of State’s failure to comply with the Planning Act 2008 and Overarching National Policy Statement For Energy (NPS EN-1), Mrs Justice Lieven stated that: “If the SoS was going to rely upon the failure to properly consider an alternative, as he did here, then he had to do so applying the policy approach in EN-1 4.4.3; or explaining why he intended to depart from the policy. It is a trite proposition that an applicant for development consent is entitled to rely on policy, particularly in this statutory scheme, an NPS, and if the decision maker wishes to depart from it, he has to explain why.

In relation to the requirement of the Tameside duty in this case, Mrs Justice Lieven held that the Secretary of State had acted irrationally in failing to make proper inquiries, stating that: “the ExA had found a strong need case in favour of the development which clearly outweighed the harm found. The consequence of this was that in the ExA’s view there was a significant public interest in the development. It should be noted that the Claimant contended, and the ExA accepted, that the development could meet 4-5% of the UK’s electricity need with the obvious public benefits that would follow. The level of this public benefit meant that any reasonable SoS would have inquired into the feasibility and viability of Mannington before rejecting the development on the purely speculative basis that it might provide an alternative to Lovedean.

The decision as to whether to grant Development Consent for the AQUIND Interconnector will now be remitted back to the Secretary of State, who will reconsider the position and take a fresh decision.

Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
Partner
+44 20 7466 2066

Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
Partner
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Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
Professional Support Consultant
+44 20 7466 2998

THE UK’S PROPOSED NEW FOREIGN INFLUENCE REGISTRATION SCHEME: SIGNIFICANT UNINTENDED CHALLENGES

The National Security Bill, currently before the House of Lords on a shortened timetable, raises significant challenges for a wide range of businesses and others with international dimensions or interests, including charities, NGOs, institutions and other friendly international bodies. In essence, the Bill requires all foreign organisations, including companies, LLPs and unincorporated associations, whether businesses, charities or otherwise, to register publicly each of their interactions with UK policy and decision makers.

The main scheme can be described, in brief, as follows:

  • Public registration requirements fall on almost all foreign entities (even if fully UK based and operated), with no focus on national security related characteristics. In addition to all foreign organisations, a foreign subsidiary of a UK business would fulfil the criteria to be caught by requirements of the scheme. Similarly, a UK subsidiary of a foreign organisation where directed (or worried about the perception of direction) by its parent would be caught.
  • The scheme relates to a swathe of activities with no focus on national security related characteristics. Any routine UK / regulatory decisions for business from whatever branches of Government are included. E.g. BEIS, the CMA, Ofgem, HMRC and so on, would have to be assumed to be in scope in practice in circumstances where the content might involve civil servants of deputy director (or equivalent) in correspondence or meetings. Any engagement with such officials in relation to public policy debates which are live in any UK parliament are also in scope, as is engagement with any MP, MSP, MS or peer to influence on anything (the latter not limited to government decisions or policy).
  • The information required has limited confidentiality exemptions and is unusually intrusive.

Our HSF colleagues, James Palmer (Partner and former Chair and Senior Partner) and Paul Butcher (Director of Public Policy) have produced an in-depth briefing on this issue, including examples of potential unintended impacts, which can be read here: THE UK’S PROPOSED NEW FOREIGN INFLUENCE REGISTRATION SCHEME: SIGNIFICANT UNINTENDED CHALLENGES | Herbert Smith Freehills | Global law firm.

Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
Partner
+44 20 7466 2066

Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
Partner
+44 20 7466 2465

James Palmer
James Palmer
Partner
+44 20 7466 2327

Paul Butcher
Paul Butcher
Director of Public Policy
+44 20 7466 2844

Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
Professional Support Consultant
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Court rejects challenge to new food regulations designed to tackle childhood obesity

In R. (on the application of Kellogg Marketing and Sales Co (UK) Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWHC 1710 (Admin) the High Court dismissed all four grounds of a challenge brought by Kellogg to the Food (Promotions and Placement) (England) Regulations 2021 (SI 2021/1368) (the “Regulations”).

Key Points

  • The courts will take a deferential approach to policy decisions involving weighing up competing interests, particularly in areas such as public health.
  • There is no rule that prohibits the incorporation of extraneous documents into a statutory instrument by reference, provided this is permitted under the enabling legal provision.

Background

The Regulations (due to come into force on 1 October 2022) introduce restrictions on the promotion of food classified as high in fat, sugar or salt (“HFSS“) and therefore considered “less healthy”, as part of the Government’s strategy to tackle childhood obesity. The assessment of whether a particular food is “less healthy” depends on the score given under the Food Standards Agency’s existing Nutrient Profiling Model (“NPM“) which is incorporated into the Regulations by reference along with the associated technical guidance (together the “NPTG“).

Regulation 10 provides that an improvement notice may be issued by an enforcement authority where it has reasonable grounds for believing that a food proprietor is failing to comply with the Regulations. In making this provision, the Defendant relied on the authorisation contained within the Food Safety Act 1990 (the “FSA“), specifically Section 10 FSA which concerns the regulations of food preparation processes and hygiene practices (or as extended by Section 48(1) FSA “matters similar”). Section 16 FSA also enables further provisions to be made by regulation in the interest of food safety and consumer protection.  

Following the classification of a number of Kellogg breakfast cereals as “less healthy” the Claimants sought to challenge the Regulations on four grounds:

Ground 1: Regulation 10 is ultra vires as Section 10 FSA does not permit the issue of improvement notices for the subject matters concerned in the Regulations.

Ground 2: The incorporation of the NPTG by reference, as opposed to by inclusion in the statutory instrument itself, is ultra vires.

Ground 3: The Defendant failed to adequately consider the appropriateness of assessing cereal as sold (i.e. without milk) rather than as consumed (i.e. with milk), and this failure amounts to irrationality.

Ground 4: The assessment of cereal without milk disproportionately infringes the Claimants’ right to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions contrary to Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“A1P1 ECHR“).

Judgment

Ground 1

The Claimants contended that Section 10 FSA does not confer a power to enact regulations which expand the scope for issuing improvement notices, and that Regulation 10 therefore has the effect of amending primary legislation.

The court dismissed the argument that the Defendant had sought to amend primary legislation on account of the fact that Regulation 10 is a free-standing mechanism which “enlarges” the power to issue improvement notices in a way that is consistent with the aims of the FSA rather than altering Sections 10 and 11 FSA.

The court then addressed the question of whether the relevant FSA provisions confer a power on the Defendant to enact Regulation 10. After considering the relevant statutory provisions in detail, Linden J did not accept that there was any real doubt as to the existence of the power.

Ground 2

As conceded by the Claimants, there is no rule which forbids the incorporation by a statutory instrument of rules set out in an extraneous document. Whether or not this is permitted in a given case therefore depends on the construction of the enabling provision. The Claimants referred to Section 16 FSA which permits the Defendant to make provisions “by regulations [emphasis added]” to suggest that the reliance on the NPTG (which is not contained within the Regulations directly) was ultra vires. The court rejected the notion that this formulation created a requirement for the whole provision to be contained in one document and suggested that “it would be surprising if the position were otherwise” given the detailed scientific analysis which, though important, need not be spelt out in the statutory instrument.

It is worth noting here that the court also reiterated that the incorporated document must be in existence at the time the statutory instrument is laid before Parliament, and that “the effect of it becoming law is that it cannot then be changed without following whatever legislative process is required to amend or replace the statutory instrument itself”.

Ground 3A

Grounds 3A and 3B both centred on what the Claimants refer to as “the milk issue“. The Claimants argued that the Defendant was irrational in failing to conduct an assessment of the appropriateness of determining the nutritional profile of breakfast cereals without taking into account the fact that they are normally consumed with milk. Had the nutritional value of the milk been considered alongside that of the cereal, fewer products would have become subject to the restrictions imposed by the Regulations.

The court accepted that the Defendant had not been asked in any Ministerial submission to reassess the issues ventilated in formulating the existing NPM nor the process by which they were decided and the question therefore was whether the Defendant was bound to consider these matters or make further inquiries into them (as per the Tameside principle). The court concluded he was not, reasoning that it was open to him to make further inquiries as necessary (indeed he did so) and ultimately he “evidently considered that he was sufficiently well informed“.

Furthermore, the court highlighted that the relevant matters had been carefully considered in the course of the development and review of the NPM by various experts over a period of years. There had then been ample opportunity to raise the point again in a 2019 public consultation, in response to which the Claimants did not raise these issues. The court held that, “the approach stated in the NPM had been applied for more than a decade without controversy” and simply because the Claimants sought to re-open decisions taken more than a decade earlier and re-taken in 2021 “at the eleventh hour” did not render those decisions irrational or mean it would be irrational for the Defendant to proceed without making further inquiries.

Ground 3B

The court acknowledged that there was no dispute that A1P1 was engaged and that the question was therefore whether the Defendant could justify the relevant infringements, with the dispute between the parties focusing on proportionality. The court noted that although the Defendant did not personally consider the issues now raised by the Claimants under Grounds 3A and 3B, these issues were considered at length and in detail by various experts and expert bodies, including state bodies, in the period 2004-2009. The court found that the Defendant was clearly aware of the relevant considerations, and that he “evidently considered that the public interest and considerations of public health outweighed the detrimental impact on business of the measures“.

The court went on to conduct a broad analysis in which it noted that “the addition of milk does not alter the nutritional profile of the products themselves” and that the move to an “as consumed” approach would reduce the effectiveness of the NPM by introducing multiple points of uncertainty in the assessment.

The court concluded that the Defendant’s approach was both proportionate and rational.

Comment

In this judgment the court took a robust approach to the various grounds of challenge brought by the Claimants, which is to be expected in an area of social policy such as health. In relation to Ground 3 in particular, the court emphasised that “[t]his is a case in which a significant degree of deference should be accorded to the decision marker(s)“. Despite this deferential approach the courts conducted an analysis of the practical implications of the “milk issue” from various perspectives, but the court was ultimately dismissive of the notion that the NPM as currently applied would cause unfairness to the Claimants or arbitrariness in the effects on their business.

The court’s comments in relation to ground 3A demonstrate the importance of engaging early in the regulatory process and raising key legal arguments before the decision maker takes a final decision. A failure to do so is likely to weaken the ability to challenge the final decision.

Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
Partner
+44 20 7466 2066

Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
Partner
+44 20 7466 2465

Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
Of Counsel
+44 20 7466 2998

The long-awaited Procurement Bill goes before Parliament: 10 key features

The much-anticipated Procurement Bill was laid before the UK Parliament on 11 May and has already received its first reading in the House of Lords.   Once enacted, the Bill will overhaul the existing regulations governing the award of public and utility contracts in the UK (other than Scotland).  These outgoing regulations are based closely on EU Directives, which the Government sees as outdated and overly bureaucratic.  Following completion of the Parliamentary process, the Bill will become the Procurement Act and is likely to enter into force in 2023.

The Bill implements most of the changes foreseen in the Government’s Green Paper of December 2020 on transforming public procurement, as modified in its response to the Green Paper consultation, issued in December 2021.  We covered these developments here and here.

The Bill is a long and complicated instrument, running to well over 100 pages.  We outline and comment on ten of the Bill’s main features below.  We will closely monitor the Bill’s progress through Parliament and issue further updates in due course.

The Procurement Bill

A single Act consolidating four previously separate sets of regulations

As foreseen in the Green Paper, the Procurement Bill will replace the four separate sets of regulations that are currently applicable in England, Wales and Northern Ireland: namely, the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, the Utilities Contracts Regulations 2016, the Concession Contracts Regulations 2016 and the Defence & Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011.

The Bill will therefore ensure that all of the procurement regulations applicable in the UK (outside Scotland) can be found in a single instrument.  This consolidation is to be welcomed, but does mean that the Bill’s provisions are littered with detailed carve-outs and exceptions applicable only to utilities, concessions or defence.

Familiar provisions, but substantially re-worded and re-ordered

The Bill covers almost all of the provisions found in the current regulations, but these are extensively re-worded and re-ordered.  For example, the voluminous rules on scope (relevant entities and contracts), exemptions, technical specifications, contract modifications and court remedies remain substantively similar, but have all been rewritten in a more British style.

New terminology

Underlining the last point, the Bill introduces a lot of new terminology.  For example:

  • Excludable supplier, for bidders falling within a discretionary exclusion ground
  • Treaty state supplier, for bidders from countries with which the UK has a free trade agreement, giving them equal access to UK public contracts.
  • Planned procurement notice, instead of prior information notice (PIN)
  • Tender notice, instead of contract notice
  • Dynamic markets, in place of dynamic purchasing systems
  • Most advantageous tender, replacing most economically advantageous tender
  • Order setting aside the contract, instead of a declaration of ineffectiveness.
  • Contract details notice, instead of a contract award notice.

Increased use of Schedules

It is noticeable that many of the core provisions which appear in the main body of the current regulations are relegated to the 11 schedules at the back of the Bill.  These include the extensive provisions on exempted contracts (Schedule 2), valuation of contracts (Schedule 3), grounds justifying direct awards (Schedule 5), bidder exclusion grounds (Schedules 6 and 7) and permitted contract modifications (Schedule 8).

The increased use of Schedules arguably makes the text less user-friendly, as readers will frequently need to scroll between the front and back ends of the Act in order to ascertain the full picture on any particular point.

A simpler, less-regulated competitive award procedure

The above aspects of the Bill could be described as mere window-dressing, but the Bill does also include some more substantive changes.  In our view, the most important is the new “competitive award procedure”.  This single, flexible procedure, which authorities may structure largely as they see fit, will replace four existing procedures: namely, the restricted procedure, competitive dialogue, the competitive procedure with negotiation, and innovation partnerships.  The current plethora of overlapping procedures is unnecessary and confusing.  Rolling them into one, flexible process is a genuine improvement.

Greater scope to adjust procurements mid-process

Another helpful innovation is an express provision (clause 31 of the Bill) allowing contracting authorities to make non-substantial modifications to the terms of a procurement at any time before the deadline for submitting tenders.  In a similar vein, clause 23 allows an authority to refine its award criteria at any time before it invites bidders to submit their tenders.

Open frameworks

The Bill retains most of the existing rules on framework agreements, including their prima facie maximum duration of four years.  However, as foreseen in the Green Paper, the Bill also introduces a new option, called “open frameworks” (clause 47).   These are successive frameworks which may last for a total period of 8 years, provided the framework is re-opened to competition at least once during its first three years and once in the subsequent 5 years.  It is debateable whether this rather complicated new option offers any real improvement on the current possibility of awarding two (or more) successive frameworks of four years each.

Increased transparency – and red tape

Another recurring theme of the Bill is the requirement for increased transparency.  In particular, contracting authorities will be required to publish various new types of notice.  In addition to the PINs, contract notices and award notices that already have to be published (and which will be re-named, as noted above), the Bill provides for at least seven new types of notice:

  • Preliminary market engagement notice (clause 18 of the Bill)
  • Transparency notice (before any direct award) (clause 43)
  • Payment compliance notice (clause 64)
  • Contract change notice (clause 69)
  • Contract termination notice (clause 72)
  • Below-threshold tender notice (clause 79)
  • Pipeline notice (clause 82)

Furthermore, before entering into any contract worth more than £2 million, the Bill (clause 50) requires the contracting authority to set and publish at least three key performance indicators (KPIs).  The authority must then publish an assessment against those KPIs at least every 12 months during the contract’s term (clause 66).

Greater transparency has its merits, but these new publication requirements will impose a significant administrative burden on contracting authorities.  One of the Government’s stated aims in overhauling the regulations was to make the rules less bureaucratic, but these new publicity requirements will entail more “red tape”, not less.

A (slightly) modified remedies regime

Part 9 of the Bill makes only modest adjustments to the existing remedies regime.  As expected, the more radical changes floated in the Green Paper, including a cap on damages and the introduction of a specialised procurement tribunal, have been dropped.

The most significant change in this part of the Bill is a newly-worded test to be applied by courts when deciding whether to lift the automatic suspension on contract-making.  The new test requires courts to take into account the public interest in ensuring compliance with procurement law and in avoiding delays to public contracts, as well as the private interests of suppliers and whether damages would be an adequate remedy for the claimant.  In reality, however, these matters are already taken into account under the existing “balance of convenience” test derived from the American Cyanamid case.

Debriefing of unsuccessful bidders still required

Somewhat surprisingly, the Green Paper proposed abandoning the requirement that authorities send debrief letters (often called standstill or Alcatel letters) to unsuccessful tenderers before signing the contract with the winning bidder.  The Bill, however, requires authorities to send an “assessment summary” to each tenderer which sets out information about the authority’s assessment of that tenderer’s tender and the tender of the winning bidder (clause 48).  Although the nature of the required information is not specified, this sounds like a debrief letter in all but name.

Conclusion

Overall, the Bill delivers upon most of the changes foreseen in the Green Paper.  However, as outlined above, many of these changes are somewhat cosmetic in nature and do not fundamentally alter the underlying substance.  Moreover, the sheer length and complexity of the Bill calls into question whether it achieves the Government’s original stated aims of simplifying the procurement rules and making them less burdensome for the public sector, utilities and their suppliers.

Tim Briggs
Tim Briggs
Partner
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Adrian Brown
Adrian Brown
Partner
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Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
Partner
+44 20 7466 2465

Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
Partner
+44 20 7466 2066

Rachel Lidgate
Rachel Lidgate
Partner
+44 20 7466 2418

Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
Of Counsel
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Constitutional All Change? The Judicial Review and Courts Act, the Brexit Freedoms Bill and a new Bill of Rights

Recent weeks have seen a number of notable developments concerning new or proposed legislation which could have a wide-ranging impact on aspects of public and administrative law. In particular:

  • The Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 has recently received Royal Assent and introduces, amongst other things, changes to remedies in judicial review.
  • The Queen’s Speech, delivered on 11 May 2022, revealed the Government’s legislative agenda for the Parliamentary year ahead, including the introduction of a Bill of Rights and a Brexit Freedoms Bill which could impact claims based on human rights and retained EU law respectively, going forward.

The Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 (the “JRCA“)

On 28 April 2022, the JRCA received Royal Assent (though the relevant provisions discussed below have not yet come into force). The JRCA will introduce a number of changes to judicial review, which we detail further below. You can also listen to our views on the draft bill here.

(i) Quashing orders

Section 1 of the JRCA amends the Senior Courts Act 1981 to provide for two new types of quashing order, which can be made with or without conditions:

  • A suspended quashing order (“SQO“) which may provide that quashing does not take effect until a date specified in the order. The impugned decision or act will be valid until that date. The purpose of having a period of suspension would be to retain some certainty in a period where the original decision is valid, whilst allowing the public body time to re-evaluate its decision before the date of suspension.
  • A prospective quashing order (“PQO“) which may remove or limit any retrospective effect of the quashing. The effect of a PQO would be that only future acts or decisions would be affected.

In deciding whether to make an SQO or PQO, the court must take into account factors such as:

  • The nature and circumstances of the relevant defect;
  • Any resulting detriment to good administration;
  • The interests or expectations of persons who would benefit from the quashing;
  • The interests or expectations of persons who have relied on the impugned act; and
  • Any other matter that appears relevant to the court.

Notably, the Government accepted the House of Lords’ proposal to remove the presumption that either an SQO or PQO should be granted where this offered adequate redress, unless there was a good reason not to do so. We welcome this amendment as it gives the courts greater discretion as to the use of these new remedies.

(ii) Exclusion of review of an Upper Tribunal decision to refuse permission to appeal a First-tier Tribunal decision.

Section 2 of the JRCA 2022 amends the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 by providing that where the Upper Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, that decision is described as “final and not liable to be questioned or set aside in any other court” (subject to certain limited exceptions). This is a legislative attempt to ensure that such a decision should not be amenable to judicial review. The purpose of this was to partially reverse the decision in R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28.

The Queen’s Speech

The Queen’s Speech, along with its accompanying Background Briefing Notes, provided some detail on legislative developments which may have an effect on the nature and/or scope of public law claims going forward.

(i) A new Bill of Rights

The Government announced its intention to introduce a Bill of Rights which is likely to impact the approach to human rights claims in the UK going forward. This announcement is a further step pursuant to the Government’s intention to “restore the balance of power between the legislature and the courts” through the proposed Bill of Rights.

According the Background Briefing Notes, the main elements of the Bill are:

  • Establishing the primacy of UK case law, clarifying there is no requirement to follow the Strasbourg case law and that UK Courts cannot interpret rights in a more expansive manner than the Strasbourg Court.
  • Ensuring that UK courts can no longer alter legislation contrary to its ordinary meaning and constraining the ability of the UK courts to impose ‘positive obligations’ on our public services without proper democratic oversight by restricting the scope for judicial legislation.
  • Guaranteeing spurious cases do not undermine public confidence in human rights so that courts focus on genuine and credible human rights claims. The responsibility to demonstrate a significant disadvantage before a human rights claim can be heard in court will be placed on the claimant.
  • Recognising that responsibilities exist alongside rights by changing the way that damages can be awarded in human rights claims, for example by ensuring that the courts consider the behaviour of the claimant when considering making an award.”

As outlined in our previous blog post here, this development was foreshadowed in the Government’s consultation to overhaul the existing human rights regime in the UK by replacing the Human Rights Act 1998 with a new Bill of Rights (the “HRA Consultation“). HSF’s views on the HRA Consultation were discussed here and in March we published HSF’s response to the consultation.

Proposals envisaged in the HRA Consultation included providing guidance to the courts on how to apply the principle of proportionality and requiring a ‘permission stage’ for human rights claims in order to ‘weed out frivolous or unmeritorious claims’. However, the extent to which the specific proposals in the HRA Consultation will be carried forward in the draft wording of the Bill of Rights remains to be seen. It is therefore unclear what precise impact any new Bill of Rights will have on the scope of and approach to human rights claims, but it is possible that the impact could be significant.

(ii) The Brexit Freedoms Bill

Following the UK’s departure from the EU, the Government has also announced an intention to introduce a Brexit Freedoms Bill. This has the potential to enable further divergence from EU law going forward. The stated purpose of the Bill is to “end the supremacy of European law and seize the benefits of Brexit“. The main elements of the Bill are stated to be:

  • Creating new powers to strengthen the ability to amend, repeal or replace the large amounts of retained EU law by reducing the need to always use primary legislation to do so.
  • Removing the supremacy of retained EU law as it still applies in the UK.
  • Clarifying the status of retained EU law in UK domestic law to reflect the fact that much of it became law without going through full democratic scrutiny in the UK Parliament.”

The focus on the Bill therefore appears to be on EU retained law (i.e. some EU law measures which were effectively transferred into domestic law and ‘retained’ as UK law following the end of the Brexit transition period). This approach was taken in relation to a significant volume of EU legislation and according to the Queen’s Speech briefing paper, “the Government’s review of retained EU law has, to date, identified over 1,400 pieces of EU-derived law that have been transferred into UK law.”

The proposals for the Brexit Freedoms Bill could have an impact on public law claims founded upon EU retained law going forward. For example, currently, a piece of retained EU law in our domestic legislation may be similar (if not the same) in substance to the original EU law measure on which it was based. This means that post-Brexit, any claim based on that piece of retained EU law may be similar in substance to a claim that would have been based on the original EU law measure before Brexit. However, the Brexit Freedoms Bill appears to envisage facilitating amendments / replacements of retained EU law. This could create potential for greater (and possibly more accelerated) divergence of our domestic law from EU law measures.

Conclusion

Each of the developments discussed above has the potential for far-reaching implications. Taken together they give a strong indication of the Government’s wish for Parliament and the Executive to “take back control”, whether that be by moving away from EU law or the influence of the European Court of Human Rights, or encouraging the courts in judicial review cases to consider allowing unlawful acts to remain valid at least for some period of time.  It is also interesting to see a further attempt to use an ouster clause. It remains to be seen how the courts will interpret and apply these new provisions once they are included in legislation and come into force.

Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
Partner
+44 20 7466 2066

Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
Partner
+44 20 7466 2465

Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
Of Counsel
+44 20 7466 2998

Hannah Lau
Hannah Lau
Associate
+44 20 7466 2314

HSF responds to the Government’s consultation on human rights reform

The main window for response to the Government’s consultation paper on the reform of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA“) has now closed. The consultation paper proposed an overhaul of the existing human rights regime in the UK by replacing the HRA with a new Bill of Rights. The proposals involved giving greater legislative guidance to courts on key human rights issues, tweaking some of the existing legislation, and cultivating a distinctly British angle to domestic human rights law. A summary of the proposals can be read here.

In this blog post, we summarise some of the key aspects of our response to the consultation paper. In general, we think the system works well as it currently stands. We are concerned that changes may result in misalignment with the jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR“). Such misalignment is likely to cause more cases to seek redress directly from the ECtHR, defeating the original purpose of the HRA, which was to make rights accessible domestically. We also consider that the courts are best placed to determine human rights law, and therefore we warn against an overly prescriptive legislative regime that may inhibit the courts’ discretion. Please see below for more detail on some of the key issues. You can find our full response here.

  • Reform of section 2 concerning the status of Strasbourg caselaw. We do not consider it necessary to ‘soften’ the wording of section 2 or to explicitly suggest that domestic courts can draw on a wide range of sources when determining human rights issues. We believe that the current arrangements strike the right balance: they indicate that courts should generally align themselves with case law from the ECtHR while allowing for departure in appropriate cases.
  • Reform of section 3 concerning how legislation should be interpreted. We think that any attempt to provide more guidance in legislation that courts should consider the will of Parliament is not likely to have a significant effect. Courts already accept that section 3 cannot be used to ‘go against the grain’ of the legislation. Adjusting section 3 is likely to cause confusion and bring our domestic jurisprudence out of step with that of the ECtHR.
  • Permission stage. Our view is that a permission stage for human rights cases would not be desirable but would simply make the process of bringing a claim more expensive and cumbersome. Additionally, if the proposed ‘significant disadvantage’ test creates a higher threshold than the current ‘victim’ test, there is a risk that meritorious claims will not be heard. It may be that there are cases where the full extent of the harm caused to the claimant does not come fully to light at the permission stage.
  • Reduction of liability for public authorities. We do not support the proposed attempts to reduce the liability of public authorities. Regarding the proposals to limit the extent of public bodies’ positive obligations, although we accept that positive obligations do place a burden on public authorities, we think that in some circumstances they are necessary in order to give proper effect to rights. Equally, we do not think that public bodies should be afforded a greater defence when acting in accordance with the will of Parliament than that already present in section 6(2) of the HRA.
  • Proportionality. Proportionality is an inherently flexible principle that does not lend itself well to codification. Legislative guidance on the principle is likely to lead to uncertainty and unnecessary litigation. Moreover, our view is that any change is unnecessary. Courts already give significant deference to Parliament and the executive on appropriate matters. Legislative guidance on the principle of proportionality is likely to restrict the courts’ ability to apply the principle flexibly.
  • Declarations of incompatibility. We contend that while the declaration of incompatibility mechanism works well in relation to primary legislation, it is not necessary in the context of secondary legislation, because the same democratic concerns do not arise. Secondary legislation is normally passed quickly by ministers without, in practice, Parliamentary scrutiny. We do not think that the declaration of incompatibility mechanism should replace the courts’ existing power, explained in RR (AP) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2019] UKSC 52, to disapply secondary legislation.
  • Remedies. We do not think that any more guidance is needed for courts to determine the quantum of damages in human rights cases. The courts already take into account a wide range of considerations when determining the quantum of damages and are best placed to make fact-specific assessments in each case to achieve an equitable outcome.
Andrew Lidbetter
Andrew Lidbetter
Partner
+44 20 7466 2066
Nusrat Zar
Nusrat Zar
Partner
+44 20 7466 2465
Jasveer Randhawa
Jasveer Randhawa
Of Counsel
+44 20 7466 2998